Jaaz Alexander Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 16, 2016
• Docket: 79A02-1512-CR-2273
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 16 2016, 7:36 am

regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE David A. Shircliff Gregory F. Zoeller Bedford, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Jennifer G. Schlegelmilch James B. Martin Anderson, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jaaz Alexander Jones, September 16, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 79A02-1512-CR-2273 v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D02-1402-FA-11

Najam, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 1 of 10 Statement of the Case [1] Jaaz Alexander Jones appeals his convictions after a jury found him guilty of

burglary, as a Class A felony, and robbery, as a Class B felony. Jones raises the

following three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Jones’ motion to dismiss, which he had premised on his theory that the State had failed to preserve materially exculpatory, or at least potentially useful, evidence.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury.

3. Whether the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Jones’ convictions.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] In the overnight hours of February 12 to 13, 2014, Alexis Daniels, Cortez

Collins, and Lawrence Anderson planned to break into the apartment of Tim

Mounts in Lafayette to rob him. At Collins’ insistence, the group waited for

another associate of Collins’, Jones, to arrive from Indianapolis to accompany

them. Once Jones arrived, he and Anderson drove to Mounts’ apartment in

Jones’ white Chevy Impala. The others went in Collins’ black Chevy Monte

Carlo.

[4] Jessica Wise, Mounts’ girlfriend, lived at Mounts’ apartment and was watching

a DVD of Jurassic Park on a PlayStation 3 when Daniels knocked on the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 2 of 10 apartment door. Although Mounts was not home at the time, Wise recognized

Daniels, and, upon opening the door, Daniels entered the apartment with three

African-American men who had their faces covered and were armed with

firearms. One of the men severely beat Wise while the other two searched the

apartment. The intruders eventually left with a safe and the PlayStation 3.

[5] Wise contacted law enforcement shortly thereafter and identified Daniels.

Lafayette Police Department (“LPD”) Officer Nathan Lamar went to nearby

Cambridge Estates, where Daniels lived, to find her. Upon pulling into

Cambridge Estates, Officer Lamar observed two black males. Officer Lamar

stopped the two men, one of whom was Jones, and asked if they lived there.

Jones responded that he did not. Jones then informed the officer that he had a

firearm, and Officer Lamar safely disarmed Jones. Jones further informed

Officer Lamar that he had arrived in Lafayette about twenty minutes

beforehand in his nearby Chevy Impala. Officer Lamar walked over to the

Impala and observed a PlayStation 3 in the back seat. He removed the

PlayStation 3 from the Impala and powered it on from his own vehicle, at

which time he was able to eject a DVD of Jurassic Park from the machine.

Officer Lamar then arrested Jones. Officers arrested Jones’ confederates a short

time later. The State charged Jones with numerous offenses, including

burglary, as a Class A felony, and robbery, as a Class B felony.

[6] Officers impounded Jones’ Impala and searched it. In their search, the officers

found a ski mask, which one of the intruders at Mounts’ apartment had worn.

While the vehicle was in the LPD’s possession, Jones’ counsel did not

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 3 of 10 investigate the vehicle or place an evidentiary hold it. Thereafter, the LPD

notified Jones that he could retake possession of the Impala from Jim’s Garage,

where it had been impounded. On March 18, 2014, Jim’s Garage sent a notice,

by way of certified mail, to Jones stating that the Impala would be sold at public

auction as an abandoned vehicle if not claimed. The vehicle went unclaimed,

and Jim’s Garage sold it on May 8.

[7] On July 22, Jones moved to dismiss the State’s charges against him on the

theory that the Impala was materially exculpatory, or at least potentially useful,

evidence, and the sale of the Impala denied him a fair trial. The trial court held

its ruling on Jones’ motion in abeyance pending trial. At his ensuing jury trial,

Jones renewed his motion to dismiss, at which time the court denied the

motion.

[8] At trial, Daniels testified against Jones. During closing, Jones argued to the

jury that it should draw a negative inference against the State from the sale of

the Impala because the State had asserted that Anderson, while wearing a

bloody shirt following the intrusion into Mounts’ apartment, had ridden in the

Impala, and that the absence of any blood evidence inside the Impala would

have exonerated Jones of the State’s allegations. Jones also asserted that the

Impala had unique features, such as unusual headlights, that would have made

it recognizable by witnesses who did not describe any such characteristics.

Jones further requested the court to instruct the jury that it may draw a negative

inference against the State from the sale of the Impala, but the trial court denied

Jones’ request.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 4 of 10 [9] The jury found Jones guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment of

conviction on burglary, as a Class A felony, and robbery, as a Class B felony.

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision Issue One: Motion to Dismiss

[10] Jones first asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss

because the Impala was materially exculpatory, or at least potentially useful,

evidence. Generally, we review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss

for an abuse of discretion. Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 974 (Ind. Ct. App.

2014), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if

the court’s judgment is contrary to law. See id.

[11] Jones asserts that the State denied him his due process rights when it failed to

preserve the Impala. In such cases, “we must first decide whether the evidence

is potentially useful evidence or material[ly] exculpatory evidence.” State v.

Durrett, 923 N.E.2d 449, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

Evidence is materially exculpatory if it “possess[es] an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and [it is] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 675-76 (Ind. 2000) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)). Exculpatory evidence is defined as “[e]vidence tending to establish a criminal defendant’s innocence.” Black’s Law Dictionary 597 (8th ed. 2004). A prosecutor’s duty to preserve

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 5 of 10 exculpatory evidence is limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the defendant’s defense. Noojin, 730 N.E.2d at 675 (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488). Failure to preserve material[ly] exculpatory evidence violates due process regardless of whether the State acted in good or bad faith. Blanchard v. State, 802 N.E.2d 14, 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988)).

Evidence is merely potentially useful if “no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” Id. at 26 (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57). The State’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a violation of due process rights unless the defendant shows bad faith on the part of the police. Id. at 26-27.

Id. (alterations original).

[12] Here, Jones asserts that his white Chevy Impala was not the same white Chevy

Impala identified by witnesses as one of the two vehicles that transported the

intruders to and from Mounts’ apartment. According to Jones, had the State

preserved his Impala, he would have been able to demonstrate that there was

no blood inside the vehicle, which, he alleges, would have been relevant to

discount the State’s assertion that Anderson was wearing a bloody shirt when

he rode in the vehicle. Jones further argues that his vehicle had unique

characteristics, which the witnesses who had observed the Impala did not

suggest they had noticed.

[13] Accordingly, Jones first contends that his Impala was materially exculpatory

evidence. We cannot agree. Daniels testified that she entered Mounts’

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 6 of 10 apartment with Jones and that she observed Jones inside the apartment. She

testified that Jones drove a white Chevy Impala. And officers found a

PlayStation 3 inside Jones’ Impala that matched the machine stolen from

Mounts’ apartment.

[14] At best, had the State preserved Jones’ Impala he could have impeached

Daniels’ description of his car. And he could have, as he did anyway, cast

doubt on the presence of Anderson in his car because no blood evidence had

been discovered. But that does not place the Impala at a level that it “tend[s] to

establish a criminal defendant’s innocence.” Durrett, 923 N.E.2d at 453-54.

And neither did the Impala possess “an exculpatory value that was apparent”

before it was sold. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Impala was not

materially exculpatory evidence.

[15] In the alternative, Jones asserts that the Impala was at least potentially useful.

To demonstrate that he is entitled to have the charges against him dismissed

based on the State’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence, Jones must

demonstrate that the State’s failure to preserve that evidence was in bad faith.

See id. “Bad faith is defined as being not simply bad judgment or negligence[]

but rather implies the conscious doing of wrong because of dishonest purpose or

moral obliquity.” Wade v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)

(quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. Simply, Jones has presented no

evidence of bad faith on the part of the State. Accordingly, we affirm the trial

court’s denial of Jones’ motion to dismiss.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 7 of 10 Issue Two: Jury Instructions

[16] Jones next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to

give one of his proffered jury instructions. As our supreme court has explained:

Because instructing the jury is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, we will reverse a trial court’s decision to tender or reject a jury instruction only if there is an abuse of that discretion. We determine whether the instruction states the law correctly, whether it is supported by record evidence, and whether its substance is covered by other instructions. Jury instructions are to be considered as a whole and in reference to each other; error in a particular instruction will not result in reversal unless the entire jury charge misleads the jury as to the law in the case.

Pattison v. State, 54 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. 2016) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

[17] Here, Jones proffered a jury instruction regarding the State’s purported failure

to preserve the Impala. But Jones’ argument on this issue is premised on his

assertion that the evidence demonstrated that the Impala was either materially

exculpatory or potentially useful evidence. See Appellant’s Br. at 21-22. As

explained above, the evidence does not support those conclusions. Moreover,

the trial court did instruct the jury that it could find reasonable doubt based on a

lack of evidence. Accordingly, Jones’ proffered jury instruction was not

supported by the evidence, and the jury instructions as a whole did not

“mislead[] the jury as to the law in the case.” Pattison, 54 N.E.3d at 365. Thus,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 8 of 10 the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Jones’ proffered jury

instruction.

Issue Three: Sufficient Evidence

[18] Finally, Jones asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to

support his convictions. Our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence needed to support a criminal conviction is as follows:

First, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Second, we only consider the evidence supporting the [verdict] and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.

Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citations and quotation

marks omitted).

[19] In essence, Jones’ entire argument on this issue is that the State failed to present

sufficient evidence to support his conviction because certain portions of

Daniels’ testimony were not properly supported by independent evidence

showing the existence of a conspiracy with Jones. See, e.g., Lott v. State, 690

N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. 1997) (holding that, to admit a statement of a co-

conspirator as nonhearsay, the State must “provide other evidence . . . the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 9 of 10 conspiracy existed as a precondition to admitting” the out-of-court statements).

While the trial court did not enter a judgment of conviction against Jones on

the conspiracy charges, nonetheless Daniels’ testimony was substantive

evidence against Jones on all allegations.

[20] Assuming for the sake of argument that Daniels’ testimony regarding out-of-

court statements made by her confederates was inadmissible, the State still

presented sufficient independent evidence to support Jones’ convictions.

Daniels testified that she personally saw Jones enter Mounts’ apartment,

participate in the intrusion, and drive a white Chevy Impala. Tr. at 296-97.

Wise testified that Daniels entered the apartment with three armed, African-

American men. Officer Lamar observed Jones near Daniels’ apartment shortly

after the intrusion. Officer Lamar found a firearm on Jones and, in Jones’

white Chevy Impala, a PlayStation 3 with a DVD of Jurassic Park inside it,

which matched the PlayStation that had been stolen from Mounts’ apartment.

A reasonable fact-finder could conclude from that evidence alone that Jones

committed burglary, as a Class A felony, and robbery, as a Class B felony. See

Meehan v. State, 7 N.E.3d 255, 258-59 (Ind. 2014). Thus, we affirm Jones’

convictions.

[21] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Baker, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1512-CR-2273 | September 16, 2016 Page 10 of 10