Judgment rendered January 11, 2023. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
***** ON REMAND *****
No. 54,230-CA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
J. SCHUYLER MARVIN, 26TH Plaintiff-Appellee JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
versus
ROBERT BERRY, and CYPRESS Defendants-Appellees BLACK BAYOU RECREATION And WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT *****
On Remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court
Originally Appealed from the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Bossier, Louisiana Trial Court No. C-162,928
Honorable E. Charles Jacobs, Judge
LOUISIANA DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Counsel for Appellants- CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiffs in Intervention, By: Assistant Attorneys General: the State of Louisiana Madeline Carbonette and Attorney General Emily G. Andrews Jeffrey M. Landry, in Angelique Duhon Freel His Official Capacity J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Plaintiff- 26th Judicial District Attorney Appellee, J. Schuyler Marvin
LAW OFFICE OF RONALD J. Counsel for Defendant- MICIOTTO, LLC Appellee-Robert Berry By: Ronald J. Miciotto Justin P. Smith
AYRES, SHELTON, WILLIAMS, Counsel for Defendant- BENSON & PAINE, LLC Appellee, Cypress Black By: Lee H. Ayres Bayou Recreation & Alexandra E. Vozzella Water Conservation District
Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and THOMPSON, JJ. PITMAN, J.
This matter comes before this court on remand from the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the consideration of Intervenor-Appellant State of
Louisiana’s, through the Attorney General’s Office (the “AG”), assignment
of error related to the summary judgment. For the following reasons, we
affirm the district court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment filed
by Defendants-Appellees Robert Berry and the Cypress Black Bayou
Recreational and Water Conservation District (the “District”).
FACTS
On July 10, 2020, the AG notified Berry of a complaint that he was
violating the Dual Officeholding and Dual Employment Law, La. R.S.
42:61, et seq., through his employment as the Executive Director of the
District and service as a member of the District’s Board of Commissioners
(the “Board”).
On August 19, 2020, J. Schuyler Marvin, the District Attorney of the
26th Judicial District (the “DA”), filed a petition for declaratory judgment
and requested that the district court determine whether Berry held
incompatible offices in his appointed and employed positions.
On October 23, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. They requested that the district court determine that there are no
genuine issues as to material fact, render a declaratory judgment that Berry
is not in violation of La. R.S. 42:64 and dismiss the DA’s claims.
On November 6, 2020, the DA filed an opposition to the motion for
summary judgment. On November 12, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion
to submit the motion for summary judgment and opposition on briefs and
waive oral argument. On November 18, 2020, the AG filed a petition to intervene and a
motion to continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. On
November 20, 2020, it filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
On November 23, 2020, Defendants filed an opposition to the petition
to intervene. They also replied to the AG’s opposition to their motion for
summary judgment and argued that it was untimely and failed to present
evidence of a material factual dispute.
A hearing was held on November 24, 2020. The district court denied
the AG’s petition to intervene and motion to continue. It granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and rendered declaratory
judgment that Berry’s positions as a Board member and Executive Director
do not constitute incompatible offices pursuant to La. R.S. 42:64. On
December 2, 2020, the district court filed a judgment granting Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.
The AG appealed the November 24 and December 2, 2020 rulings.
In Marvin v. Berry, 54,230 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/22), 338 So. 3d 572,
writ granted, cause remanded, 22-00969 (La. 11/1/22), 348 So. 3d 1274,
this court affirmed the district court’s denial of the AG’s petition to
intervene, which pretermitted consideration of the AG’s assignments of
error. The AG applied for writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court, which
determined that the AG could have intervened. It granted the application
and remanded the matter to this court for consideration of the AG’s
assignments of error related to the summary judgment.
2 DISCUSSION
The AG argues that the district court erred in granting Defendants’
motion for summary judgment. It contends that Berry was and remains in
violation of the Dual Officeholding and Dual Employment Law, specifically
La. R.S. 42:64(A)(1), (4) and (6), by serving as a member of the District’s
Board and as the District’s Executive Director.
Defendants argue that the district court properly granted their motion
for summary judgment. They state that they submitted competent evidence
to establish that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that
Berry’s positions as a Board member and as Executive Director do not
constitute incompatible offices under La. R.S. 42:64.
The DA filed a brief stating that it is an uninterested party in this
appeal and that it finds the reasoning of the district court to be persuasive.
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when
there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed
for by a litigant. Reynolds v. Bordelon, 14-2371 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d
607. A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,
memorandum and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue
as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).
A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery,
affects a litigant’s ultimate success or determines the outcome of the legal
dispute. Maggio v. Parker, 17-1112 (La. 6/27/18), 250 So. 3d 874. A
genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree. Id. If
reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a
trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. 3 The burden of proof rests with the mover. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).
If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the
court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden does not
require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim,
action or defense. Id. Rather, he must point out the absence of factual
support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim,
action or defense. Id. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual
support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Appellate courts review motions for summary judgment de novo,
using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether
summary judgment is appropriate. Reynolds v. Bordelon, supra.
La. R.S. 42:61(A) states the purpose of a prohibition on dual
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Judgment rendered January 11, 2023. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
***** ON REMAND *****
No. 54,230-CA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
J. SCHUYLER MARVIN, 26TH Plaintiff-Appellee JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
versus
ROBERT BERRY, and CYPRESS Defendants-Appellees BLACK BAYOU RECREATION And WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT *****
On Remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court
Originally Appealed from the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Bossier, Louisiana Trial Court No. C-162,928
Honorable E. Charles Jacobs, Judge
LOUISIANA DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Counsel for Appellants- CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiffs in Intervention, By: Assistant Attorneys General: the State of Louisiana Madeline Carbonette and Attorney General Emily G. Andrews Jeffrey M. Landry, in Angelique Duhon Freel His Official Capacity J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Plaintiff- 26th Judicial District Attorney Appellee, J. Schuyler Marvin
LAW OFFICE OF RONALD J. Counsel for Defendant- MICIOTTO, LLC Appellee-Robert Berry By: Ronald J. Miciotto Justin P. Smith
AYRES, SHELTON, WILLIAMS, Counsel for Defendant- BENSON & PAINE, LLC Appellee, Cypress Black By: Lee H. Ayres Bayou Recreation & Alexandra E. Vozzella Water Conservation District
Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and THOMPSON, JJ. PITMAN, J.
This matter comes before this court on remand from the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the consideration of Intervenor-Appellant State of
Louisiana’s, through the Attorney General’s Office (the “AG”), assignment
of error related to the summary judgment. For the following reasons, we
affirm the district court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment filed
by Defendants-Appellees Robert Berry and the Cypress Black Bayou
Recreational and Water Conservation District (the “District”).
FACTS
On July 10, 2020, the AG notified Berry of a complaint that he was
violating the Dual Officeholding and Dual Employment Law, La. R.S.
42:61, et seq., through his employment as the Executive Director of the
District and service as a member of the District’s Board of Commissioners
(the “Board”).
On August 19, 2020, J. Schuyler Marvin, the District Attorney of the
26th Judicial District (the “DA”), filed a petition for declaratory judgment
and requested that the district court determine whether Berry held
incompatible offices in his appointed and employed positions.
On October 23, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. They requested that the district court determine that there are no
genuine issues as to material fact, render a declaratory judgment that Berry
is not in violation of La. R.S. 42:64 and dismiss the DA’s claims.
On November 6, 2020, the DA filed an opposition to the motion for
summary judgment. On November 12, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion
to submit the motion for summary judgment and opposition on briefs and
waive oral argument. On November 18, 2020, the AG filed a petition to intervene and a
motion to continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. On
November 20, 2020, it filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
On November 23, 2020, Defendants filed an opposition to the petition
to intervene. They also replied to the AG’s opposition to their motion for
summary judgment and argued that it was untimely and failed to present
evidence of a material factual dispute.
A hearing was held on November 24, 2020. The district court denied
the AG’s petition to intervene and motion to continue. It granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and rendered declaratory
judgment that Berry’s positions as a Board member and Executive Director
do not constitute incompatible offices pursuant to La. R.S. 42:64. On
December 2, 2020, the district court filed a judgment granting Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.
The AG appealed the November 24 and December 2, 2020 rulings.
In Marvin v. Berry, 54,230 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/22), 338 So. 3d 572,
writ granted, cause remanded, 22-00969 (La. 11/1/22), 348 So. 3d 1274,
this court affirmed the district court’s denial of the AG’s petition to
intervene, which pretermitted consideration of the AG’s assignments of
error. The AG applied for writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court, which
determined that the AG could have intervened. It granted the application
and remanded the matter to this court for consideration of the AG’s
assignments of error related to the summary judgment.
2 DISCUSSION
The AG argues that the district court erred in granting Defendants’
motion for summary judgment. It contends that Berry was and remains in
violation of the Dual Officeholding and Dual Employment Law, specifically
La. R.S. 42:64(A)(1), (4) and (6), by serving as a member of the District’s
Board and as the District’s Executive Director.
Defendants argue that the district court properly granted their motion
for summary judgment. They state that they submitted competent evidence
to establish that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that
Berry’s positions as a Board member and as Executive Director do not
constitute incompatible offices under La. R.S. 42:64.
The DA filed a brief stating that it is an uninterested party in this
appeal and that it finds the reasoning of the district court to be persuasive.
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when
there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed
for by a litigant. Reynolds v. Bordelon, 14-2371 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d
607. A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,
memorandum and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue
as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).
A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery,
affects a litigant’s ultimate success or determines the outcome of the legal
dispute. Maggio v. Parker, 17-1112 (La. 6/27/18), 250 So. 3d 874. A
genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree. Id. If
reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a
trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. 3 The burden of proof rests with the mover. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).
If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the
court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden does not
require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim,
action or defense. Id. Rather, he must point out the absence of factual
support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim,
action or defense. Id. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual
support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Appellate courts review motions for summary judgment de novo,
using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether
summary judgment is appropriate. Reynolds v. Bordelon, supra.
La. R.S. 42:61(A) states the purpose of a prohibition on dual
officeholding and dual employment as follows:
It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that public officials and employees perform the public business in a manner which serves to promote and maintain in the general citizenry a high level of confidence and trust in public officials, public employees, and governmental decisions. The attainment of this end is impaired when a public official or employee holds two or more public offices or public jobs which by their particular nature conflict with the duties and interests of each other. The attainment of a high level of confidence and trust by the general citizenry in public officials, employees, and governmental decisions is further impaired by the excessive accumulation of governmental power which may result from public officials or employees holding two or more public offices or public jobs.
La. R.S. 42:63 sets forth the general prohibitions on dual
officeholding and dual employment. La. R.S. 42:64(A) addresses
incompatible offices and states, in pertinent part:
In addition to the prohibitions otherwise provided in this Part, no other offices or employments shall be held by the same 4 person in combination if any of the following conditions are found to pertain and these prohibitions shall exist whether or not the person affected by the prohibition exercises power in conjunction with other officers: (1) The incumbent of one of the offices, whether or not in conjunction with fellow officers, or employment has the power to appoint or remove the incumbent of the other . . . . *** (4) The incumbent of one office, whether or not in conjunction with fellow officers, or employment is required by law to execute orders and follow directions given by the incumbent of the other office or employment. *** (6) Funds received by one office or employment are deposited with or turned over to the other office or position.
The District was created pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2601, et seq. La.
R.S. 38:2603 states that the District is a political subdivision of the state of
Louisiana and sets forth its purpose and powers. La. R.S. 38:2604
establishes that the District shall be governed and controlled by a board of
five commissioners who serve five-year terms and details the appointment of
these commissioners.
As Defendants would not bear the burden of proof at trial, they must
show the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the
AG’s claim. A de novo review of the record confirms that there are no
genuine issues as to material fact and that Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants
provided affidavits of the District’s five Board members, including Berry.
Board members Jerry Fowler, Mel Allen, Gary Wyche and Walt Bigby all
stated that Berry does not have and never attempted to exercise the authority
to vote on his appointment or removal as Executive Director or any other
matters related to his employment as Executive Director, has never served as
an officer of the Board and has never received compensation for his position 5 as a Board member. Berry stated the same and added that his position as a
Board member is a part-time appointive office, not an elected position, and
that he is employed as Executive Director. Berry, Fowler, Wyche and Bigby
noted that Berry was excluded from the vote to make him Executive
Director.
These affidavits demonstrate that Berry is not in violation of La.
R.S. 42:64(A)(1) because he does not have the authority as a Board member
to appoint or remove himself as Executive Director. Further, Berry does not
have the authority to appoint or remove a Board member because La.
R.S. 38:2604 grants this power to the police jury of Bossier Parish, the
mayor and governing authority of the city of Bossier City, the mayor and
governing authority of the village of Benton, the Bossier Parish School
Board and the Board of Commissioners of the Bossier Levee District. La.
R.S. 42:64(A)(4) is inapplicable because the Executive Director position was
not created by La. R.S. 38:2601, et seq., and there are no laws that require
the Executive Director to execute orders and follow directions given by the
Board. La. R.S. 42:64(A)(6) is also inapplicable because no funds have
been deposited with or turned over to the District or from the District.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and determining that Berry’s positions as a Board
member and Executive Director of the District do not constitute
incompatible offices pursuant to La. R.S. 42:64.
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s granting of
the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants-Appellees Robert 6 Berry and the Cypress Black Bayou Recreational and Water Conservation
District. Costs in the amount of $3,638 are assessed to the State of
Louisiana, through the Attorney General’s Office.
AFFIRMED.