J. Raymond Clark v. Superior Court for the District of Columbia

D.C. Circuit

J. Raymond Clark v. Superior Court for the District of Columbia

905 F.2d 389, 284 U.S. App. D.C. 284, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 21595, 1990 WL 76537

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedApril 9, 1990

Docket89-7202

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 905 F.2d 389 (J. Raymond Clark v. Superior Court for the District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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J. Raymond Clark v. Superior Court for the District of Columbia, 905 F.2d 389, 284 U.S. App. D.C. 284, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 21595, 1990 WL 76537 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

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Opinion

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the courts’ orders to show cause and the responses thereto, appellant’s supplemental emergency motion for stay, the response thereto and the reply, and appellant’s motion for remand, it is

ORDERED that the orders to show cause be discharged. It is

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that the district court’s order, filed November 14, 1988 be summarily affirmed. The Employees’ Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, et seq. (1974), is inapplicable to the instant case because the funds at issue do not constitute benefits under the protection of an ERISA Plan. Hence, both the anti-alienation provision and general preemption clause of ERISA are inapplicable to this case. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1); § 1141. Appellant received his benefits in a lump sum and therefore no longer “is or may be entitled to a benefit” under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). See Kunt v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 318, 93 L.Ed.2d 291 (1986). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that appellant’s motion for remand and emergency motion for stay be dismissed as moot.

The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C.Cir. Rule 15.

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ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the courts’ orders to show cause and the responses thereto, appellant’s supplemental emergency motion for stay, the response thereto and the reply, and appellant’s motion for remand, it is

ORDERED that the orders to show cause be discharged. It is

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that the district court’s order, filed November 14, 1988 be summarily affirmed. The Employees’ Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, et seq. (1974), is inapplicable to the instant case because the funds at issue do not constitute benefits under the protection of an ERISA Plan. Hence, both the anti-alienation provision and general preemption clause of ERISA are inapplicable to this case. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1); § 1141. Appellant received his benefits in a lump sum and therefore no longer “is or may be entitled to a benefit” under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). See Kunt v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 318, 93 L.Ed.2d 291 (1986). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that appellant’s motion for remand and emergency motion for stay be dismissed as moot.

The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C.Cir. Rule 15.

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905 F.2d 389, 284 U.S. App. D.C. 284, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 21595, 1990 WL 76537, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/j-raymond-clark-v-superior-court-for-the-district-of-columbia-cadc-1990.

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