J. R. Watkins Co. v. Clark

147 P.2d 348, 65 Idaho 504, 1944 Ida. LEXIS 75
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 17, 1944
DocketNo. 7117.
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 147 P.2d 348 (J. R. Watkins Co. v. Clark) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
J. R. Watkins Co. v. Clark, 147 P.2d 348, 65 Idaho 504, 1944 Ida. LEXIS 75 (Idaho 1944).

Opinions

*506 GIVENS, J.

Respondent, a manufacturer and wholesaler of drugs, medicines, and sundries, entered into an agreement 1 with appellant Clark, August 31, 1938, whereby it agreed to sell and he agreed to purchase various merchandise which he was authorized thereby to retail in the locality where he was then engaged in business. The other appellants, as sureties or guarantors for appellant Clark, signed the appended agreement. 2

*507 January 8, 1940, respondent terminated the contract. At that time Clark was indebted to respondent in the amount of $2000.75. Merchandise was returned in the amount of $870, for which Clark was credited, leaving a balance of $1130.75, for which this suit was instituted.

The agreement between respondent and appellant Clark recited that at the date of its execution his then indebtedness under a previous similar contract was $1502.39. Appellants contended and testified that figure was not in the contract when they signed the surety addenda but the space therefor was blank. Various officers of the respondent corporation testified the amount was typewritten in the contract before appellants signed. The court submitted this issue to the jury, which found in favor of respondent.

Appellants’ defenses are that this blank was not filled in and that being filled in by respondent constituted a material alteration to their detriment and voided their *508 agreement; that after the date of the agreement respondent insisted upon appellant’s purchasing an unwarranted amount of goods and extended an unreasonable credit, and that the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to submit this issue to the jury, it being their contention they were liable for only a “reasonable” amount of credit.

Various other errors are assigned, but they are all substantially disposed of by consideration of two propositions.

The surety agreement provided that if the amount of indebtedness was blank it could be filled in, without specifying by whom. Appellants rely upon J. R. Watkins Co. v. Keeney, 52 N.Dak. 280, 201 N.W. 838, 37 A.L.R. 1389, as holding that a creditor may not so fill in the blank but only the principal for whom the sureties have signed. The court there arrived at the restrictive conclusion by saying that it was the party to whom the instrument was delivered *509 who had the right to so fill in. Even upon that premise the conclusion was wrong because the party to whom the agreement was delivered in the legal sense would be the obligee, not the principal. (50 C.J., Principal and Surety, p. 42, sec. 67 [6], 38 C.J.S., Guaranty, p. 1160, sec. 21.) Delivery to the principal would be merely for transmittal to the obligee. Furthermore, no valid reason is given for the conclusion, and the comments in J. R. Watkins Co. v. Williams, 233 Ala. 135, 170 So. 194, rejecting the ruling *510 announced in J. R. Watkins Co. v. Keeney, supra, are logical and compelling. Many cases are cited by appellants in support of their proposition that the obligee may not fill in such a blank. None of them, however, are under contracts containing this permissive clause, hence, are not in point.

For two reasons, therefore, we must take as conclusive that this amount was in the contract at the time it was signed or permissibly inserted thereafter — first, because the issue was submitted to the jury and found in favor of the respondent; second, because of the terms and provisions of the surety agreement. Therefore, the surety appellants guaranteed the payment absolutely and unqualifiedly of $1502.39.

Appellants contend, however, that because credit was thereafter given which in a total amount exceeded the amount specifically guaranteed, the issue of reasonableness thereof should have been submitted. The amount sued upon, however, was less than the amount positively guaranteed. *511 They cannot be heard to say that the amount they positively guaranteed was not reasonable. The goods delivered and for which credit was given subsequently to the signing of the contract obviously could not aifect the indebtedness then existing; and the remittances made by appellant Clark, together with the returned goods, total $1852.10, which exceeded the merchandise received by him subsequent to the date of this contract by $371.64, which was applied on the indebtedness of $1502.39. Therefore, instead of being injured, appellants were benefited by this extension of credit, because the amount they had positively guaranteed, viz., $1502.39, was thereby reduced to the amount named herein, namely, $1130.75. The cases cited by appellants 3 as to the necessity of submitting the reasonableness of further credit to the jury did not consider a contract positively guarantying a definite, initial indebtedness, hence, are not in point.

We find support for the thought that respondent is entitled to recover the amount specified herein regardless of future credit, since it did not exceed the amount they guaranteed, in Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Sage, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 171, 56 P. (2d) 565.

Conceding that the surety agreement is to be construed most strongly in favor of the guarantors, the pertinent language in Cargill Commission Co. v. Swartwood, 159 Minn. 1, 198 N.W. 536, at 540, on rehearing, leaves no room for construction or interpretation other than that without equivocation the amount of the indebtedness existing at the time the credit was made was accepted and guaranteed by appellant sureties. The refusal to submit the issue of reasonableness of additional credit, therefore, was correct. An instructed verdict in favor of respondent for $1130.75 should have been ordered. Consequently, the asserted errors in connection with the introduction of evidence concerning the second phase of the controversy need not be discussed.

Judgment affirmed, and costs awarded to respondent.

Holden, C.J., and Dunlap, J., concur.
1

“IAO $1502.39 2187

“THIS AGREEMENT, Made at Winona, Minnesota, this 31st day of August, 1938 between THE J. R. WATKINS COMPANY, a corporation, hereinafter called ‘the Company,’ and Ernest M. Clark of Shoshone, Idaho, hereinafter called ‘the Purchaser,’ witnesseth.

“1.

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Bluebook (online)
147 P.2d 348, 65 Idaho 504, 1944 Ida. LEXIS 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/j-r-watkins-co-v-clark-idaho-1944.