J. Moore L.L.C., Appellant, vs. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Respondent

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: October 6, 2025
• Docket: a242030
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-2030

J. Moore L.L.C., Appellant,

vs.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Respondent.

Filed October 6, 2025 Reversed and remanded Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-24-9289

Mihajlo Babovic, Greenstein Sellers PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Scott G. Williams, Lindsey A. Streicher, HAWS-KM, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Florey,

Judge.

SYLLABUS

Substitute service on a foreign insurance company is permitted under Minnesota

Statutes section 45.028, subdivision 1(c) (2024), when the foreign insurance company

appoints the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce for service of process pursuant to

Minnesota Statutes section 60A.19, subdivision 3, or section 60A.21, subdivision 2(1)

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. (2024). It is not necessary to specifically plead section 45.028, subdivision 1(c), in the

complaint.

OPINION

CONNOLLY, Judge

This appeal concerns what a plaintiff is required to do when serving a foreign

insurance company using substitute service under Minnesota Statutes section 45.028

(2024). The district court held that appellant is required to allege the basis for serving the

commissioner of commerce in its complaint and, because it did not do so, concluded that

there was insufficient service of process. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Appellant J. Moore L.L.C., a Minnesota company, purchased an insurance policy

from respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, an Illinois insurance company,

that covered damage to property located in Minneapolis caused by, among other things,

wind and hail. The district court found and the parties do not dispute that the policy

contained a two-year suit limitation period, stating that no action would be brought against

State Farm unless there has been compliance with the policy provisions and the action is

started within two years after the occurrence causing loss or damage. On June 11, 2022,

Moore’s property was damaged by wind and hail. Moore sought coverage under the policy.

Over the following two years, both parties disputed the amount of coverage under the

policy. On June 11, 2024, exactly two years after the property damage occurred, Moore

filed a complaint and asserted two claims: breach of contract and declaratory judgment.

2 Moore served the summons and complaint on State Farm through substitute service

on the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce (the commissioner) under Minnesota

Statutes section 45.028. It did not specifically mention the statute, or any other statutes

permitting service on the commissioner, in its complaint. According to the “affidavit of

compliance of Minn. Stat. § 45.028,” Moore served a copy of the summons and complaint

on State Farm and separately on the commissioner via U.S. certified mail on June 11, 2024.

In July 2024, State Farm filed and served its answer, and in August 2024, State Farm

brought a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that service was ineffective under

section 45.028. State Farm argued that (1) Moore did not allege that it engaged in conduct

prohibited or made actionable by the statutes enumerated in section 45.028, and

(2) Moore’s claim was consequently “time-barred by the policy contract.”

In opposition to State Farm’s motion to dismiss, Moore argued that service was

effective because State Farm agreed to substitute service of process on the commissioner

under Minnesota Statutes section 60A.19, subdivision 3. And because Minnesota Statute

section 45.028, subdivision 1(c), provides that substitute service is applicable “in all cases

in which service of process is allowed to be made on the commissioner,” Moore asserted

that its service was proper.

In September 2024, the district court heard arguments on the motion to dismiss. The

district court granted the motion on the basis that Moore failed to specifically allege the

reason service upon the commissioner is permitted in its complaint.

Moore appeals.

3 ISSUE

Did the district court erroneously construe Minnesota Statutes section 45.028, subdivision 1(c), to require Moore to specifically plead the reason service of process is allowed to be made on the commissioner in its complaint?

ANALYSIS

Moore argues that the district court erroneously interpreted section 45.028,

subdivision 1(c), to require it to plead the specific reason why service on the commissioner

was permitted. Moore contends that substitute service on the commissioner was proper

because State Farm, a foreign insurance company, appointed the commissioner as its

attorney for service of process under Minnesota Statutes sections 60A.19 or 60A.21 (2024).

We agree.

We review the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s service of process under the Minnesota

Statutes de novo. Meeker v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 862 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Minn. 2015).

Similarly, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Id. at 46. “The goal of

all statutory interpretation ‘is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’”

State by Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d 584, 590 (Minn.

2021) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020)).

We begin with the rules governing service of process. “Service of process must

accord strictly with statutory requirements.” Lundgren v. Green, 592 N.W.2d 888, 890

(Minn. App. 1999) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 28, 1999). Under rule

4.03(c), a plaintiff may serve a corporation “by delivering a copy [of the summons] to an

officer or managing agent, or to any other agent authorized expressly or impliedly or

designated by statute to receive service of summons.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(c).

4 A plaintiff may also serve a defendant, including a company, through substitute

service on the commissioner in three circumstances. See Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1.

First, substitute service is permitted when the defendant has engaged in prohibited conduct

based on statutes enumerated in subdivision 1(a), the defendant has not consented to

service of process, and the action is based on that conduct and brought under those statutes.

Id., subd. 1(a). Second, it is allowed in all other cases under the statutes enumerated in

subdivision 1(b)1 when the defendant has filed a consent to service of process. Id., subd.

1(b). And third, substitute service is permitted “in all cases in which service of process is

allowed to be made on the commissioner.” Id., subd. 1(c). Moore relies on the third

mechanism—subdivision 1(c)—in arguing that his service on the commissioner was

proper. In doing so, Moore points to Minnesota Statutes sections 60A.19 and 60A.21 as

the underlying statutory bases permitting such service. We agree.

Section 60A.19 governs foreign insurance companies. Minn. Stat. § 60A.19,

subdivision 3 of that section requires a foreign insurance company, before it is “admitted

to or authorized to transact the business of insurance” in Minnesota, to “appoint the

commissioner and successors in office its true and lawful attorney, upon whom proofs of

loss, any notice authorized or required by any contract with the company to be served on

it, summonses and all lawful processes in any action or legal proceeding against it may be

served.” Id., subd. 3; see also Krebsbach v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 24-CV-2241,

2024 WL 5201587, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2024) (“Because State Farm is an out-of-state

1 The enumerated statutes in subdivisions 1(a) and 1(b) are identical. Compare Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(a), with Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(b).

5 insurer, Minnesota law requires it to file its consent to service on the Commissioner.”).2

Moreover, even if a foreign insurance company fails to file its appointment of the

commissioner for service, that entity is deemed, by operation of law, to have consented to

service on the commissioner whenever it transacts insurance business in Minnesota. Minn.

Stat. § 60A.21, subd. 2(1); see Krebsbach, 2024 WL 5201587, at *2. And sections 60A.19

and 60A.21 both provide that service of process as authorized under those sections shall be

made “in compliance with section 45.028, subdivision 2.” Minn. Stat. §§ 60A.19, subd. 4,

.21, subd. 2(2).

Turning to section 45.028, subdivision 2, the plaintiff must complete three steps in

order for service to be effective: (1) leave a copy of the process in the office of the

commissioner, or send it by certified mail; (2) send notice of service and a copy of the

process by certified mail to the defendant at its last known address; and (3) file the affidavit

of compliance “on or before the return day of the process.” Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2.

There is no dispute that Moore met these requirements.

Moore’s substitute service of process on the commissioner—made in compliance

with section 45.028, subdivision 2—was effective. There is no dispute that State Farm is

a foreign insurance company which transacted business in Minnesota by issuing the policy

to Moore.3 As such, State Farm was required to appoint the commissioner as its service

2 “Though they do not bind us, we consider federal court opinions for their persuasive value and afford those opinions due deference.” Laliberte v. Dollar Tree, Inc., 987 N.W.2d 590, 594 n.4 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted). 3 These facts were drawn from the complaint and answer, and while they sufficiently establish that the commissioner was appointed in this case, we acknowledge that it is not necessary that the facts be established in this manner.

6 agent. Minn. Stat. § 60A.19, subds. 3–4. State Farm does not contend that it did not

appoint the commissioner as required. But, even if that were the case, the commissioner

would then have been appointed by operation of law. Minn. Stat. § 60A.21, subd. 2(1)-

(2). Accordingly, it is clear that “service of process is allowed to be made on the

commissioner” in this case. Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(c). The district court erred by

granting State Farm’s motion to dismiss.

As Moore points out, the only applicable precedential case recognized that a

plaintiff may use substitute service on a foreign insurance company conducting business

in Minnesota. Meeker, 862 N.W.2d at 45 (“Because IDS is a nonresident insurance

company that conducts business in Minnesota, the Meekers were authorized to commence

an action against IDS under the substituted-service statute, Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2,

which allows the Commissioner of Commerce to accept service of process for foreign

companies.”).

Moreover, we recently addressed a similar issue in Lehnertz v. RAM Mutual

Insurance Co., No. A24-0251, 2024 WL 4260269, at *2–4 (Minn. App. Sept. 23, 2024).4

There, and like Moore, the appellant asserted two claims—one for common law breach of

contract and one for declaratory judgment under Minnesota Statutes section 555.02 (2022).

Id. at *3. Narrowly construing the statutory language of subdivision 1(a), we held that the

appellant could not use substitute service because he did not allege a statutory violation

4 Because nonprecedential opinions of this court are not binding authority, we cite Lehnertz for its persuasive value only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not binding authority . . . but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”)

7 under any of the enumerated statutes under section 45.028, subdivision 1(a). Id. The key

difference here, however, is that Moore relies on other statutes in addition to Minnesota

Statutes section 45.028, whereas the appellant in Lehnertz did not. Id. at *2 n.1 (“[The

appellant] did not attempt substitute service in reliance on any statute other than Minnesota

Statutes section 45.028. For example, [the appellant] did not rely on Minnesota Statutes

section 60A.19 (2022), which requires that foreign insurers appoint the commissioner as

their attorney, upon whom all lawful processes in any action or legal proceeding against

the foreign insurers may be served.” (quotation omitted)).

To support its argument, State Farm relies on Egge v. Depositors Insurance Co.,

where we upheld the district court’s dismissal of the appellant’s complaint for insufficient

service of process because the appellant “failed to include the necessary jurisdictional

statements to effect process” under section 45.028, subdivision 1(a). No. A07-150, 2007

WL 2703137, at *1–2 (Minn. App. Sept. 18, 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2007).

However, we did not discuss section 45.028, subdivision 1(c), or service on the

commissioner under section 60A.19, section 60A.21, or any other statute that permits

service of process on the commissioner. See id.

State Farm also cites to other nonbinding authority to further its argument. See Sec.

Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sw. Reinsure, Inc., No. 11–1358, 2013 WL 500362, at *8–9 (D.

Minn. Feb. 11, 2013) (stating that plaintiff’s complaint did not “allege any relevant

statutory violations, so the attempted service through the Department of Commerce was

ineffective” under section 45.028, subdivision 1(a)); Oprenchak v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co.,

No. 11–cv–00425, 2012 WL 1247216, at *10–11 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2012) (stating that

8 plaintiff’s action “must be based on conduct prohibited by and brought under the

[enumerated] chapters” in section 45.028, subdivision 1(a), but dismissing complaint on

other grounds, including that the requirements of subdivision 2 were not met); Wandersee

v. RAM Mut. Ins. Co., No. A21-1060, 2022 WL 589461, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 28, 2022)

(stating that section 45.028, subdivision 1(a), requires “the complaint to allege the

defendant engaged in conduct prohibited or made actionable by” Minnesota law (quotation

omitted)). However, each of these cases is distinguishable. In Southwest Reinsure,

Oprenchak, and Wandersee, the courts analyzed only section 45.028, subdivision 1(a), in

concluding that the plaintiffs had to allege conduct prohibited or made actionable by the

enumerated statutes—they did not discuss subdivision 1(c). Sw. Reinsure, 2013 WL

500362, at *8–9; Oprenchak, 2012 WL 1247216, at *10–11; Wandersee, 2022 WL 589461,

at *2–3.

To convince us otherwise, State Farm contends that Moore’s reading of section

45.028 would render subdivisions 1(a) and 1(b) meaningless. It claims that, so long as a

defendant is a foreign insurance company, subdivisions 1(a) and 1(b) of section 45.028

would not be utilized. We disagree.

To begin, subdivisions 1(a) and 1(b) of section 45.028, do not apply solely to foreign

insurance companies; in fact, the statutes enumerated in those subdivisions includes a wide

range of industries. For example, Minnesota Statutes chapters 46–59 cover banking, Minn.

Stat. §§ 46.01–58B.10 (2024); chapters 80A.40–.91 cover the regulation of securities,

Minn. Stat. §§ 80A.40–.91 (2024); chapters 82-83 cover real estate sales regulations, Minn.

Stat. §§ 82.55–83.45 (2024); chapter 155A covers cosmetology, Minn. Stat. §§ 155A.20–

9 .36 (2024); and chapter 309 covers social and charitable organizations, Minn. Stat. §§

309.50–.77 (2024). Thus, contrary to State Farm’s assertions, subdivision 1(c) does not

swallow subdivisions 1(a) and 1(b) simply because the defendant is a foreign insurance

company. Moreover, by embracing State Farm’s interpretation of subdivisions 1(a) and

1(b), we would actually render subdivision 1(c)—along with other statutes such as sections

60A.19, subdivision 4, and 60A.21, subdivision 2(2)—meaningless. As sections 60A.19

and 60A.21 make clear, service of process may be made on the commissioner as provided

in section 45.028, subdivision 2. Minn. Stat. §§ 60A.19, subd. 4, .21, subd. 2(2).

State Farm lastly asks us to “reject [Moore’s] call to infer jurisdictional facts are

established.” State Farm contends that we must infer from Moore’s complaint that he is

relying on sections 60A.19 and 60A.21 in support of his claim that he is entitled to

substitute service under section 45.028, subdivision 1(c). Again, we are not persuaded.

As noted earlier, the federal district court in Krebsbach held that, under section

45.028, subdivision 1(c), the “law requires that a plaintiff have a basis for effecting service

under section 45.028, but nothing in the relevant statutes or rules requires that the

defendant’s consent—or the legal authority requiring (or creating) that consent—be

pleaded.” 2024 WL 5201587, at *2. We agree. Nothing in section 45.028, subdivision

1(c), requires Moore to plead in its complaint that State Farm appointed the commissioner

as its agent for service.5 Moreover, State Farm provides no authority, and we are aware of

5 Even if State Farm did not file its consent to appoint the commissioner as its attorney in fact, “State Farm is nevertheless deemed, by operation of law, to have consented to service on the Commissioner whenever it transacts insurance business in [Minnesota].” Krebsbach, 2024 WL 5201587, at *2; see also Minn. Stat. § 60A.21, subd. 2(1).

10 none, which would generally require a party to plead how it intends to effect service of

process—something that occurs after the complaint is drafted.6 The statutory framework

of sections 60A.19 and 60A.21 requires that a foreign insurance company appoint the

commissioner to receive service of process in certain circumstances, such that it may be

served in compliance with section 45.028, subdivision 2. Minn. Stat. §§ 60A.19, subds.

3–4, .21, subd. 2(1)-(2). The undisputed facts establish a basis to do so here, and we discern

no reason why that basis would need to be alleged in the complaint.

In sum, Moore was able to use substitute service of process under section 45.028,

subdivision 1(c), because service may be made on the commissioner who State Farm

appointed under sections 60A.19, subdivision 3, or 60A.21, subdivision 2(1)-(2).

Accordingly, the district court erred by granting State Farm’s motion to dismiss Moore’s

complaint. And because Moore complied with the requirements of section 45.028,

subdivision 2, by timely delivering a copy of the summons and complaint by certified mail

to State Farm and the commissioner, and by filing an affidavit of compliance, the

contractual limitations period for commencing the suit did not expire before the suit was

commenced. See Meeker, 862 N.W.2d at 47 (“[S]ervice of process is made, and therefore,

6 We agree that whether a particular method of service of process is permitted may turn on allegations in the complaint in certain circumstances. For example, because substitute service is allowed under section 45.028, subdivision 1(a), only for conduct prohibited by particular statutes, and actions brought under those statutes, the allegations in the complaint will impact whether substitute service is allowed. But where, as here, the question is only whether “service of process is allowed to be made on the commissioner,” Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 1(c), we see no reason why the answer would turn on the allegations in the complaint.

11 an action is commenced, when a plaintiff sends a copy of the process to the Commissioner

of Commerce by certified mail.”).

DECISION

Because the commissioner was appointed as State Farm’s lawful attorney for service

of process under sections 60A.19, subdivision 3, or 60A.21, subdivision 2(1), Moore was

permitted to complete substitute service of process on State Farm by serving the

commissioner in compliance with section 45.028, subdivision 2, without having to

expressly plead section 45.028, subdivision 1(c), in its complaint.

Reversed and remanded.