J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Pace

172 S.W. 146, 1914 Tex. App. LEXIS 1479
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 21, 1914
DocketNo. 8041.
StatusPublished

This text of 172 S.W. 146 (J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Pace) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Pace, 172 S.W. 146, 1914 Tex. App. LEXIS 1479 (Tex. Ct. App. 1914).

Opinion

BUCK, J.

This case was tried by the court without the aid of a jury, and the court filed his findings of fact and conclusions of law, which findings of fact have not been attacked by the appellant, either as to their sufficiency or correctness, and the same will be adopted by this court, and, being rather full, will avoid the necessity of a further statement of the case and the issues of fact involved. Such findings of fact are as follows:

I. “The plaintiff’s suit was brought on two promissory notes for $250 each, executed by the defendants L. C. Davis and Nat G. Mitchell payable to the order of the plaintiff, J. M. Radford Grocery Company, at Abilene, Tex., on December 20, 1910, and March 1, 1911, respectively, both dated October 17, 1910, bearing 10 per cent, interest from date, and containing the usual 10 per cent, attorney’s fee clause, the note first due bearing credits, as follows, viz.: 12— 20 — 10, ck. $50.00; 12 — 28—10, ck. $50.00; 2— 27 — 11, ck. $25.00; 4 — 13—11, ck. $20.00.”
II. “That said notes were secured by a chattel mortgage executed by the defendant L. C. Davis which conveyed to the plaintiff the following described property, to wit: One self-measuring oil tank; one Hall & Co. safe, weighing about 2,500 pounds; one upright desk; one stool; one invoice file system; one pair platform scale; one thread cabinet; one soap showcase; one chewing gum case; one 8-foot showcase; one 6-foot cigar showcase; two paper cutters; one clock; one paper mill; one pair Dayton computing scales; one fruit showcase; one Mc-Creary refrigerator; one large coffee mill; one 18-foot counter with bins; one 20-foot counter; one 10-foot counter; one pair of trucks; one broom rack; one thread cabinet and desk; one cash register; one tobacco knife; one paper bag rack; one cracker rack; and one cheese cutter — located in the O. D. Goostree Building in the town of Seymour, Tex. The said Davis warrants title to said property to the plaintiff by the usual warranty clause, and said mortgage then contains the following stipulation, viz.: ‘This conveyance is intended as a mortgage, I being indebted to the said J. M. Radford Grocery Company in the sum of nine hundred and no/100 dollars, as evidenced by my four certain notes bearing date 17th day of October, 1910, and due 10-25-10, 11 — 5—10, 12 — 20—10, 3— 1 — 11, and payable to J. M. Radford Grocery Company at Abilene, Tex.’ Then follows the usual defeasance clause of a chattel mortgage with power of seizure and sale to satisfy said indebtedness. This mortgage is dated October 17, 1910, and was filed for registration in the office of the county clerk of Baylor county, Tex., at 9:30 o’clock a. m., on October 18, 1910. This mortgage the plaintiff sought to foreclose.”
III. “That the defendants J. H. Pace and J. T. Pace by their plea'in intervention and cross-action sued the defendant Davis on a note for $200 executed by defendant L. C. Davis, payable to the order of J. H. Pace and J. T. Pace at Seymour, Tex., 12 months after date, and being dated October 17, 1910, bearing interest at the rate of 10 per cent, per annum, and containing the usual 10 per cent, attorney’s fee clause.”
IV. “That said note in favor of J. H. and J. T. Pace was secured by a chattel mortgage executed by defendant L. O. Davis, conveying to them the following property, viz.: ‘The following fixtures heretofore used by W. R. Lee & Co. in its *147 mercantile business in Seymour, Tex., and now owned and used by me, which will be removed to the O. D. Goostree storehouse, to wit: One refrigerator ; one pair of computing scales; one iron safe.’ This mortgage also contained the following stipulations: ‘I hereby warrant that said property is owned by me in good faith, under perfect title, free of all liens and incumbrances whatsoever, and I agree to hold the same where it is now located free of all liens other than the one hereby granted until the indebtedness hereinafter mentioned is paid in full. This conveyance, however, is intended as a mortgage, I being indebted to the said J. H. and J. T. Pace in the sum of two hundred dollars, as evidenced by one certain promissory note bearing date 17th day of October, 1910’ — and further describing the note sued on. This mortgage then contains the usual clause of defeasance with power to seize and sell the property in satisfaction of said indebtedness. It is dated October 17, 1910, and was duly filed for registration in the office of the county clerk of Baylor county, Tex., at 5 o’clock p. m. on October 17, 1910.”
Y. “It was agreed by the parties to the suit that the safe, refrigerator, and computing scales mentioned (in) the chattel mortgage of the defendants J. H. and J. T. Pace are the same articles as the safe, refrigerator, and computing scales mentioned in the mortgage of the plaintiff.”
VI; “That on the 29th day of September, 1911, the plaintiff sued out a writ of sequestration, and had the property covered by its mortgage seized by the sheriff under said writ about October 1, 1911, including the three articles covering the mortgage of the Paces, and said articles have since been sold by the sheriff and b&ught in by the plaintiff, and has admitted in open court that, if the mortgage of the Paces is found to be a prior or superior mortgage to the mortgage of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is liable to said Paces for the value of three articles of fixtures covered by the Paces’ mortgage, not to exceed the amount of the note held by the 1?8.C6S **
YII. “That on the 17th day of October, 1910, the plaintiff, acting solely through O. W. Gill as its agent, negotiated a sale of a portion of a certain stock of merchandise and store fixtures to the defendant L. O. Davis, said property being located in a storehouse in the McLain Block in the town of Seymour, and had been purchased by the plaintiff at a bankruptcy sale of W. R. Lee & Co.; that the negotiation of the sale of said property by plaintiff to Davis began early in the morning of October 17th, and was consummated in the afternoon; that in the forenoon an agreement was reached between plaintiff’s agfent Gill and Davis as to what goods and fixtures should be included in the sale, the price to be paid, and the amount to be paid in cash, time to be allowed on the deferred payments, and the amount of the respective notes and the character of security to be given on said notes; that it was definitely agreed upon between said Gill and Davis what articles of merchandise and fixtures were to be delivered out of the general stock to Davis, the fixtures being the same as those described in the second paragraph of these findings, and included the three .articles covered by the mortgage of the Paces; that said Davis first offered to secure the notes given for the deferred payments by a chattel mortgage on the goods and fixtures sold to him, but Gill refused to accept this security, and demanded personal security on the notes such as would make the notes good; that Davis then offered Nat G. Mitchell as surety on the notes, and the said Gill investigated the financial responsibility of Nat G. Mitchell and ascertained that he was willing to sign the notes as surety for Davis, and accepted him as surety on said notes, and would not have made the trade if •he had not thought that Mitchell made the notes good, but told Davis that he would take a chattel mortgage on the fixtures to protect Mitchell.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
172 S.W. 146, 1914 Tex. App. LEXIS 1479, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/j-m-radford-grocery-co-v-pace-texapp-1914.