FILED Aug 27 2025, 9:24 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana J.K., Appellant-Respondent
v.
S.H., Appellee-Petitioner
August 27, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PO-173 Appeal from the Boone Superior Court The Honorable Matthew C. Kincaid, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 06D01-2402-PO-332
Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges Bailey and Brown concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 1 of 13 Weissmann, Judge.
[1] S.H. (Mother) sought an order of protection against J.K. (Father), her former
romantic partner and the father of her youngest child. The trial court initially
granted an ex parte order for protection but after conducting an evidentiary
hearing, dismissed the order and denied Father’s request for attorney fees.
When Father later petitioned to expunge the ex parte protective order under the
same case number, the court summarily denied his petition. Father appealed,
challenging both the court’s refusal to grant attorney fees in the protective order
action and its denial of his expungement petition. Mother cross-appealed,
challenging the trial court’s denial of the protective order.
[2] But neither party filed a timely notice of appeal as to the protective order
judgment.1 We therefore find they forfeited their appeals of the protective order
judgment. They also offer no extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate
their forfeited appeals. Accordingly, we dismiss Father’s appeal and Mother’s
cross-appeal of the protective order judgment. As to the sole remaining claim
on appeal—Father’s timely appeal of the trial court’s denial of his expungement
petition—we affirm because Father’s petition did not comply with the
governing statute.
1 Both Father and Mother are attorneys. Father represented himself during the trial proceedings, as well as on appeal. Although represented by trial counsel below, Mother proceeded pro se on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 2 of 13 Facts [3] Mother and Father are the unmarried parents of a six-year-old child (Child).
After their volatile romantic relationship ended and their co-parenting became
equally problematic, Mother petitioned for a protective order against Father,
alleging he stalked her and engaged in a pattern of harassment against her. The
trial court granted an ex parte order for protection, and Father later moved for
summary judgment on Mother’s protective order petition. Father’s motion also
sought an award of attorney fees based on his view that Mother’s petition was
frivolous and filed in bad faith. The trial court denied Father’s motion as well as
the motion to reconsider that Father filed afterward.
[4] The trial court then conducted an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s petition for
protective order at which Mother presented hundreds of written
communications that the parties had exchanged during the six months before
the issuance of the ex parte order for protection. In these communications,
Father was often profane as he repeatedly accused Mother of bad parenting,
poor character, and undiagnosed mental illness. Father also repeatedly told
Mother that he and Child would be better off without Mother in their lives.
And he repeatedly turned discussions to his and Mother’s prior romantic
relationship despite Mother’s requests in the communications that she and
Father only discuss matters involving Child.
[5] Within hours after the hearing, Father filed Respondent’s Verified Post-Hearing
Motions. In that filing, Father requested the trial court “excuse my ineffective
counsel and the fact that I panicked during the hearing, and consider” various Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 3 of 13 matters that he “intended to raise today.” App. Vol. VII, p. 9. These matters
were his requests for: (1) the trial court to allow the parties to submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) a transcript and recording of the
evidentiary hearing; (3) attorney fees, which he labeled a “renewed” request;
and (4) reconsideration of the trial court’s decision to exclude exhibits attached
to his motion for summary judgment after Mother objected on hearsay grounds.
[6] On the same day as the evidentiary hearing—December 18, 2024—the court
entered an “ORDER ON HEARING” dismissing the ex parte protective order
and denying Mother’s motion for a protective order. But the court stated in the
judgment:
It is further ordered that the same, this Order, does not constitute an unfettered license to communicate directly with [Mother] for though [Father] may offer communication to [Mother], whether it is responded to or even accepted is up to her.
Communication should be limited to that necessary for the parties to complete their legal affairs and said communication with [Mother], on her election, may be by and through her counsel . . . or other such attorney as the case may be.
App. Vol. VII, p. 13. The trial court denied Respondent’s Verified Post-Hearing
Motions the next day (December 19, 2024).
[7] On December 24, 2024, Father petitioned to expunge the protective order. His
petition alleged that the ex parte order for protection had been “materially and
irrevocably harmful.” Id. at 17. Father conceded in the petition that he did not
attach, as required by the governing statute, certified copies of the ex parte
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 4 of 13 protective order and of the order denying the motion for protective order.
Without a hearing, the trial court denied Father’s motion for expungement on
January 7, 2025.
[8] On January 21, 2025, Father filed a notice of appeal with this Court. In that
document, Father specified that the judgments that he was appealing were the
trial court’s orders: (1) denying Respondent’s Verified Post-Hearing Motions, which
Father erroneously labeled as issued December 20, 2024, rather than December
19, 2024; and (2) denying his petition for expungement, which he erroneously
labeled as issued January 8, 2025, rather than January 7, 2025.2 Father’s notice
of appeal did not mention the trial court’s December 18, 2024 judgment, which
dismissed the ex parte order for protection and denied Mother’s protective order
petition. That judgment was entered on the chronological case summary more
than 30 days before Father filed his notice of appeal.
[9] Mother did not file a notice of appeal. But she challenged the denial of her
protective order petition by way of cross-appeal in her appellee’s brief. Father
sought dismissal of Mother’s cross-appeal based on her failure to file a notice of
appeal. A motions panel of this Court denied Father’s request.
2 Father relied on the dates the orders were electronically served rather than the dates they were entered on the chronological case summary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 5 of 13 Discussion and Decision [10] Father raises two issues on appeal. First, he challenges on several grounds the
trial court’s denial of his request for attorney fees. Second, he claims the court
was required both to set a hearing on his motion for expungement and to grant
it. Mother, in addition to contesting Father’s claims, contends in her cross-
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FILED Aug 27 2025, 9:24 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana J.K., Appellant-Respondent
v.
S.H., Appellee-Petitioner
August 27, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PO-173 Appeal from the Boone Superior Court The Honorable Matthew C. Kincaid, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 06D01-2402-PO-332
Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges Bailey and Brown concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 1 of 13 Weissmann, Judge.
[1] S.H. (Mother) sought an order of protection against J.K. (Father), her former
romantic partner and the father of her youngest child. The trial court initially
granted an ex parte order for protection but after conducting an evidentiary
hearing, dismissed the order and denied Father’s request for attorney fees.
When Father later petitioned to expunge the ex parte protective order under the
same case number, the court summarily denied his petition. Father appealed,
challenging both the court’s refusal to grant attorney fees in the protective order
action and its denial of his expungement petition. Mother cross-appealed,
challenging the trial court’s denial of the protective order.
[2] But neither party filed a timely notice of appeal as to the protective order
judgment.1 We therefore find they forfeited their appeals of the protective order
judgment. They also offer no extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate
their forfeited appeals. Accordingly, we dismiss Father’s appeal and Mother’s
cross-appeal of the protective order judgment. As to the sole remaining claim
on appeal—Father’s timely appeal of the trial court’s denial of his expungement
petition—we affirm because Father’s petition did not comply with the
governing statute.
1 Both Father and Mother are attorneys. Father represented himself during the trial proceedings, as well as on appeal. Although represented by trial counsel below, Mother proceeded pro se on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 2 of 13 Facts [3] Mother and Father are the unmarried parents of a six-year-old child (Child).
After their volatile romantic relationship ended and their co-parenting became
equally problematic, Mother petitioned for a protective order against Father,
alleging he stalked her and engaged in a pattern of harassment against her. The
trial court granted an ex parte order for protection, and Father later moved for
summary judgment on Mother’s protective order petition. Father’s motion also
sought an award of attorney fees based on his view that Mother’s petition was
frivolous and filed in bad faith. The trial court denied Father’s motion as well as
the motion to reconsider that Father filed afterward.
[4] The trial court then conducted an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s petition for
protective order at which Mother presented hundreds of written
communications that the parties had exchanged during the six months before
the issuance of the ex parte order for protection. In these communications,
Father was often profane as he repeatedly accused Mother of bad parenting,
poor character, and undiagnosed mental illness. Father also repeatedly told
Mother that he and Child would be better off without Mother in their lives.
And he repeatedly turned discussions to his and Mother’s prior romantic
relationship despite Mother’s requests in the communications that she and
Father only discuss matters involving Child.
[5] Within hours after the hearing, Father filed Respondent’s Verified Post-Hearing
Motions. In that filing, Father requested the trial court “excuse my ineffective
counsel and the fact that I panicked during the hearing, and consider” various Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 3 of 13 matters that he “intended to raise today.” App. Vol. VII, p. 9. These matters
were his requests for: (1) the trial court to allow the parties to submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) a transcript and recording of the
evidentiary hearing; (3) attorney fees, which he labeled a “renewed” request;
and (4) reconsideration of the trial court’s decision to exclude exhibits attached
to his motion for summary judgment after Mother objected on hearsay grounds.
[6] On the same day as the evidentiary hearing—December 18, 2024—the court
entered an “ORDER ON HEARING” dismissing the ex parte protective order
and denying Mother’s motion for a protective order. But the court stated in the
judgment:
It is further ordered that the same, this Order, does not constitute an unfettered license to communicate directly with [Mother] for though [Father] may offer communication to [Mother], whether it is responded to or even accepted is up to her.
Communication should be limited to that necessary for the parties to complete their legal affairs and said communication with [Mother], on her election, may be by and through her counsel . . . or other such attorney as the case may be.
App. Vol. VII, p. 13. The trial court denied Respondent’s Verified Post-Hearing
Motions the next day (December 19, 2024).
[7] On December 24, 2024, Father petitioned to expunge the protective order. His
petition alleged that the ex parte order for protection had been “materially and
irrevocably harmful.” Id. at 17. Father conceded in the petition that he did not
attach, as required by the governing statute, certified copies of the ex parte
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 4 of 13 protective order and of the order denying the motion for protective order.
Without a hearing, the trial court denied Father’s motion for expungement on
January 7, 2025.
[8] On January 21, 2025, Father filed a notice of appeal with this Court. In that
document, Father specified that the judgments that he was appealing were the
trial court’s orders: (1) denying Respondent’s Verified Post-Hearing Motions, which
Father erroneously labeled as issued December 20, 2024, rather than December
19, 2024; and (2) denying his petition for expungement, which he erroneously
labeled as issued January 8, 2025, rather than January 7, 2025.2 Father’s notice
of appeal did not mention the trial court’s December 18, 2024 judgment, which
dismissed the ex parte order for protection and denied Mother’s protective order
petition. That judgment was entered on the chronological case summary more
than 30 days before Father filed his notice of appeal.
[9] Mother did not file a notice of appeal. But she challenged the denial of her
protective order petition by way of cross-appeal in her appellee’s brief. Father
sought dismissal of Mother’s cross-appeal based on her failure to file a notice of
appeal. A motions panel of this Court denied Father’s request.
2 Father relied on the dates the orders were electronically served rather than the dates they were entered on the chronological case summary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 5 of 13 Discussion and Decision [10] Father raises two issues on appeal. First, he challenges on several grounds the
trial court’s denial of his request for attorney fees. Second, he claims the court
was required both to set a hearing on his motion for expungement and to grant
it. Mother, in addition to contesting Father’s claims, contends in her cross-
appeal that the trial court erred in denying her protective order petition.
[11] We conclude that Father forfeited his appeal of the attorney fees ruling by
failing to file a timely notice of appeal of the protective order judgment. And
because no timely notice of appeal from that judgment was filed, Mother
forfeited her cross-appeal of the trial court’s denial of her protective order
petition. The only non-forfeited issue on appeal is Father’s challenge to the trial
court’s denial of his expungement petition. As to that issue, we affirm, finding
the trial court properly denied Father’s expungement petition without hearing
because the petition did not comply with the applicable expungement statute.
I. Father and Mother Forfeited Their Appeals of the Protective Order Judgment [12] Where, as here, no motion to correct error is filed, a party initiates an appeal
from a final judgment by filing a notice of appeal “within thirty (30) days after
the entry of a Final Judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.”
Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1). “A judgment is a final judgment if . . . it disposes
of all claims as to all parties . . . .” Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)(1). “Unless the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 6 of 13 Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as
provided by P.C.R. 2.” App. R. 9(A)(5).
[13] On December 18, 2024, the trial court signed its “ORDER ON HEARING” in
which it dismissed the ex parte protective order and denied Mother’s petition
for protective order. This was a final judgment, as it disposed of all pending
claims of the parties in this protective order action. See App. R. 2(H)(1).
Respondent’s Verified Post-Hearing Motions—which was not disposed of until the
day after the protective order judgment—did not present new claims or
otherwise prevent this protective order judgment from acting as a final
judgment. Respondent’s Verified Post-Hearing Motions was simply: (1) a request for
a transcript and recording of the evidentiary hearing and to allow the parties to
submit proposed findings; and (2) a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s earlier rulings denying Father’s request for attorney fees and excluding
the motion for summary judgment exhibits that Father introduced at the
evidentiary hearing.
[14] The trial court had no obligation to even rule on any motion to reconsider. See
Ind. Trial Rule 53.4(B) (specifying that a motion to reconsider not ruled upon
within 5 days after filing is deemed denied). Even when a trial court chooses to
rule on a motion to reconsider, this ruling does not extend the period for filing a
notice of appeal. See T.R. 53.4(A) (providing that a motion to reconsider “shall
not delay the trial or any proceedings in the case, or extend the time for any
further required or permitted action, motion, or proceedings under these
rules.”). Thus, the deadline for the notice of appeal of the protective order
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 7 of 13 judgment was not extended by the trial court’s denial of Respondent’s Verified
Post-Hearing Motions. See, e.g., Snyder v. Snyder, 62 N.E.3d 455, 458-59 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016) (citing Trial Rule 53.4(A) and Appellate Rule 9, ruling that
“motions to reconsider do not toll the thirty-day timeframe within which a
party wishing to undertake an appeal must do so”); Citizens Indus. Grp. v.
Heartland Gas Pipeline, LLC, 856 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“[I]n
general civil practice a motion to reconsider does not toll the time period within
which an appellant must file a notice of appeal.”).
[15] To appeal the protective order judgment, Father was required to file a notice of
appeal by Friday, January 17, 2025—that is, within 30 days after the protective
order judgment was entered on the chronological case summary. See App. R.
9(A). Father did not file his notice of appeal until Tuesday, January 21, 2025—
four days late. He therefore forfeited his right to appeal the protective order
judgment, including his request for attorney fees in that proceeding.3
[16] If Father had filed a timely notice of appeal from the protective order judgment,
Mother could have cross-appealed that judgment without filing a notice of
appeal. See App. R. 9(D) (“An appellee may cross-appeal without filing a
Notice of Appeal by raising cross-appeal issues in the appellee’s brief.”). But
“[a] party must file a Notice of Appeal to preserve its right to appeal if no other
3 Father’s motion to dismiss Mother’s cross-appeal made clear that he believed the 30-day clock for filing the notice of appeal first began ticking on December 20, 2024, when he received electronic service of the trial court’s order denying Respondent’s Verified Post-Hearing Motions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 8 of 13 party appeals.” Id. Given Father’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal as to
the protective order judgment, Mother forfeited her appeal of that judgment by
failing to file her own notice of appeal.
[17] “[T]he forfeiture of the right to appeal on timeliness grounds does not deprive
the appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Cooper’s Hawk Indpls.,
LLC v. Ray, 162 N.E.3d 1097, 1098 (Ind. 2021). To reinstate a forfeited appeal,
a litigant must show “extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited
right should be restored.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014).
Neither Father nor Mother offers any extraordinarily compelling reasons why
their forfeited appeals should be restored. Accordingly, we dismiss Father’s
appeal and Mother’s cross-appeal insofar as they arise from the protective order
judgment.
[18] But Father did not forfeit his entire appeal. The trial court’s ruling on Father’s
requested expungement was separate from the trial court’s protective order
judgment and a final appealable order in its own right. See Ind. Code § 34-26-
7.5-4(c) (“The grant or denial of a petition for expungement is a final appealable
order.”). Father noted in his notice of appeal that he was appealing the trial
court’s denial of his expungement petition, and his notice of appeal was filed
less than 30 days after that expungement decision. As Father’s notice of appeal
from the expungement ruling was timely and Mother timely responded to that
issue, we proceed to address their arguments on this issue.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 9 of 13 II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Father’s Expungement Petition [19] “At any time after a court dismisses or denies an order for protection following
issuance of an order for protection ex parte [under Indiana Code chapter 34-26-
5], the subject of the protection order may petition to expunge protection order
records.” Ind. Code § 34-26-7.5-3(a). The petition for expungement must be
filed “with the court that issued or denied the protection order” and “in the
cause the protection order was issued under.” Id.
[20] The expungement petition also must include “[c]ertified copies of the following,
if applicable: (A) [t]he order for protection[;] (B) [t]he order for protection ex
parte[;] (C) [t]he order denying an order for protection[;] (D) [t]he opinion from
the appellate court reversing or vacating an order for protection or an order for
protection ex parte.” Ind. Code § 34-26-7.5-3(b)(9). “Unless the petition is
incomplete, or the petition conclusively indicates that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief, the court shall . . . set the matter for hearing.” Ind. Code § 34-
26-7.5-4(a). And “[t]he court shall order the protection order records expunged
if the petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is
entitled to relief.” Ind. Code § 34-26-7.5-5.
[21] Father acknowledged in his expungement petition that he had not attached, as
required by Indiana Code § 34-26-7.5-3(b)(9), the certified copies of either the
ex parte order of protection or the “ORDER ON HEARING” that dismissed
the ex parte order for protection and denied Mother’s petition for protective
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 10 of 13 order. On appeal, he claims that he substantially complied with Indiana Code §
34-26-7.5-3(b)(9) by providing uncertified copies of the two orders.
[22] Father contends that substantial compliance is deemed sufficient in other areas
of the law and that it should have been enough here to justify setting the
expungement petition for hearing, at the least. He also argues, without citation
to any authority, that strict compliance with Indiana Code § 34-26-7.5-3(b)(9)
“would prevent many from being able to attain their expungements” and
“would practically make it appear as if the law was never passed to begin with.”
Appellant’s Br., p. 50. He concludes, again without citation to authority, that
“it . . . cannot be the case that Boone County would require an out of state pro
se litigant to request certified copies of the court’s own orders . . . .” Id.
[23] Father has waived this claim by failing to provide cogent argument supported
by citation to applicable authority. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)
(specifying that contentions in the appellant’s brief be supported by cogent
reasoning and citations to authorities or statutes). Waiver notwithstanding,
Father’s claims are unpersuasive.
[24] The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.
Taylor v. State, 7 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We first determine
whether the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. Id. If so, we simply
“require that words and phrases be given their plain, ordinary, and usual
meanings” and apply no other rules of construction. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 11 of 13 [25] Indiana appellate courts have not previously interpreted Indiana Code § 34-26-
7.5-3(b)(9), but its language is clear and unambiguous. This statutory provision
expressly requires that persons seeking expungement under Indiana Code
chapter 34-26-7.5 attach to the expungement petition certified copies of certain
listed orders. Ind. Code § 34-26-7.5-3(b)(9). All the orders specified in the
statute are protective order records that are likely critical to the trial court’s
consideration of the expungement petition. See id.
[26] Thus, the plain language of these statutes requires that an expungement petition
contain certified copies of the protective order rulings, although records of those
same orders presumably would be in the files of the court in which the
expungement petition was filed. See Ind. Code § 34-26-7.5-3(a) (specifying that
petitions to expunge protective order records must be filed in the court that
issued or denied the protective order). We are unpersuaded by Father’s claims
that these statutes authorized him to include uncertified copies of the orders or
that he substantially complied with their mandates by doing so.4
[27] Father’s omission of the certified copies rendered his expungement petition
“incomplete” under Indiana Code § 34-26-7.5-4(a). Thus, the trial court was not
obligated to set the petition for hearing or to grant it. Ind Code § 34-26-7.5-4.
4 Additionally, Father exaggerates the burden imposed by these statutes. Father, an attorney in an adjoining state with a child residing in Boone County, need only have contacted the Boone County Clerk to obtain certified copies of orders issued by the courts there.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 12 of 13 Accordingly, Father has failed to establish the trial court erred in denying his
petition for expungement without hearing.
Conclusion [28] We dismiss Father’s appeal and Mother’s cross-appeal of the protective order
judgment, and we affirm the trial court’s order denying Father’s expungement
petition.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
APPELLANT PRO SE J.K. Cleveland, Ohio
APPELLEE PRO SE S.H. Zionsville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PO-173 | August 27, 2025 Page 13 of 13