J. Josephson, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co.

357 F. Supp. 1047, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12747
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 14, 1972
Docket71 Civ. 5372
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 357 F. Supp. 1047 (J. Josephson, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
J. Josephson, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 357 F. Supp. 1047, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12747 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

Opinion

Memorandum Opinion and Order

MOTLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff J. Josephson, Inc. (Josephson), a manufacturer and distributor of vinyl wallcoverings, among other products, seeks a preliminary injunction against defendant General Tire & Rubber Co. (General Tire), also a manufacturer and distributor of vinyl wall-coverings, enjoining General Tire from engaging in unfair competition with Josephson. 1 The items in question are a line of Josephson’s vinyl wallcoverings of striped and textured designs exhibited in a sample book known as “Textures & Stripes”, and a similar line manufactured by General Tire displayed in a sample book entitled “fashon: stripes & textures”. Whereas Josephson began manufacturing its line in 1968, General Tire initiated “stripes & textures” in November, 1971. Jurisdiction is based on diversity.

This is not a case arising under the copyright or trademark laws of the United States: neither Josephson’s nor General Tire’s designs for striped and textured vinyl wallcoverings are copyrighted, nor is there a registered trademark on the name of either party’s line. 2 It is a common law action for unfair competition, and is thus governed by the law of the forum. Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 780 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913, 85 S.Ct. 899, 13 L.Ed.2d 799 (1965).

We hold that Josephson has not made a sufficient showing of the likelihood of success of its claim of unfair competition, and consequently deny Josephson’s motion.

Under New York law, proof of secondary meaning attached to plaintiff’s product when coupled with a demonstration that defendant’s product is confusingly similar to that of plaintiff, will establish a cause of action for unfair competition. Absent secondary meaning, plaintiff may prove that defendant was engaged in one of a number of predatory practices which, per se, amount to unfair competition. These include palming off, actual deception, appropriation of plaintiff’s property, and interference with plaintiff’s contractual rights, Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959).

Josephson here relies on its belief that secondary meaning has attached to its “Textures & Stripes” line, and that General Tire’s “stripes & textures” line is confusingly similar in appearance to Josephson’s “Textures & Stripes.”

Secondary meaning refers to the association formed in the mind of the consumer which links an individual product with its manufacturer or distributor. It has been defined as:

“. . . the meaning which attaches to descriptive words that ‘have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase had (sic) come to mean that the article was his product’ (G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield Pub. Co., 6 Cir., 198 F. 369, mod. and affd. 6 Cir., 238 F. 1, cert. den. 243 U.S. 651, 37 S.Ct. 478, 61 L.Ed. 947).”

McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 32 Misc.2d 704, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646, 652 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co.1962). See *1049 also Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H. G. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1962).

However, where the name of a product is made up of generic terms, rather than fanciful terms, there is a heavy burden on a plaintiff attempting to establish secondary meaning for his product, since a monopoly on descriptive words in the public domain will not readily be granted. American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme Laboratories, 420 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1970), and cases cited therein; Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 849-850 (5th Cir. 1970); Clairol, Inc. v. Gillette Co., 389 F.2d 264, 269-270 (2d Cir. 1968); McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., supra, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 655-656. The phrase “Textures & Stripes” in issue here is strictly generic and merely describes the type of wallcoverings included in the “Textures & Stripes” line — that is, wallcoverings with either striped or textured patterns. Josephson has not demonstrated that, in this case, secondary meaning has attached to these descriptive words. It was said by the New York Supreme Court, with regard to the book PT 109, John F. Kennedy in World War II, that:

“Plaintiffs have chosen three names or terms — PT 109, John F. Kennedy, and World War II — which are descriptive or generic, and combined them into a title. But those names or terms still remain publici juris, and may be used by others in their primary descriptive or generic sense (citations omitted).”
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“To succeed in establishing that defendants are unlawfully competing with them, the plaintiffs must, therefore, prove more than a mere similarity of titles.”

McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., supra, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 652-653.

The particular patterns of stripes and textures designed by Josephson are not so out of the ordinary as to result in consumer identification of Josephson with the designs in the “Textures & Stripes” sample book. 3 As was said in a case in this Circuit involving two competing soap dishes:

“ ‘Manifestly, a purchaser of this simple and inexpensive household item . . . relies not on the reputation of the producer, but upon the apparent quality and eye appeal of the product itself.’ (citation omitted) And as Judge Learned Hand stated almost a ■half a century ago, ‘it is an absolute condition to any relief whatever’ on this theory ‘that the public cares who does make them, and not merely for their appearance and structure.’ Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (C.C.A.2, 1917); Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., supra, 2d Cir., 194 F.2d 416.” Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H. G. Salzman, Inc., supra, 302 F.2d at 620.

In all fairness to Josephson, we must say that it admits that most consumers do not associate wallcoverings with particular manufacturers or their sample books. Rather it contends that the retailers and distributors of the wallcoverings are the “consumers” who become well-acquainted with the various sample books of the different manufacturers.

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357 F. Supp. 1047, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/j-josephson-inc-v-general-tire-rubber-co-nysd-1972.