J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Mitchell

42 N.W. 151, 74 Mich. 679, 1889 Mich. LEXIS 693
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedApril 24, 1889
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 42 N.W. 151 (J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Mitchell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Mitchell, 42 N.W. 151, 74 Mich. 679, 1889 Mich. LEXIS 693 (Mich. 1889).

Opinion

Long, J.

On April 2, 1883, George W. Mitchell and wife, Sarah Jane Mitchell, two of the above defendants, made and executed an indenture of mortgage to George W. Jenks, administrator, etc., covering the E. % of the N. E. i of section 22, township 16 N., of range lo E., Huron county, Mich. This mortgage was recorded in the [681]*681office of the register of deeds of Huron county, on April 5, 1883, and was thereafter duly assigned in writing by said Jenks to Margaret L. Davidson, the other defendant. The mortgage was given for the sum of $182.28, and was to come due on or before April 2, 1888, with interest payable annually. For non-payment of interest when due the mortgagee had the option in the said mortgage to declare the whole amount of principal and interest due, and the right to foreclose the same under the power of sale contained in the mortgage. The interest remaining unpaid, on November 10, 1887,, the assignee of the mortgage, Mrs. Davidson, declared the whole amount for principal and interest due, and commenced a statutory foreclosure, by the publication of the usual notice, claiming there was due on the mortgage and note for principal and interest the sum of $25478.

On the same day this mortgage was given, George W. Mitchell conveyed to his wife, Sarah Jane Mitchell, the north 45 acres of the premises covered by this mortgage, by deed of warranty containing the usual covenants of seisin, and that the premises were free from all incumbrances. The north 45 acres included the homestead of George W. Mitchell and wife; the dwelling-house and appurtenances where they resided being situate thereon.

On September 16, 1886, George W. Mitchell, being indebted to the J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company, complainant, in the sum of $700, gave his promissory notes for that amount to it; and to secure the payment of said notes he, with his wife, Sarah Jane Mitchell, made and executed a mortgage for said amount on the same date to said complainant, covering the south 35 acres of the premises described in the mortgage to George W. Jenks. This amount was due under said mortgage in installments: $150, October 1, 1887; $200, December 1, 1887; $150, October 1, 1888; $200, December 1, 1888. [682]*682Default having been made in the payment of the first two installments of this mortgage, on February 4, 1888, complainant filed its bill in the circuit court, in chancery, of Huron county, to foreclose said mortgage, and to restrain the sale of the premises under the foreclosure by Margaret L. Davidson of her mortgage, which was to take place under said notice on February 7, 1888. Upon filing this bill, an injunction was allowed by the circuit judge restraining the sale under the Davidson mortgage. The complainant in its bill prays that Margaret L. Davidson be compelled under such foreclosure to sell the north 45 acres of the premises first, before resorting to or selling the south 35 acres of the premises covered by its mortgage.

The defendants all appeared and answered. The defendant Sarah Jane Mitchell in her answer alleged her home, stead interest in the north 45 acres, and her purchase from her husband; and prayed that the south 35 acres be first sold under the Davidson mortgage, before sale should be made of the 45 acres so owned by her. Defendant Davidson also answered, and prayed foreclosure of her mortgage upon the whole tract covered thereby, and for her costs in the proceedings.

On the hearing in the circuit, the court decreed that the south 35 acres be first sold under the Davidson mortgage, and that, if a sufficient sum should be realized at such sale, the north 45 acres should be released from the lien of that mortgage. The court found due on the complainant’s mortgage the sum of $317.80, and decreed that George W. Mitchell pay the same, with interest and costs, on or before February 17, 1889, and that in default thereof a sale be made of the 35 acres so covered by said mortgage. The court also found due on the Davidson mortgage the sum of $271.46, and ordered payment thereof by George W. Mitchell and Sarah Jane Mitchell, with [683]*683interest and costs, on or before February 17, 1889; and in default that defendant Davidson first proceed to a sale of the south 35 acres of said premises; and that, if that was insufficient to pay the amount due, then a sale of the north 45 acres to be made. The court ordered, further, that complainant pay to Margaret L. Davidson the sum of 842.30, the amount of costs and expenses incurred by her in her foreclosure proceedings by advertisement. The court also decreed that complainant pay the sum of 825 as costs to defendant Sarah Jane Mitchell. From this decree complainant appeals.

The deed was made and delivered to Sarah Jane Mitchell, by her- husband, and by her placed upon record, prior to the time of the execution and delivery of the complainant’s mortgage. At the time of the taking of this mortgage the complainant not only had notice by the record that the whole 80 acres was incumbered by the Davidson mortgage, but also that the title to the north 45 acres had been transferred by George W. Mitchell to his wife, Sarah Jane Mitchell, and that the legal title to that parcel was vested in her at the time of the giving of the mortgage to complainant. Where a part of the mortgaged premises has been aliened by the mortgagor subsequent to the mortgage, the rule in equity, on a foreclosure and sale, is to require that part of the premises in which the mortgagor has not .parted with his equity of redemption to be the first sold, and then, if necessary, that which has been aliened, and, where the latter is in possession of different vendees, in the inverse order of alienation. This rule rests upon the ground, chiefly, that where one who is bound to pay a mortgage confers upon others rights in any portion of the property, retaining other portions himself, it is unjust that they should be deprived of their rights, so long as he has property covered by the mortgage out of which the debt can be made. [684]*684In other words, his debt should be paid out of his own estate, instead of being charged in the estate of his grantees. Mason v. Payne, Walk. Ch. 459; Cooper v. Bigly, 13 Mich. 463.

The deed from Mitchell to his wife contains the usual covenants of warranty, and it is evident therefrom that it was the intention of the grantor in his deed to charge the part remaining in him first to the payment of this mortgage. These covenants of warranty become important in determining the intent of the mortgagor not to charge the mortgage on the property sold. If the bill had been filed to foreclose the Davidson mortgage, and the rights of complainant had not intervened, no one would deny the right of the defendant Sarah J. Mitchell, the grantee in the deed, to have the 35 acres remaining in her grantor first sold to satisfy the mortgage, before the portion purchased by her should be made liable to its payment, under the rule above stated. It is insisted, however, by counsel for complainant, that the defendant Sarah J. Mitchell, having signed the Davidson mortgage, and. taken a deed from her husband of the 45 acres, it was charged with its proportionate share of the lien, the same as if she had purchased the whole 80. This fact could not affect her right to have the south 35 acres remaining in her husband first sold. The mortgage was given to secure the payment of the debt of the husband, and she in its execution only barred her dower.

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Bluebook (online)
42 N.W. 151, 74 Mich. 679, 1889 Mich. LEXIS 693, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/j-i-case-threshing-machine-co-v-mitchell-mich-1889.