UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
S.J-D., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 24-cv-00707 (DLF)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
R.J., S.D., and their child, S.J-D., bring this action against the District of Columbia under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., challenging the
District of Columbia Public Schools’ (DCPS) failure to provide S.J-D. a free appropriate public
education (FAPE). See Compl., Dkt. 3-2. Before the Court is the plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, Dkt. 9, and the District’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 11. For the
following reasons, the Court will deny the plaintiffs’ motion and grant the District’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework
Under the IDEA, “every child with a disability in this country is entitled to a ‘free
appropriate public education,’ or FAPE.” Leggett v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 59, 62 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). For students with disabilities, public school
officials must “develop a comprehensive strategy, known as an ‘individualized education
program,’ or IEP, tailored to the student’s unique needs.” Id. at 63 (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)). “To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017).
Among other requirements, an IEP must include “a statement of the special education and
related services and supplementary aids and services . . . to be provided to the child” along with
“an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate with nondisabled
children in the regular class.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV)–(V). Special education services
“in general education” are provided in the regular classroom and among non-disabled peers,
whereas special education services “outside general education” are provided apart from the general
student population in a specialized classroom. See Z.B. v. District of Columbia, 888 F.3d 515, 528
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
Under the IDEA, “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are
educated with children who are not disabled.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). “[S]pecial classes,
separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.” Id. In other words, students must “be educated in the least restrictive environment
possible,” Leggett, 793 F.3d at 74, such that “they receive education in the regular classroom
whenever possible,” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 400 (citation modified). Under DCPS policy, a
student’s IEP will provide for “full-time” specialized instruction only when she requires “20 or
more hours of specialized instruction per week outside the general education classroom.” D.C.
Pub. Sch. Off. of Specialized Instruction, Programs & Resources Guide for Staff 4 (2014),
https://dcps.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dcps/publication/attachments/GAGA-2015-R0046-
AttachmentJ9OSI14-15ProgramsandResourcesGuideforStaff.pdf.
2 The IDEA also requires local education agencies to “establish and maintain procedures in
accordance with [the IDEA] to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are
guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a [FAPE].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).
For example, the IDEA provides parents an opportunity “to participate in meetings with respect to
the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child, and the provision of a
[FAPE] to such child.” Id. § 1415(b)(1). As relevant here, schools must give “timely access” to
parents or their designee “for observing a child’s current or proposed special educational program”
upon request. D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(5)(A); see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (“The term [FAPE] means
special education and related services that . . . meet the standards of the State educational
agency.”). School districts must also review and revise a student’s IEP “not less frequently than
annually.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
Parents with either substantive or procedural complaints about a school’s “‘identification,
evaluation, or educational placement’ of their child or to its ‘provision of a [FAPE]’ may request
a due-process hearing.” Davis v. District of Columbia, 244 F. Supp. 3d 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2017)
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)). At this hearing, parents are entitled to have counsel accompany
and advise them, to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to receive a written decision
from the hearing officer. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h). Parents may then bring a civil action in state or
federal court for judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
B. Factual Background
S.J-D. is a thirteen-year-old student. See Compl. ¶ 4. She attended Francis Stevens
Elementary School (Francis Stevens), a D.C. public school, from 2015 to 2021—from pre-
kindergarten through the fourth grade. See id. ¶ 10. In September 2018, when S.J-D. was in the
second grade, Francis Stevens developed a plan under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to
3 address her ADHD. Administrative Record (AR) 42, Dkt. 7. In February 2020, when S.J-D. was
in the third grade, DCPS found her eligible for special education and related services as a student
with an Other Health Impairment for ADHD, and it developed an initial IEP for S.J-D. AR 91–
92, 102. One month later, in March 2020, Francis Stevens transitioned to virtual learning because
of the COVID-19 pandemic. See AR 116, 122.
S.J-D.’s initial IEP included goals in math, reading, and written expression. AR 104–08.
To achieve those goals, DCPS prescribed specialized instruction of (1) two hours per week in
reading and one hour per week in math, in general education, and (2) one hour per week in written
expression and two hours per week in math, outside general education in a “small setting.” AR
109–10. By the end of the 2019–20 school year, S.J-D.’s progress reports reflected that, out of
five math goals, she mastered one, progressed on two, and was “not introduced” or “just
introduced” to two due to the pandemic. AR 118–20. Out of her four reading and writing goals,
she progressed on two and was not introduced to two. AR 120–22.
S.J-D. advanced to the fourth grade and continued to attend Francis Stevens during the
2020–21 school year. Compl. ¶ 14. The school continued to instruct its students in a virtual
learning environment that year due to the pandemic, and a portion of S.J-D.’s IEP suggested that
she was “working predominantly in groups one on one with a teacher or with one other student.”
AR 137. Her final IEP progress report reflected that she progressed on all reading and writing
goals and that, out of four math goals, she progressed on two and made no progress on two that
had been introduced in the prior quarter. AR 150–54.
In February 2021, DCPS convened an IEP team meeting. AR 133. The IEP team
maintained S.J-D.’s disability classification for ADHD, updated her IEP’s goals, and maintained
the same number of specialized instruction hours. AR 133, 135–40.
4 At the end of S.J-D.’s fourth-grade year, her parents removed her from Francis Stevens and
placed her in the Lab School of Washington, a private special-education school. Compl. ¶ 15; AR
29. The record contains “no correspondence from [the parents] explaining their decision,” but the
parents later expressed their concern about staffing shortages at Francis Stevens. AR 29. S.J-D.
enrolled in the fifth grade at the Lab School for the 2021–22 school year. AR 192.
In January 2022, S.J-D.’s parents consulted a private psychologist, Dr. Susan Hammond,
who confirmed S.J-D.’s ADHD diagnosis. AR 155, 157. Under the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental-Disorders-Fifth Edition (DSM-V) criteria, Dr. Hammond also diagnosed S.J-D.
with a language disorder, a generalized anxiety disorder, and specific learning disorders with
impairment in reading and math. AR 157–58. In her report, Dr. Hammond “fully support[ed]
[S.J-D.’s] parents’ decision to place her at the Lab School,” and asserted that S.J-D. required “small
groupings in all academic subjects, as well as individualized instruction in reading and math,” and
“speech/language therapy.” AR 167. That report was shared with the IEP team on May 10, 2022.
AR 1073. Two months later, S.J-D.’s parents informed DCPS that S.J-D. would continue to attend
the Lab School for the 2022–23 school year and requested funding. AR 206. DCPS denied their
request to fund S.J-D.’s private-school placement. AR 255.
In August 2022, DCPS convened an IEP meeting and provided a draft IEP. AR 208, 211.
In the August 2022 IEP, DCPS updated S.J-D.’s goals and provided specialized instruction of (1)
two hours per week in reading, one hour per week in math, and one hour per week in written
expression, all in general education, and (2) two hours per week in math outside general education.
AR 213–25. The IEP also added other classroom aids and services like time for breaks, repetition
of directions, and frequent check-ins. AR 224–25.
5 In addition, DCPS independently reviewed Dr. Hammond’s evaluation and administered
its own educational assessments of S.J-D. AR 228–45. DCPS determined that S.J-D. did not meet
the criteria for a specific learning disability classification, as advocated by Dr. Hammond, and
maintained her Other Health Impairment classification for ADHD. AR 241–42. DCPS also
concluded that the Lab School records did not show that S.J-D. had a disabling oral communication
disorder that would make her eligible for speech-language pathology services. AR 249. The
parents were unsatisfied with the proposed August 2022 IEP because, in their view, it provided
too few specialized instruction hours outside general education. See AR 252.
In September 2022, DCPS further assessed S.J-D. under a comprehensive speech and
language evaluation. AR 268–95. The evaluator analyzed S.J-D.’s scores on a variety of tests,
interviewed S.J-D.’s Lab School teachers, observed her in a classroom setting, and concluded that
S.J-D.’s language profile was “not consistent with a student with a disabling oral communication
disorder that would prevent her from accessing or gaining benefit from the general education
curriculum.” AR 290, 1262.
In October 2022, DCPS convened an IEP meeting to discuss those evaluations. AR 304.
In attendance were S.J-D.’s father, his attorney, and Amy Mounce, an educational consultant hired
by the parents to assist with developing S.J-D.’s IEP. AR 304, 838. DCPS explained its decision
not to place S.J-D. under any additional disability classifications. AR 309–10. S.J-D.’s parents
objected to DCPS’s refusal to add a specific learning disability classification, which would entitle
S.J-D. to Speech and Language Services. AR 306. After discussing S.J-D.’s social and emotional
struggles, DCPS proposed amending the August 2022 IEP to add behavioral support services
(BSS). AR 313. DCPS later added BSS goals to the August 2022 IEP and provided three hours
per month of BSS outside general education. AR 344–51.
6 In May 2023, DCPS held its next annual IEP review with the plaintiffs. AR 446. The May
2023 IEP maintained S.J-D.’s disability classification as Other Health Impairment, updated the
IEP goals, and provided specialized instruction of (1) five hours per week in written expression
and five hours per week in reading, all in general education, and (2) five hours per week in math
outside general education. AR 454–77. The IEP also included 90 minutes per month of
consultation BSS, which provides support to S.J-D.’s teachers, AR 1338, and three hours per
month of BSS outside general education, which provides direct support to S.J-D., AR 1342. AR
476–77. Finally, the IEP added several new classroom aids and services, including “check-in[s]
with trusted adult/social worker when needed,” “trusted teacher check-in,” and “small groups.”
AR 476. DCPS proposed the plaintiffs’ local school, Francis Stevens, as the implementing school.
AR 452. Unsatisfied with the proposed IEP, S.J-D.’s parents communicated that they wanted their
daughter to remain at the Lab School. AR 452.
Three days later, on May 19, 2023, S.J-D.’s mother asked to observe the proposed program
at Francis Stevens with the family’s educational consultant, Amy Mounce. AR 482. DCPS offered
an observation nearly seven months later. AR 1093–1094.
C. Procedural History
On July 14, 2023, S.J-D.’s parents filed a due process complaint against DCPS in the proper
administrative tribunal. AR 573. They alleged that S.J-D. had been denied a FAPE due to DCPS’s
failure to (1) propose an appropriate program or placement for the 2022–23 and 2023–24 school
years and (2) timely respond to S.J-D.’s mother’s request for an observation of Francis Stevens.
AR 40. The plaintiffs sought (1) reimbursement for S.J-D.’s tuition at the Lab School for the
2022–23 school year and (2) placement at Lab School for the 2023–24 school year. AR 34.
7 A four-day due process hearing was held in December 2023 before a hearing officer. AR 4.
The plaintiffs presented five witnesses: educational consultant Amy Mounce, AR 836–916;
speech-language pathology expert Gretchen Kunz, AR 921–44; the Lab School director of
jurisdictional services Audrey Dolginoff, AR 946–1011; psychologist Susan Hammond, AR
1013–59; and S.J-D.’s father, AR 1062–1132. DCPS presented six witnesses: psychology expert
Shirley Hodges, AR 1146–212; speech-language pathology expert Delisa Green, AR 1214–83;
school social worker Regina Nadir, AR 1315–59; special education expert Nicole Manuel, AR
1362–437; assistant principal Olamide Gbenro, AR 1439–53; and special education programming
and placement expert Sean Bradley, AR 1286–309. The hearing officer issued a decision in favor
of DCPS on January 16, 2024. AR 69. He found that DCPS had not denied S.J-D. a FAPE in
either year and therefore rejected the parents’ claims for reimbursement and placement at the Lab
School. AR 69.
Following these proceedings, plaintiffs filed this action against the District on March 13,
2024, seeking review of the hearing officer’s decision. See Dkt. 3. The parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment, which are now ripe for resolution. See Dkts. 9, 11.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one
that could affect the outcome of the lawsuit. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A dispute is “genuine” if a
reasonable jury could determine that the evidence warrants a verdict for the nonmoving party. See
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. “If there are no genuine issues of
8 material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party
‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
In an IDEA suit, “judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision by way of
summary judgment motion . . . is not a true summary judgment procedure.” Lopez-Young v.
District of Columbia, 211 F. Supp. 3d 42, 50 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation modified). “Instead, the
district court essentially conducts a bench trial based on a stipulated record.” L.R.L. ex rel. Lomax
v. District of Columbia, 896 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation modified); see also Smith
v. District of Columbia, 846 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that court review in
the IDEA context is like “review of an administrative decision”). When “no additional evidence
is introduced in a civil suit seeking review” of a hearing officer’s determination, “a motion for
summary judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidence comprising the
record.” Brown v. District of Columbia, 568 F. Supp. 2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2008). “The party
challenging the administrative determination takes on the burden of persuading the court that the
hearing officer was wrong.” Middleton v. District of Columbia, 312 F. Supp. 3d 113, 129 (D.D.C.
2018) (citation modified) (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The
court bases “its decision on the preponderance of the evidence.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
The court must give “due weight” to the hearing officer’s determination and “may not
substitute its own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities.” Turner
v. District of Columbia, 952 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation modified). But
“[j]udicial review under [the] IDEA is more rigorous than in typical agency cases.” N.G. v. District
of Columbia, 556 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia,
9 401 F.3d 516, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). “[A] hearing decision without reasoned and specific findings
deserves little deference,” Reid, 401 F.3d at 521 (citation modified), and in such a case, a “district
court may determine that the appropriate relief is a remand to the hearing officer for further
proceedings,” id. at 526 (citation modified).
III. ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs contend that S.J-D. was denied a FAPE and ask the Court to reverse the
hearing officer’s decision and order reimbursement for the 2022–23 and 2023–24 school years at
the Lab School. S.J-D.’s parents argue that the hearing officer erred by (1) disregarding key
evidence and relying on flawed evidence when assessing the adequacy of the August 2022 and
May 2023 IEPs; (2) improperly assessing the credibility of witnesses; (3) finding that DCPS’s
failure to offer an observation did not constitute a denial of FAPE; and (4) ignoring DCPS’s delay
in developing S.J-D.’s August 2022 IEP. The Court will address each argument in turn.
A. Adequacy of the IEPs
Under the IDEA, an IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 399. “Accordingly, for
a child fully integrated in the regular classroom, an IEP typically should . . . be ‘reasonably
calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.’” Id. at
401 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203–04
(1982)); see Uhlenkamp v. District of Columbia, 691 F. Supp. 3d 224, 240 (D.D.C. 2023). An IEP
is reviewed as of the time that the IEP “was created rather than with the benefit of hindsight.” Z.B.,
888 F.3d at 524 (citation modified).
The hearing officer found that the August 2022 and May 2023 IEPs were reasonably
calculated to enable S.J-D. to make progress and advance from grade to grade. He based this
10 conclusion on S.J-D.’s current performance levels, the IEPs’ level of specialized education hours,
and the IDEA’s least restrictive environment requirement. AR 27–32. To prevail on review, the
plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the evidence that “the hearing officer was wrong in
concluding that [S.J-D.’s] IEPs were appropriate.” Edward M.R. v. District of Columbia, 128
F.4th 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citation modified). The plaintiffs fail to meet that burden.
First, the record does not support the plaintiffs’ contention that the hearing officer
arbitrarily rejected Dr. Hammond’s testimony that S.J-D.’s learning profile required full-time
specialized instruction that would entirely remove her from a general education environment.
Contra Pls.’ Mot. at 13–15, Dkt. 9. As the hearing officer explained, he found Dr. Hammond’s
recommendations “unpersuasive for several reasons.” AR 30. In particular, Dr. Hammond failed
to evaluate S.J-D. under the proper IDEA criteria for disability classifications, relying instead on
the DSM-V criteria, AR 24, 30, 1046; she “did not talk to any of [S.J-D.’s] teachers” at the Lab
School or at DCPS, AR 24, 1050–51; she “did not review” records from S.J-D.’s time in a general
education environment and was unfamiliar with any quantitative data about the student’s
performance in that environment, AR 24, 30, 1042; and she did not know what S.J-D.’s class sizes
would be at Francis Stevens, AR 30, 1045.
Further, Dr. Hammond’s recommendations contradicted the evaluations conducted by
DCPS witnesses Hodges and Green, whom the hearing officer found to be “more balanced and
credible.” AR 30. Hodges explained that Dr. Hammond’s evaluation overemphasized a single
subtest result to reach her diagnosis. AR 1167, 30. Green, for her part, applied the IDEA criteria
and concluded that S.J-D. lacked a disabling communication disability that would “prevent her
from accessing or gaining benefit from the general educational curriculum.” AR 292, 19; see AR
1261–63 (“[G]iven her linguistic profile, I don’t see anything that would preclude her from being
11 able to benefit from [a general education environment] . . . . There was nothing that indicated that
[S.J-D.] had a disabling oral communication disorder that would require speech and language
therapy.”). Faced with such conflicting testimony, the Court gives “‘due weight’ to the hearing
officer’s credibility determinations.” J.T. v. District of Columbia (J.T. I), No. 20-cv-7105, 2022
WL 126707, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2022) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206); see J.T. v. District
of Columbia (J.T. II), 496 F. Supp. 3d 190, 207 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[T]he hearing officer is best
positioned to make credibility judgments as to testifying witnesses and resolve factual disputes
that amount to inconsistent testimony.”).
Second, the hearing officer did not ignore Mounce’s determination that “a general
education setting was not appropriate for S.J-D.” Pls.’ Mot. at 16. Instead, he found that Mounce’s
conclusion, which was based on limited information, was “pure conjecture” and “speculative” as
to how S.J-D. would perform in a general education environment. AR 32. Mounce’s testimony
was based on “current year data from the Lab School evaluations, information provided by the
family and [the] Lab School, [her own] observations, and [a] review of all the documents.” AR
870. She pointed to S.J-D.’s “academic levels, but also her anxiety, her academic levels, coupled
with her memory weakness and language weakness, functioning in a larger class.” AR 872. And
Mounce recounted, “[E]ven in the classes I saw [at the Lab School] where it was four, seven
students, excuse me,” S.J-D. “still required [an] adult . . . checking in” and needed “the reassurance
and the prompting and having her rehearse what is the next step.” Id. According to Mounce, “that
just can’t be programmed for in a larger setting.” Id. 1
1 In addition, the plaintiffs note that they alerted DCPS in May 2023 to their observation that S.J-D. “is really struggling, even in a class size of 4 with really good teachers” at the Lab School. AR 446; Pls.’ Opp’n & Reply at 7, Dkt. 14. Because S.J-D. struggled even in a small-group setting, the plaintiffs argue that DCPS was wrong to ignore their request for full-time specialized instruction and to keep her primarily in a general education environment. But the plaintiffs fail to
12 But the mere fact that S.J-D. required “an adult . . . checking in” with her in a special
education environment does not mean that such check-ins would be ineffective in a general
education environment. See H.R. v. District of Columbia, No. 21-cv-1856, 2024 WL 3580663, at
*7 (D.D.C. July 30, 2024) (finding that testimony “based on the unsupported assumption that
because [a student] had progressed in smaller class sizes, he could not progress in larger ones” was
“based on conjecture” and insufficient). Mounce provided no basis to conclude that DCPS could
not effectively provide the kind of supports that allowed S.J-D. to succeed at the Lab School. In
fact, S.J-D.’s IEPs specifically provided for direct adult supervision through frequent check-ins,
checks for understanding, and repetitions of directions by her teachers. AR 224, 476. Given
credible testimony that “S.J-D. would benefit from interaction with non-disabled peers,” AR 25,
1262, the hearing officer properly determined that Mounce’s testimony failed to establish that
S.J-D. required full-time specialized instruction in light of IDEA’s least restrictive environment
requirement.
Third, even assuming that it was improper for the hearing officer to rely on S.J-D’s progress
reports from the COVID-19 years, as the plaintiffs argue, 2 Pls.’ Opp’n & Reply at 4, the record,
specify that this observation was from S.J-D.’s math class. AR 446, 450. And S.J-D.’s IEPs specifically provided for specialized instruction outside general education in math. AR 476. Indeed, DCPS targeted math as S.J-D.’s “greatest weakness” and increased the hours of specialized instruction where she would have “no more than 12 students in the classroom” with “one certified teacher and one teacher’s aide.” AR 1400. Ultimately, the May 2023 IEP proposed five hours of math outside general education, an increase from two hours in the August 2022 IEP. Considered together, the Court finds that these adjustments were reasonably calculated to allow S.J-D. to progress in the least restrictive environment. 2 The Court agrees with the plaintiffs that the record is, at a minimum, unclear as to the type of learning environment S.J-D. experienced at Francis Stevens from 2020 to 2021, when S.J-D was receiving virtual instruction, rather than in-person instruction. On the one hand, a section of S.J-D.’s February 2021 IEP states that she “had been working predominantly in groups one on one with a teacher or with one other student.” AR 137. On the other hand, her progress reports under the same IEP suggest that S.J-D.’s virtual education was representative of a general education
13 taken as a whole, substantiates the hearing officer’s conclusion that the 2022 and 2023 IEPs were
supported by a “requisite analysis of [S.J-D.’s] circumstances” and “reasonably calculated to
afford her an opportunity to make progress in light of her particular circumstances,” Z.B., 888 F.3d
at 518.
Starting with the August 2022 IEP, both Dr. Hammond’s and DCPS’s assessments
reflected that in 2022, “S.J-D.’s [r]eading scores ranged from [a]verage to high [a]verage, her
[w]riting scores were all in the [a]verage range,” and her math scores “were in the [a]verage range
for all areas except Math Problem Solving.” AR 65. S.J-D.’s academic performance therefore
showed that she was “capable of average range achievement scores and above average grades,”
and her “academic deficits” did “not support a full-time special education placement.” A.D. ex
rel. E.D. v. District of Columbia, 20-cv-2765, 2022 WL 683570, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2022).
Thus, where “the data pointed to average functioning,” DCPS appropriately sought to “keep
[S.J-D] in the general education setting and offer her supports in that placement.” AR 1387. To
support S.J-D. in those areas, DCPS prescribed specialized instruction in general education of one
hour per week in written expression and two hours per week in reading. AR 224. And in math,
where S.J-D. was underperforming on at least one metric, DCPS appropriately prescribed
specialized instruction of two hours per week outside general education in addition to one hour per
week in general education. AR 1387.
environment. For example, S.J-D. mastered a goal “introduced in the general education curriculum,” AR 119, worked on goals “in the context of the general education curriculum,” AR 120, 126, and solved problems “embedded in the current general education curriculum that the class [was] working on,” AR 123. Because the record does not make clear that S.J-D. was in a general education environment at the time, the Court will assume for purposes of its ruling that the hearing officer’s reliance on progress reports from the COVID-19 years was erroneous.
14 In S.J-D.’s May 2023 assessments, her math scores dropped to the eighth percentile, and
her reading scores were just below average at the twentieth percentile. AR 456, 460. Accordingly,
DCPS placed the entirety of S.J-D.’s specialized instruction in math outside general education and
increased those services to five hours per week. AR 476. And for both reading and writing, DCPS
likewise increased her specialized instruction in general education to five hours per week. AR
476. DCPS did so “out of an overabundance of caution . . . to make sure that [they] were giving
[S.J-D.] as much support as possible as she made that transition [to seventh grade].” AR 1400. In
other words, where S.J-D. struggled, DCPS responded with additional specialized instruction.
In sum, both of the contested IEPs appropriately balanced S.J-D.’s underachievement in
math against the IDEA’s requirement that S.J-D. remain in the least restrictive environment
possible. The August 2022 IEP noted that S.J-D. “demonstrated difficulties in math that require
small group math support.” AR 225. Likewise, the May 2023 IEP stated that S.J-D. “will benefit
from specialized instruction in math outside the general education setting to meet her academic
needs.” AR 477. Besides those carve-outs for math, DCPS witnesses explained that the data
supported their finding that S.J-D. would progress in a general education environment, AR 1261–
1262, 1334, 1343, 1405–06, and that the IEPs otherwise addressed S.J-D.’s challenges in executive
functioning and attention through “supports and accommodations [under which she] is able to
make progress” instead of “over[-]pathologizing [and] saying that a child has significant and
severe deficits,” AR 1182, 25.
Indeed, each reason articulated by the plaintiffs’ witnesses in favor of full-time specialized
instruction was accounted for by the accommodations that DCPS provided in the IEPs. See H.R.,
2024 WL 3580663, at *7 (“[M]uch of the witnesses’ rationales for full-time special education were
already addressed in the IEPs.” (citation modified)). Dr. Hammond was “concerned about [S.J-D.]
15 falling between the cracks, that she wouldn’t understand what was happening . . . [a]nd [that] with
too many kids in the classroom, the teachers might not notice that she was completely at sea.” AR
1035. Mounce testified that “[S.J-D.] still required that adult . . . checking in, [and] the
reassurance and the prompting and having her rehearse what is the next step . . . that just can’t be
programmed for in a larger setting.” AR 872. Kunz likewise opined that S.J-D. needed to be in a
small classroom, because “[S.J-D.] needed teacher check-ins, . . . less distractions, less people
around, less noise,” and “supports of repetition [and] clarification.” AR 938. Dolginoff reasoned
that a general education environment would be inappropriate because S.J-D. would not “ask[] for
help independently, or even clarification.” AR 981–82. And S.J-D.’s father testified that a “large
classroom . . . just doesn’t work with her anxiety and executive functioning, especially her task
initiation.” AR 1114.
In response to these concerns, DCPS programmed for “frequent check[-]ins & checks for
understanding,” “repetition of directions,” and “access to noise-cancelling headphones [and]
privacy boards” in the general education environment. AR 224, 476. The May 2023 IEP further
provided for “small groups,” “trusted teacher check-in[s],” and behavioral support services outside
general education. AR 476. On this record, the plaintiffs “have not shown that the [IEPs] lacked
appropriate types or hours of instruction.” Z.B., 888 F.3d at 527. Rather, the Court finds that the
IEPs were tailored to provide S.J-D. with services directly responding to her particular needs.
At bottom, the plaintiffs argue that the IEPs “did not provide [S.J-D.] enough small-group
or individual education, especially by contrast to the full-time special education offered at the Lab
School.” Id. at 528; see Pls.’ Mot. at 13. But “[w]ithout more, that argument runs up against the
IDEA’s imperative that, to the maximum extent appropriate, public schools provide students with
disabilities an education in the least restrictive environment possible.” Z.B., 888 F.3d at 528.
16 (citation modified). It is undisputed that S.J-D. advanced from grade to grade in the pre-pandemic
general education environment. See Def.’s Opp’n & Mot. at 24, Dkt. 11; see generally Pls.’ Opp’n
& Reply. And the overall record indicates that S.J-D. can satisfactorily progress in the regular
classroom with “the use of supplementary aids and services.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). In
accordance with the IDEA, DCPS appropriately calibrated S.J-D.’s IEPs to provide (1) support
services that would allow her to “receive education in the regular classroom whenever possible”
and (2) specialized instruction outside general education when it was justifiably required. Endrew
F., 580 U.S. at 400 (citation modified). The plaintiffs therefore fail to show that the hearing officer
erred in concluding that the IEPs were adequate.
B. Hearing Officer’s Credibility Determinations
Next, the plaintiffs make several arguments that the hearing officer made erroneous
credibility determinations, but none of them prevails.
Courts must give “due weight to the administrative proceedings and afford some deference
to the expertise of the hearing officer and school officials responsible for the child’s education.”
Long v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 49, 59 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation modified). The Court
need not “defer to a [hearing officer’s] decision that lacks reasoned and specific findings,” McNeil
v. District of Columbia, 217 F. Supp. 3d 107, 114 (D.D.C. 2016), and it expects school authorities
to “offer a cogent and responsive explanation . . . that shows the IEP is reasonably calculated,”
Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404. “[T]he hearing officer,” however, “is best positioned to make
credibility judgments as to testifying witnesses and resolve factual disputes that amount to
inconsistent testimony.” J.T. II, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 207. Therefore, “[a] hearing officer’s findings
based on credibility determinations of live witness testimony are given particular deference where
there is no supplementation of the record.” McAllister v. District of Columbia, 45 F. Supp. 3d 72,
17 76 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation modified). And when a “dispute boils down to conflicting testimony,”
the court “must give ‘due weight’ to the hearing officer’s credibility determinations.” J.T. I, 2022
WL 126707, at 2* (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206).
First, the plaintiffs complain that the hearing officer credited Hodges and Green over Dr.
Hammond. With respect to Hodges, they contend that her report “had no information about
S.J-D.’s performance at [Francis Stevens] or in the general education setting” and that Hodges
failed to “complete [an] assessment of S.J-D . . . administered by another school psychologist.”
Pls.’ Mot. at 29. The plaintiffs further argue that Hodges’s testimony was not “cogent and
responsive.” Id. at 26.
But this argument “ignores the subject matter on which the witness[] [was] testifying.”
B.B. v. District of Columbia, 20-cv-2467, 2022 WL 834146, at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2022).
Hodges was credited as an expert in school psychology. AR 1146. She testified about her review
of S.J-D.’s records, AR 1158–59; her participation in the Analysis of Existing Data meeting, AR
1151; her attendance at the October 2022 IEP meeting, AR 1178; and her evaluation of S.J-D.’s
cognitive performance under the IDEA criteria, AR 1169–70. Hodges also analyzed S.J-D.’s
scores in Dr. Hammond’s evaluation and in DCPS’s own assessment. Based on that data, Hodges
concluded that S.J-D.’s cognitive performance was more consistent with an Other Health
Impairment from ADHD and that it did not present evidence of a disabling condition consistent
with the additional specific learning classification advocated by Dr. Hammond. AR 309–10.
The Court defers to the hearing officer’s resolution of this conflict between Dr.
Hammond’s and Hodges’s testimonies. See J.T. I, 2022 WL 126707, at *2. He chose to credit
Hodges’s analysis, which used the proper IDEA criteria and concluded that S.J-D. was not
“performing significantly below age and grade expectation as it relates to her cognitive
18 performance” such that she required a specific learning disability classification. AR 1175. Hodges
explained that S.J-D.’s low phonological proficiency test score—on which Dr. Hammond based
her clinical diagnosis—was an outlier compared to S.J-D.’s other scores. AR 1167. She also
testified that DCPS sought “not to over pathologize” and to “look[] at the data and what the data
says and mak[e] sure that [DCPS is] following those determinations.” AR 1182. Hodges
acknowledged that S.J-D.’s challenges with ADHD and executive functioning—as identified in
Dr. Hammond’s report—showed “vulnerabilities or areas of support.” Id. But she explained that
those challenges did not create “a disabling condition” such that S.J-D. had “significant and severe
deficits” requiring full-time special education. AR 1181–82. With such reasoning, Hodges’s
testimony was cogent and responsive. See Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404.
As for Green’s testimony, the plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer “fail[ed] to provide
any legal analysis as to why [her] testimony and opinion were given more weight.” Pls.’ Mot. at
30 (emphasis added). “It is undisputed that a hearing officer is entitled to make reasonable
credibility determinations and, in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, those
determinations are entitled to deference from the [c]ourt.” Wimbish v. District of Columbia, 381
F. Supp. 3d 22, 29 n.5 (D.D.C. 2019) (citation modified). Here, the hearing officer found that
Green’s evaluation was more credible than Dr. Hammond’s and that it “refuted [Dr. Hammond’s]
assertion that [S.J-D.] has a disabling communication disability.” AR 30–31. That determination
was reasonable and deserves deference. Green was qualified as an expert in speech and language
pathology. AR 1214. She explained that “the field of psychology is very different from the field
of speech pathology.” AR 1225. Upon reviewing Dr. Hammond’s report, Green determined that
“there were no super red flags for . . . a speech and language disorder” but still agreed to do a
speech and language evaluation out of an “overabundance of caution.” AR 1223. To evaluate
19 S.J-D.’s speech and language capabilities, Green met with S.J-D.’s teachers at the Lab School,
observed S.J-D. in the classroom, and conducted multiple speech and language tests. AR 1262.
Besides S.J-D.’s receptive vocabulary score, which was less than “one standard deviation below
the mean” and therefore borderline “below the average range,” AR 1238, S.J-D.’s language
performance was “commensurate with her age-matched peers,” AR 1241, and her “profile [was]
not consistent with a student with a disabling communication disorder,” AR 1249. Green further
explained that the discrepancy between S.J-D.’s expressive and receptive vocabulary scores was
attributable to her attention deficits. AR 1237–38. She opined that S.J-D. would “benefit from
interaction with her typically developing or nondisabled peers in a general education environment”
because that exposure would “sharpen [her] linguistic skills” and “[nothing] would preclude her
form being able to benefit from that.” AR 1261–62. Like Hodges’s testimony, Green’s testimony
therefore provided a “cogent and responsive explanation.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404.
Second, the plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer improperly discredited Mounce’s
testimony that S.J-D required full-time specialized instruction. They contend that instead of
accepting Mounce’s conclusion, the hearing officer erroneously relied on S.J-D.’s previous
progress reports. Pls.’ Mot. at 30. But, as the Court already found above, see supra at 12–13, any
misplaced reliance on the progress reports does not taint the hearing officer’s conclusion that
Mounce’s testimony was based on “pure conjecture,” AR 32. Nor does it call into question the
hearing officer’s determination that Mounce’s recommendation to place S.J-D. in a full-time
specialized environment conflicted with the IDEA’s least restrictive environment mandate. See
Z.B., 888 F.3d at 528. And, again, Mounce’s concerns about S.J-D.’s ability to progress in a
general education environment were accounted for by the numerous support services included in
her IEPs. See supra at 15–16.
20 Third, the plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer improperly ignored the testimonies of
Kunz and Dolginoff because he “did not consider their opinion at all in reaching his conclusions
[of law].” See Pls.’ Mot. at 16–17. Citing M.O. v. District of Columbia, the plaintiffs argue that
the hearing officer’s omission amounted to a fatal lack of “sufficiently detailed reasoning.” 20 F.
Supp. 3d 31, 40 (D.D.C. 2013).
The facts of this case are different. In M.O., the court found that the hearing officer’s
decision lacked any “discussion of the adequacy of the District’s consideration of the
recommendations, or why the District’s review of the evaluations was credited over those of the
plaintiffs’ witnesses.” Id. at 41. But here, the hearing officer thoroughly recounted the testimony
of each witness, including Kunz and Dolginoff, in his findings of fact. AR 23. Kunz opined that
S.J-D. required speech and language services. Id. Both argued that S.J-D. required full-time
specialized education. Id. Their testimonies directly contradicted the testimonies of Green and
Hodges, both of whom the hearing officer found to be “balanced and credible.” AR 30. And
Kunz’s and Dolginoff’s asserted reasons for full-time specialized education were addressed by the
support services included in S.J-D.’s IEPs. See supra at 15–16. The Court therefore defers to the
hearing officer’s weighing of the conflicting testimonies. See K.S. v. District of Columbia, 962 F.
Supp. 2d 216, 225 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[W]hile Plaintiffs contend that the hearing officer’s failure to
explain why he was discounting the testimony of their experts merits remand, the Court cannot
concur. Because he otherwise provided substantial justification for his determination that [the
student] was receiving sufficient educational benefit . . . no remand for further elaboration is
warranted.”).
Fourth, the plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer improperly credited DCPS witnesses
Manuel and Hodges even though they had never met, observed, or evaluated S.J-D. Pls.’ Mot. at
21 30–31. But as the plaintiffs admit, both were “qualified in their respective fields.” Id. at 30.
Manuel and Hodges were members of the DCPS Central IEP team and participated in various IEP
meetings and reviews of S.J-D.’s records to develop her IEPs. AR 35–36, 211, 228, 308, 365, 450.
As a school psychologist, Hodges reviewed Dr. Hammond’s report and analyzed S.J-D.’s
disabilities under the IDEA criteria. AR 1169–70. As a program specialist and licensed teacher
for general and special education, Manuel drafted the May 2023 IEP. AR 1362, 1386–88, 1396.
In accordance with their respective roles, Hodges and Manuel appropriately testified about their
own analyses and how they developed S.J-D.’s IEPs based on the relevant data—including data
collected from in-person observations conducted by other DCPS witnesses. See AR 1231–32
(Green’s observation and assessments), 1322 (Nadir’s first observation), 1336 (Nadir’s second
observation). Ultimately, the hearing officer weighed the opinions before him and found Hodges
and Manuel to be more credible. AR 30. The plaintiffs offer no concrete reason to disturb that
finding. See B.B., 2022 WL 834146, at *10 (“Hearing Officers have the opportunity to hear
testimony in person, examine the demeanor of the witness and reactions of the participants, and
bring immeasurable experience and expertise in this specialized area.” (citation modified)).
In sum, contrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, “there is no evidence that blind deference was
accorded to the [DCPS] witnesses by the [h]earing [o]fficer.” Id. at *12. Contra Pls.’ Mot. at 30.
Because the hearing officer’s decision does not lack “reasoned and specific findings” as to the
witnesses before him, McNeil, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 114 (citation modified), and the plaintiffs have
not shown extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the Court will defer to the hearing officer’s credibility
determinations, Wimbish, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 29 n.5 (citation modified).
22 C. Procedural Violations
A procedural violation creates a viable claim under the IDEA “only if [that] procedural
violation[] affected the student’s substantive rights.” Lesesne ex rel. B.F. v. District of Columbia,
447 F.3d 828, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation modified). To establish a denial of substantive rights
such that a “child did not receive a [FAPE],” the plaintiffs must show that the procedural
inadequacies (1) impeded the child’s right to a FAPE; (2) significantly impeded the parents’
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process for the provision of a FAPE to the
parents’ child; or (3) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii).
1. DCPS’s Failure to Offer an Observation
The plaintiffs are correct that DCPS’s failure to provide a timely observation of the
proposed program at Francis Stevens constituted a procedural violation. Pls.’ Mot. at 32. DCPS’s
failure denied the plaintiffs an opportunity to observe how Francis Stevens would implement the
proposed IEP. See D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(5)(A). And a violation of “the-right-to-observe
provision” may indeed “impede[] [a parent’s] opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking
process regarding the provision of a FAPE.” Middleton, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 147–48.
The plaintiffs have not, however, shown “a serious deprivation, in light of the many
opportunities [the] plaintiff[s] had for participation.” J.T. II, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 203. S.J-D.’s
parents had “substantial input” at all stages of the IEP development. Cooper v. District of
Columbia, 77 F. Supp. 3d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2014). S.J-D.’s father attended the August 2022 and
October 2022 meetings, where he communicated his feedback on the proposed IEP. AR 1077,
1080. Both parents and their educational consultant attended and shared their feedback during the
January 2023 meeting and the May 2023 IEP review. AR 354–56, 446–49. “At each meeting,
[the] plaintiff[s] had substantial input into the IEP baselines, annual goals, special education and
23 related services requirements that the [IEP team] developed on behalf of [S.J-D.].” Cooper, 77 F.
Supp. 3d at 38. And where appropriate, the IEP team responded to the plaintiffs’ concerns by
adjusting S.J-D.’s specialized instruction and classroom supports. See, e.g., AR 355, 448. Such
parental involvement in IEP development indicates meaningful participation such that there was
no denial of a FAPE. Paolella ex rel. Paolella v. District of Columbia, 210 Fed. Appx. 1, 3 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
2. DCPS’s Delay
The plaintiffs also argue that DCPS’s delay in developing S.J-D.’s August 2022 IEP
constituted a substantive denial of a FAPE. Pls.’ Mot. at 23–26.
DCPS’s delay in convening the team meeting amounts to a “failure to meet a procedural
deadline,” and the parents must therefore show that the delay affected S.J-D.’s substantive rights.
D.R. ex rel. Robinson v. Gov’t of D.C., 637 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation modified)
(quoting Lesesne, 447 F.3d at 834). But because the plaintiffs failed to raise this procedural
violation before the hearing officer, AR 6–7, 616, they cannot seek judicial review of it here, see
Douglass v. District of Columbia, 605 F. Supp. 2d 156, 165 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 326–27 (1988)) (“Judicial review is generally unavailable under the IDEA unless
all administrative procedures have been exhausted.”).
D. Reimbursement
Because the Court concludes that the District did not deny S.J-D. a FAPE for the 2022–23
and 2023–24 school years, it will not consider the plaintiffs’ request for tuition reimbursement.
24 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,
Dkt. 9, and grants the District’s cross-motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 11. A separate order
consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.
________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH September 22, 2025 United States District Judge