Izuchukwu Ozurumba v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: 24-2070
• Status: Published

Opinion

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2070

IZUCHUKWU OZURUMBA,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

------------------------------

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEE LAW EXPERTS,

Amici Supporting Petitioner.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Argued: May 7, 2025 Decided: September 2, 2025

Before WYNN, RICHARDSON, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Petition for review granted; vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Berner joined. Judge Richardson wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Christopher M. Kimmel, COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Paul F. Stone, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 2 of 33

Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Aimee Mayer-Salins, Ellyn Jameson, Washington, D.C., Genesis Aguirre Guerra, AMICA CENTER FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, Baltimore, Maryland; Aditya Trivedi, Sarah Kratt, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Yaakov M. Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Ethan B. Kanter, Chief, National Security Unit, Office of Immigration Litigation – GLA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Jonathan Weinberg, WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, Detroit, Michigan, for Amicus American Immigration Lawyers Association. Sarah H. Paoletti, Transnational Legal Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Amici International Human Rights and Refugee Law Experts.

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WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Under U.S. immigration law, a noncitizen is ineligible for asylum or withholding of

removal if they have provided material support to a terrorist organization, even if they are

otherwise eligible.

An immigration judge (“IJ”) found that Petitioner Izuchukwu Ozurumba, a Nigerian

citizen, provided material support to a terrorist organization when he was forced to prepare

meals for its leaders, and denied his application for asylum or withholding of removal. The

Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirmed.

Because the record does not support the conclusion that Ozurumba provided

material support, we grant the petition for review, vacate the Board’s order, and remand to

the Board for further proceedings.1

1 Our good colleague apparently enjoys bombast for law—wielding rhetorical flourishes about Napoleon’s alleged digestive wisdom. But it is one thing to observe that soldiers need food; it is quite another to stretch that battlefield maxim into a statutory command Congress never enacted. The statute prohibits “material support” to terrorist organizations, yes—but it does so in the particular ways that Congress enumerated. The dissent, unfazed by textual restraint, wants to read “meals” into the statute as though judges have the freedom of grocery clerks who can stock the shelves of statutes as they see fit. But Congress chose specific terms; judges are not free to supplement them because Frederick the Great talked about his dinner. To say that every provision of food is support for terrorism is to collapse the statute into absurdity: under the dissent’s theory, a soup kitchen feeding the hungry—some of whom may be unsavory characters—would find itself guilty of aiding terrorism. That’s not textual fidelity; that is judicial overreach. Nonetheless, the dissent accuses the majority of policymaking. The irony is rich. What the dissent proposes is not interpretation of law but enactment of a new one—that makes for a stirring read but it’s not what Congress wrote.

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I.

A.

The following facts are drawn from Ozurumba’s testimony, which the IJ found

“generally credible . . . . [and] consistent,” J.A. 193;2 the testimony of Ozurumba’s country-

conditions expert, Dr. Inge Amundsen, which the IJ found “credible and helpful,” J.A. 194;

and Ozurumba’s declaration in support of his application for asylum and withholding of

removal. The Board did not disturb the IJ’s credibility determinations.

Ozurumba is a 56-year-old native and citizen of Nigeria. In 2005, he traveled to

Venezuela in search of more lucrative employment. He obtained a residential visa and

remained in Venezuela for five years, working in clothing sales. Ultimately, however, after

being robbed several times and in light of what he described as Venezuela’s “turmoil,”

Ozurumba moved back to Nigeria in 2010. J.A. 526. He continued to work in clothing

sales, but struggled to make ends meet. By 2022, Ozurumba was “desperate for a better

job,” and began asking “everyone [he] knew” for leads. J.A. 527. An acquaintance, Peter,

told him about an opportunity to work as a cook at Peter’s workplace. Peter did not answer

Ozurumba’s questions about the nature of his employer; he simply directed him to a bus

station.

Ozurumba travelled to the bus station, boarded a van along with several other

people, and was driven about 45 minutes “to a rural camp, where there were a couple of

2 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed under seal by the parties in this appeal.

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houses and a warehouse” and security officers who “patrolled and carried guns.” J.A. 527.

The camp looked to Ozurumba “like a factory” or “a company.” J.A. 308. A man

Ozurumba understood to be “the boss” told him that if the leaders of the camp liked his

cooking, they would employ him. J.A. 311. The leaders did like his cooking, and they hired

Ozurumba to cook three meals a day for the 15 to 17 “bosses” of the camp. J.A. 318.

Only after starting work did Ozurumba begin to discover the true purpose of the

camp. Ozurumba testified that as soon as he arrived, “[t]here was no way for [him] to

leave” because security forces guarded the gates. J.A. 320. He soon “observed people that

were in government and politicians” entering and leaving the camp, including the governor

of Imo State, who Ozurumba had heard was “not a good person.” J.A. 312. He asked Peter

what purpose the camp served and why politicians were visiting. Peter initially “refused to

respond” to Ozurumba’s questions, but eventually told him that the camp’s leaders “used

the young boys in that place to commit evil, destroy things like the police stations,” and

extort government officials. J.A. 313–14. Ozurumba soon learned that the camp belonged

to a group known as the “Unknown Gunmen.”

Ozurumba’s country-conditions expert, Dr. Amundsen, testified that the Unknown

Gunmen are likely Igbo separatists who operate in the Biafra region in southern Nigeria.

Dr. Amundsen credited several reports showing that two Igbo separatist groups—the

Indigenous People of Biafra and the Eastern Security Network—operate camps in the area

that Ozurumba described. Some local politicians support these groups, but the Nigerian

government considers them to be terrorist organizations. Dr. Amundsen explained that

politicians sometimes hire Unknown Gunmen to intimidate voters during elections, and

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Ozurumba cited reports of Unknown Gunmen burning down police stations and killing

politicians. Dr. Amundsen noted that some workers in Unknown Gunmen camps are there

voluntarily to earn money or to support the cause, but that others were “abducted or forced

into it.” J.A. 445. He testified, as did Ozurumba, that the police cannot protect people from

the Unknown Gunmen.

Following his conversation with Peter, Ozurumba noticed that, after young people

would leave and return to camp, he would see news reports of murder or arson. He

concluded that those crimes were committed by the Unknown Gunmen. Because he

opposes violence, Ozurumba “became very, very upset” and withdrew from the camp’s

social life. J.A. 314.

The “second in command” at the camp noticed that Ozurumba’s attitude had

changed. J.A. 326. He “use[d] a hard voice” with Ozurumba and told others to “monitor”

him. J.A. 330. On one occasion, Ozurumba was asked to accompany a group of Unknown

Gunmen on what he expected would be a violent raid; he feigned illness and did not

participate in the raid. He later saw on the news that a politician’s house and cars had been

burned.

Around this time, the camp’s leaders stopped paying Ozurumba for his work, and

Ozurumba became afraid for his life. He told one of the leaders that he wanted to quit, but

was told that he must keep working. The security guards wouldn’t allow him to leave, so

Ozurumba continued working without pay “until [he] had an escape plan.” J.A. 528.

After around six months of cooking for the camp’s leaders—three without pay—

Ozurumba seized an opportunity to escape. The camp sent Ozurumba into town to buy

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groceries, escorted by someone else from the camp. When they stopped for gas, Ozurumba

got permission to use the restroom. He escaped through an open gate into the bush, where

he stayed for two days before making his way to a nearby city. From there he went to

Lagos, where he stayed with a friend for two days. When the friend “became fearful,”

Ozurumba “started to move from house to house.” J.A. 333. Members of the Unknown

Gunmen called him “every day” to tell him that they would find him and “do something

very bad to” him because he “had discovered what they were doing.” J.A. 333–34.

One day in Lagos, as Ozurumba left a church service, he noticed a car following

him. “[T]he next thing [he] knew, four people jumped [out of] the car.” J.A. 334. They

called his name, beat him with sticks and knives, and threatened to kill him if he did not

go with them. Bystanders called the police, but Ozurumba does not know whether they

reported to the scene because he passed out. He regained consciousness in a hospital, and

staff informed him that he had been brought there by somebody who was not a police

officer. Ozurumba suffered injuries to his head and leg.

On another occasion, Unknown Gunmen showed up at the door of a house in Lagos

where Ozurumba was staying. Ozurumba screamed for the neighbors, and the Gunmen fled

in a car. Yet another time, Unknown Gunmen followed Ozurumba on the way home from

the store, threatening to kill him. He screamed again, drawing a crowd, and the Unknown

Gunmen ran away. After this incident, Ozurumba felt that “if [he] stay[ed] [in Nigeria,]

[he] [would] not be able to live.” J.A. 338. He asked his brother to sell their deceased

father’s land to raise funds for him to leave the country.

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Ozurumba used the money to travel back to Venezuela, where he had last lived in

2010. But he “felt unsafe and knew [he] could not survive there.” J.A. 529. At the same

time, he could not go home: Unknown Gunmen called him frequently to tell him that the

day he returned to Nigeria “would be the day that [he] would die.” J.A. 341.

After five months in Venezuela, Ozurumba raised enough money to travel to the

United States. He entered at the southern border in July 2023, where he surrendered himself

to Border Patrol. He passed a credible-fear interview and rebutted the presumption of

ineligibility for asylum under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.33. On August 22, 2023, the Department of Homeland Security issued Ozurumba

a notice to appear in removal proceedings. Ozurumba was detained by Immigration and

Customs Enforcement throughout the proceedings that followed.

B.

In his first immigration hearing, Ozurumba admitted that he was a native and citizen

of Nigeria and that he had entered the United States without valid entry documents. The IJ

found him removable as charged but gave him an opportunity to apply for asylum and

withholding of removal, and for protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Ozurumba did so, and the IJ held merits hearings on his application in February and March

2024. In an oral decision issued on March 7, 2024, the IJ denied Ozurumba all forms of

relief and ordered him removed to Nigeria.

Two elements of that decision, as later addressed by the Board, are relevant on

appeal. First, the IJ found Ozurumba ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal

based on a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act known as the material-support

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bar, which deems inadmissible a noncitizen who “affords material support” to a “terrorist

organization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI); see id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I). The IJ

concluded that the Unknown Gunmen qualify as a terrorist organization and that Ozurumba

lent material support to the group by “providing food, in the form of cooking” for “the

bosses of the camp three times a day for anywhere from three to six months.” J.A. 197.

Second, the IJ found Ozurumba ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT and its

implementing regulations because he failed to show that he would likely be tortured with

the acquiescence of a public official if removed to Nigeria. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c),

208.18(a)(1).

On September 27, 2024, the Board affirmed. It agreed with the IJ that the material-

support bar has no de minimis or duress exceptions, such that even “relatively minimal”

actions are sufficient to bar asylum and withholding of removal. J.A. 4. The Board also

affirmed the IJ’s denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, explaining that Ozurumba

“has not shown a clear probability that members of the Unknown Gunmen will torture him

in the future, or that any harm to him would be inflicted by or with the consent or

acquiescence (including ‘willful blindness’) of a public official or other person acting in

an official capacity.” J.A. 5.

Ozurumba timely petitioned this Court for review. In December 2024, Ozurumba

filed an emergency motion to stay the order of removal pending appeal. This Court denied

the motion a few weeks later. According to his attorneys, Ozurumba was removed to

Nigeria on April 1, 2025.

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II.

We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a).3 We review the Board’s “factual findings for substantial evidence, treating them

as conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615, 626 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting

Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2014)). “We review the [Board]’s legal

conclusions, including the question of whether the [Board] has applied the proper standard

of review, de novo.” Ibarra Chevez v. Garland, 31 F.4th 279, 288 (4th Cir. 2022). We will

uphold the Board’s decision unless we conclude that it abused its discretion—for example,

“if it failed to offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distorted or disregarded

important aspects of the applicant’s claim.” Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 968,

972 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011)).

Although it did not expressly adopt the IJ’s analysis, the Board plainly incorporated

elements of that analysis into “an opinion of its own” that “affirm[ed] the IJ’s decision.”

Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 456 (4th Cir. 2018); see J.A. 4 (“affirm[ing],”

“agree[ing] with,” and citing the IJ’s analysis). We cannot evaluate the Board’s reasoning

without reference to the IJ’s analysis; accordingly, “we review both decisions.” Salgado-

Sosa, 882 F.3d at 456; see Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Where,

as here, the [Board] has adopted and supplemented the IJ’s decision, we review both

3 The IJ’s oral decision culminated in an order of removal, see J.A. 239, which became final (and thus appealable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)) when the Board affirmed that order, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i).

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rulings.”). However, because “generally we may only affirm on the grounds relied upon by

the Board,” Herrera-Martinez v. Garland, 22 F.4th 173, 180 n.1 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 461 n.14 (4th Cir. 2015)), we consider only those

portions of the IJ’s decision that have been incorporated, expressly or by reference, into

the Board’s decision, Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 350, 356 (4th Cir. 2021).

III.

The Immigration and Nationality Act’s material-support bar deems inadmissible a

noncitizen who “has engaged in a terrorist activity,” including by “commit[ing] an act that

the [noncitizen] knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support . . . to a

terrorist organization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), (iv)(VI). The statute does not define

“material support,” although it provides some examples. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).

Noncitizens subject to the material-support bar are ineligible for asylum unless the

Attorney General, in his or her discretion, makes an exception. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v). And

“[b]ecause the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum—even

though the facts that must be proved are the same—an applicant who is ineligible for

asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).”

Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). However, noncitizens subject to

the material-support bar remain eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT. Kouyate

v. Garland, 122 F.4th 132, 141 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-6792, 2025 WL

1426729 (U.S. May 19, 2025).

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Ozurumba does not challenge the IJ’s conclusion that the Unknown Gunmen qualify

as a Tier III terrorist organization under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).4 Instead, he

argues that the material-support bar does not apply because any support he lent the group

was not “material.” We agree.

We have not expressly defined the minimum support necessary to qualify as

“material support” in the context of the material-support bar. In Viegas v. Holder, we

rejected a challenge to the Board’s determination that an individual’s payment of monthly

dues to a terrorist organization for four years qualified as “material support.” 699 F.3d 798,

803 (4th Cir. 2012). We agreed with the Board that “the sum of Viegas’s dues was

sufficiently substantial standing alone to have some effect on the ability of the [terrorist

organization] to accomplish its goals,” and held that it was not arbitrary and capricious for

the Board to find that support meeting that description qualified as material support. Id.

(quotation marks omitted). But we stopped short of identifying the term’s lower boundary.

As an initial matter, we note that Congress’s inclusion of the modifier material

“suggests that some support may not rise to the level that would disqualify [a

noncitizen]”—in other words, some forms of support are immaterial. Hosseini v. Nielsen,

4 A noncitizen who provides material support to a Tier I or Tier II terrorist organization is inadmissible whether or not he knew that he was supporting a terrorist organization. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc). But a noncitizen who provides material support to a Tier III terrorist organization remains admissible if he “can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [he] did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization.” Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd); see Hosseini v. Nielsen, 911 F.3d 366, 373 (6th Cir. 2018). Ozurumba testified that he did not know that his employer was a terrorist organization until several weeks after starting his job as a cook and that he was unable to leave the camp. The government does not challenge that testimony.

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911 F.3d 366, 375 (6th Cir. 2018). A contrary conclusion would violate “the ‘cardinal

principle’ of interpretation that courts ‘must give effect, if possible, to every clause and

word of a statute.’” Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) (quoting Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)).

Because the statute does not define “material,” we turn to dictionaries. As other

courts of appeals have observed, two definitions of the word “material” are pertinent in this

context. Black’s Law Dictionary “compares material to ‘relevant,’ explaining that material

means ‘having some logical connection with the consequential facts.’” Hosseini, 911 F.3d

at 375 (quoting Material, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). “But material may also

mean ‘significant’ or ‘essential.’” Id. (quoting Material, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.

2014)); see Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2004); Merriam-Webster’s

Collegiate Dictionary 717 (10th ed. 1993) (“[H]aving real importance or great

consequences.”).

Statutory context confirms that “material” takes both overlapping meanings here.

We interpret a general term “‘in light of any common attribute[s] shared by’ statutory

examples of that term.” Env’t Prot. Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refin., L.L.C., 145 S.

Ct. 1735, 1746 (2025) (some quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon,

596 U.S. 450, 458 (2022)).

Here, the statute offers a list of examples of material support, including: “a safe

house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial

benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or

radiological weapons), explosives, or training.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). Every

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item on that list “can either be directly used to plan or carry out terrorist activities or can

be readily diverted to such use.” Opening Br. at 25. Indeed, the “examples suggest that the

support must be ‘significant’ or even ‘essential’ to the commission of terrorism.” Hosseini,

911 F.3d at 375–76; see also Nuure v. Garland, 857 F. App’x 394, 397 (9th Cir. 2021)

(Friedland, J., concurring) (explaining that “unlike cooking,” each of the activities

enumerated in the statute are “important to advancing the goals of terrorism”). That

suggests that “material support” must be both relevant (logically related to terrorism) and

significant (enough to make a difference).5

Our colleague in dissent argues that material support need not “advance the

organization’s commission of terrorism.” Dis. Op. at 26. That view is hard to square with

this enumerated list of activities. “Perhaps,” the dissent ventures, “the statute enumerates

safe houses”—not because safe houses, like funds or weapons or the other items on the list,

can be used to conduct terrorist activities—but because “shelter for an organization’s

members is important.”6 Id. at 31. Furthermore, the dissent continues, a “safe house never

used for committing terrorism would still help the organization accomplish its goals

5 We stress that “relevance” and “significance” overlap, and thus do not lend themselves to a two-part test. 6 Even disregarding the other items on the list, were Congress actually concerned with the literal shelter of members of a terrorist organization, it could have said something like “housing.” A “safe house,” on the other hand, surely connotes criminal activity in this context. See Safe House, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (noting that “[l]awbreakers” use safe houses “to shield criminal activity,” but that safe houses could be used legally by “[l]aw enforcement agencies” to “protect witnesses”).

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because it provides members a place to regroup, to meet to conduct general operations, or

to keep as one of many options for future activities.” Id.

Respectfully, this argument fails to recognize the pattern between the enumerated

activities, which are all susceptible to use for terrorism. To be sure, a safe house could be

used for any number of non-terrorist purposes. Our reading is not that every item on the

list could only be used for terrorism, but rather that every item on the list—safe houses

included—could be readily diverted for use in terrorism. That pattern helps illustrate what

sorts of support Congress was concerned with, and, by implication, the sorts of support

Congress was not concerned with.

Our reading is consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “material

support” in a similar statute in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 561 U.S. 1

(2010). There, the Supreme Court interpreted the criminal material-support provision in 18

U.S.C. § 2339B as prohibiting, among other things, “train[ing] members of [the terrorist

organization] on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve

disputes” and “how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for

relief”—which, the Court was careful to note, “naturally included monetary relief.” Id. at

36–37. “Money is fungible,” the Court explained, “and Congress logically concluded that

money a terrorist group . . . obtains using the techniques plaintiffs propose to teach could

be redirected to funding the group’s violent activities.” Id. at 37. “Such support . . . . also

importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it

easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—all of which

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facilitate more terrorist attacks.” Id. at 30. In other words, the Court held that support was

material insofar as it helps the organization carry out its terrorist activities.

The government argues that material refers to “a type of support rather than an

amount or quantity.” Response Br. at 21. We agree with the premise: the measure of

material support is more qualitative than quantitative.

But the government makes no persuasive attempt to identify what type of support is

material. The closest it comes is to cite the Board’s definition from its 2018 decision in In

re A-C-M-, which encompasses any support that has a “logical and reasonably foreseeable

tendency to promote, sustain, or maintain the organization, even if only to a de minimis

degree.” Response Br. at 20 (quoting In re A-C-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 303, 308 (BIA 2018)).

That interpretation does not bind us, nor are we permitted to defer to the Board’s reasoning.

See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412–13 (2024).

Moreover, A-C-M-’s interpretation reads the word “material” out of the statute.

Support that meets A-C-M-’s criteria need not be relevant or significant to terrorist

activities. The government admits as much when it argues that “material support . . . is a

term of art designed to cut off all support to terrorist organizations.” Response Br. at 32.

Tellingly, the government fails to identify a single example of immaterial support. Under

its interpretation, it seems, no such thing exists.

We decline to read the material-support bar so broadly. Instead, we adopt the

definition we gestured toward in Viegas: “material support” is support that is sufficiently

substantial standing alone to help the terrorist organization accomplish its terrorist

activities. Cf. Viegas, 699 F.3d at 803.

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Ozurumba’s contributions to the Unknown Gunmen do not meet that standard.

Cooking meals using food and supplies purchased by the organization may have

“sustained” the organization in the broadest possible sense—by converting raw groceries

into meals they enjoyed—but provided nothing that the organization could use or readily

divert to plan or carry out its terrorist activities. As far as the record shows, Ozurumba was

simply a captive laborer whose work had nothing to do with those activities.

Nor did Ozurumba’s brief association with the group—which appears to have been

the result of a bait-and-switch—“lend legitimacy” to the group. HLP, 561 U.S. at 30. In

Hosseini v. Nielsen, the Sixth Circuit, citing HLP, concluded that the material-support bar

applied to an individual who copied and distributed flyers for two terrorist groups because

that action introduced others to the terrorist organizations, “allowed th[e] organizations to

redirect some of their communications resources elsewhere,” and “gave [them]

legitimacy.”7 911 F.3d at 377. By contrast, Ozurumba’s cooking demonstrated no

expressive affinity for the Unknown Gunmen, and neither publicized nor legitimized their

activities.

In sum, we conclude that Ozurumba’s cooking was not sufficiently substantial

standing alone to help the Unknown Gunmen accomplish their terrorist activities. On this

record, the Board erred in applying the material-support bar to deny Ozurumba’s

7 Similarly, in Viegas, we affirmed the Board’s application of the material-support bar to a noncitizen who “hung posters for” a terrorist organization, although our holding relied on that noncitizen’s four years of “voluntarily paid dues,” which were “sufficiently substantial standing alone to have some effect on the ability of the [terrorist organization] to accomplish its goals.” 699 F.3d at 803 (quotation marks omitted).

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application for asylum and withholding of removal. We therefore vacate the order of

removal and remand for further proceedings.8

IV.

Ozurumba argues in the alternative that any material support he provided to the

Unknown Gunmen was under duress, and that the material-support bar includes an implied

exception for material support provided under duress. This raises an unanswered question

of administrative law that we will leave for a future case.

In Barahona v. Holder, we “defer[red]” under Chevron to the Board’s determination

that the material-support bar has no implied duress exception. 691 F.3d at 356 (4th. Cir.

2012). In other words, we held that the statute was ambiguous as to whether it included a

duress exception but that the Board reasonably concluded that it didn’t. But in Loper Bright

Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court held that courts “may not defer to an agency

interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.” 603 U.S. at 413 (2024).

At first blush, then, it’s not clear that Barahona’s holding—which was based on Chevron

deference—retains precedential value.

8 Ozurumba also argues that the Board erred in denying his application for deferral of removal under the CAT. As a matter of judicial economy, we decline to reach that claim. See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”); Arita-Deras, 990 F.3d at 361 n.10 (declining to reach withholding-of-removal and CAT claims in light of vacatur and remand on asylum claim). If the Board were to decide on remand to reverse the IJ’s denial of asylum or withholding of removal, there would be no need for the Board or this Court to address Ozurumba’s CAT arguments. And in light of our vacatur, the Board could decide to remand to the IJ for further proceedings on the CAT issue. Accordingly, we express no view on the merits of the CAT claim.

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However, Loper Bright held, “we do not call into question prior cases that relied on

the Chevron framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are

lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to

statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology.” Id. at 412. We

reaffirmed that approach in Chavez v. Bondi, 134 F.4th 207, 213 (4th Cir. 2025).

The government contends Loper Bright “made clear that just because a prior

decision was based on Chevron is insufficient to undermine its precedential value,” so

“Barahona’s holding that there is no implied duress exception to the [material-support] bar

remains intact.” Response Br. at 46, 48 (capitalization normalized). We aren’t so sure.

Loper Bright binds us to our “holdings . . . that specific agency actions are lawful.” 603

U.S. at 412 (emphasis added). In Barahona, the specific agency action was “deeming

[Barahona] ineligible for . . . relief.” 691 F.3d at 350. So, while Barahona may not reopen

his case simply because Chevron is dead, it’s not clear that Ozurumba is precluded from

making a duress argument. On the other hand, Loper Bright instructs us to apply

“statutory” stare decisis, which might indicate that our statutory interpretation is still

binding. 603 U.S. at 412 (emphasis added).

Loper Bright is not crystal clear on how to square this circle, and circuits have

already split on how to treat Chevron holdings. Compare In re MCP No. 185, 124 F.4th

993, 1002 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that “we are not bound” by a Chevron statutory

interpretation because that case approved of a different “specific agency action” than the

one before the Sixth Circuit), with Lopez v. Garland, 116 F.4th 1032, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024)

19 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 20 of 33

(holding that the statutory interpretation in a Chevron case “remains precedential authority

which binds us”).

The government’s approach to stare decisis also presents a practical problem. Prior

to Loper Bright, agencies were, within certain bounds, permitted to change their

interpretations of a statute. Under the government’s view, we would be stuck—forever—

with the most recent agency interpretation that we upheld before Loper Bright. That strikes

us as arbitrary.

Because we hold that any support Ozurumba provided the Unknown Gunmen was

not “material,” we leave these questions for a more appropriate case, where parties can

better brief and argue this important question of administrative law.

Ozurumba’s attorneys represent that on April 1, 2025, the government removed him

to Nigeria. Shortly after his deportation, Ozurumba requested that we order the government

to facilitate his return to the United States. We decline to do so at this stage, instead leaving

the matter for the agency to address in the first instance.

As we explained in our 2018 decision in Ramirez v. Sessions, “[u]nder an

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policy directive, ‘[a]bsent extraordinary

circumstances, if [a noncitizen] who prevails before . . . a U.S. court of appeals was

removed while his or her [petition for review] was pending, ICE will facilitate the

[noncitizen’s] return to the United States if . . . the [noncitizen’s] presence is necessary for

20 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 21 of 33

continued administrative removal proceedings.’”9 887 F.3d 693, 706 (4th Cir. 2018)

(citation omitted) (quoting U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, Policy Directive Number

11061.1, Facilitating the Return to the United States of Certain Lawfully Removed Aliens

(Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/11061.1_current_

policy_facilitating_return.pdf [https://perma.cc/24UQ-F5W8]). We leave it to the agency

on remand to decide whether Ozurumba’s presence will be necessary to his continued

removal proceedings.

VI.

We grant Ozurumba’s petition for review, vacate the Board’s order of removal, and

remand for further proceedings.

PETITION GRANTED; ORDER OF REMOVAL VACATED, AND REMANDED

9 As we explained in Ramirez, in this context, “facilitating [a noncitizen’s] return” includes “enabling [them] to ‘engage in activities which allow [them] to travel to the United States (such as by issuing a Boarding Letter to permit commercial air travel) and, if warranted, parol[ing] [them] into the United States upon . . . arrival at a U.S. port of entry.’” 887 F.3d at 706 n.11 (quoting Directive 11061.1). It “does not necessarily include funding the [noncitizen’s] travel via commercial carrier to the United States or making flight arrangements for the [noncitizen].” Id. (quoting Directive 11061.1).

21 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 22 of 33

RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

“An army marches on its stomach.” This truism is widely attributed to Napoleon

Bonaparte, the famous French commander and emperor, and to Frederick the Great, the

well-known King of Prussia. Perplexingly, the majority thinks it knows better, finding that

providing thousands of meals to a terrorist organization does not constitute material support

to that organization. It arrives at this answer by reading one of the several objects of

material support—terrorist organization—out of the statute, narrowing it to only include

support for acts of terrorism. Because I cannot go along with such judicial policy-making,

or with the majority’s other errors, I respectfully dissent.

I. Background

Izuchukwu Ozurumba admits that he cooked around 8,000 meals1 for the bosses of

the Unknown Gunmen, a Nigerian organization that he knew committed acts of terrorism.

Ozurumba, however, eventually fled Nigeria to Venezuela. He later crossed the southern

border into the United States in July 2023.

When Ozurumba arrived in the United States, he was detained by Border Patrol

personnel and ordered to appear for removal proceedings. At the removal proceedings, the

Immigration Judge determined that the Unknown Gunmen were a Tier III terrorist

organization.2 The Immigration Judge then found that Ozurumba had materially supported

1 Ozurumba testified that he cooked meals for the 15–17 leaders of the camp, three times a day, seven days a week, for six months. 2 Terrorist organizations are separated into three tiers. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi). Tier I and II organizations must be designated as such by certain members of the executive

22 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 23 of 33

the Unknown Gunmen and thus barred him from receiving asylum or withholding of

removal under the Convention Against Torture. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i), (iv).

The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s application of the

material-support bar. Ozurumba timely petitioned for review.

II. Material Support To A Terrorist Organization Means Support Which Helps A

Terrorist Organization Achieve Its Goals

Section 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) provides that “[a]ny alien who . . . has engaged in a

terrorist activity . . . is inadmissible.” Nobody contends, however, that Ozurumba

“hijack[ed] . . . an aircraft” or “attack[ed] . . . an internationally protected person.” See

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (defining “[t]errorist activity”). He is not a terrorist in that sense.

But an alien may “engage in terrorist activity” in ways other than committing acts

of terrorism. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). Instead, the statute broadly defines “engage in terrorist

activity” to include any “act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords

material support . . . for the commission of a terrorist activity.”

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(aa). Importantly, its broad definition also includes any “act that

branch. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)–(II), 1189(a). Tier III organizations are “group[s] of two or more individuals . . . which engage[] in” terrorist activities as defined by § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). Immigration Judges and the Board designate organizations as Tier III terrorist organizations “on a case-by-case basis . . . ., and [a]s a result,” such a designation “only impacts the alien whose case is before that” Immigration Judge or the Board. A.A. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 973 F.3d 171, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, Ozurumba’s Immigration Judge determined that the Unknown Gunmen were a Tier III terrorist organization. The Board held that Ozurumba waived any challenge to that determination. He does not appeal that decision, so I join the majority in accepting it. Majority Op. at 12. 23 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 24 of 33

the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support . . . to a terrorist

organization.” § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd) (emphasis added). It is whether Ozurumba

provided “material support . . . to a terrorist organization” that we must answer.3

The phrase “material support to a terrorist organization” is not self-defining. But

our traditional tools of interpretation reveal its meaning. Start with the noun “support.”

“Support” is broadly defined as many things, including “a source or means of living,”

“sustenance,” etc. Support, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990); accord Support,

Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).4 By definition, “support” plainly includes food,

which is “sustenance.”5

Next, the adjective “material.” “Material” might have two senses—one

quantitative, and one qualitative. In the first, “material” might mean that the support is

“significant.” Material, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999); see also Material, Black’s

3 We must answer that question, as that’s what the agency found barred Ozurumba’s admission. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). 4 The material-support bar was added in 1990. Bryan Clark & William Holahan, Material Support: Immigration and National Security, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 935, 939–42 (2010). In 2001, Congress amended the language to its present form. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a)(1)(F), 115 Stat. 272, 346. Thus, dictionaries from this period inform the meaning of the material-support bar. 5 The statutory examples illustrate that “material support” extends beyond providing the tools of terror, covering areas as diverse as shelter, transportation, and communications. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (“including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training”). By use of the term “including,” the statute facially extends beyond the listed examples. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941). Thus, terms like safe house and transportation shed light on what material support means “general[ly].” Id. 24 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 25 of 33

Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining material as “important” or “having influence or

effect.”). In the second, “material” might mean relevant, or “logical[ly] connect[ed]” to

the object of the noun it modifies. See, e.g., Material, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.

1999).

Some types of support to an organization, even if quantitatively minimal, can be

material merely because of their qualitative aspects, such as fungibility, legitimizing

power, or aspects otherwise core to an organization’s needs or goals. See, e.g., Sesay v.

Att’y Gen. of U.S., 787 F.3d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). Qualitative

materiality requires articulating how the support is connected to the organization’s goals.

Other types of support, standing alone, may lack qualitative significance. For example,

letting one organization member walk across your property is likely not material. But

sometimes quantity changes the qualitative nature of the support. If everyone in the

organization crosses your land as a shortcut to their headquarters, significance and

relevance emerge. By its nature, support is something helpful (even if only marginally in

small quantities). It therefore follows that once there is enough of it, no matter the type, it

can become material.6 Indeed, this Court has suggested that material support encompasses

these ideas. We upheld a Board determination that an alien’s provision of money and

services was “material support” because it was “sufficiently substantial standing alone to

6 This does not mean that anything can be material support. If something does not constitute support to begin with, increasing it will not magically transform it into support, much less material support. For example, let’s say one started dumping garbage at a terrorist organization’s camp. No matter how much garbage one gives to the terrorist organization, it would not count as “material support” because dumping garbage is not “support” at all. 25 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 26 of 33

have some effect on the ability of the” terror organization “to accomplish its goals.” Viegas

v. Holder, 699 F.3d 798, 803 (4th Cir. 2012).

Yet “material support to a terrorist organization” does not mean such support must

advance the organization’s commission of terrorism. In the material-support bar itself,

Congress distinguished affording material support “for the commission of a terrorist

activity” from material support “to a terrorist organization.” §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(aa),

(dd) (emphasis added). By enumerating both objects, Congress has instructed us that the

material-support bar sweeps more broadly than support for the terroristic acts that a terrorist

organization takes. Congress could have added the phrase “for a terrorist activity” as a

qualifier to subclause (dd)—but it did not. Nor did it in subclause (cc), which applies to

support for Tier I and Tier II terrorist organizations (while (dd) applies to Tier III

organizations). § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc). Nor did it in subclause (bb), which bars

anyone who provides material support “to any individual who the actor knows, or

reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity.”

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb). Congress three times, then, decided that material support

extends beyond support tied to “the commission of terrorism” or the “accomplish[ment]”

of “terrorist activities.” Contra Majority Op. at 14, 16. The only possible interpretation of

this statute is that a terrorist organization may be materially supported by means that lack

a connection to acts of terrorism.7

7 This is nontrivial. Despite their name, terrorist organizations often have goals beyond committing acts of terrorism. HLP, 561 U.S. at 30–31. They may have social, political, and even charitable goals. See id. Without financial firewalls, funds raised for admirable goals can be redirected to terroristic ones. Id. at 31. 26 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 27 of 33

The Supreme Court adopted this broad interpretation in Holder v. Humanitarian

Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). In HLP the Supreme Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,

a statute which criminalizes “knowingly” providing “material support or resources to”

terrorist organizations. 561 U.S. at 7. Like Ozurumba and the majority, the organization

in HLP argued that material support of a terrorist organization required “proof that a

defendant intended to further a foreign terrorist organization’s illegal activities”—that is,

their terrorism. HLP, 561 U.S. at 16. The court swiftly rejected that view. In analyzing

the breadth of “material support,” the Court looked to surrounding statutory text. See id.

Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) criminalized “provid[ing] material support or resources

. . . knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out

. . . violent terrorist acts.” Id. at 17 (quoting § 2339A(a)) (cleaned up). In contrast,

§ 2339B(a)(1) only “prohibits ‘knowingly’ providing material support” and makes no

mention of specific terrorist acts. Id. at 16. The Court found respondent’s view “untenable

in light of the sections immediately surrounding § 2339B,” because Congress did not

import the specific intent language of § 2339A into § 2339B, when it easily could have.

Id. In other words, the Court refused to only apply § 2339B in situations where someone

specifically aided terrorist activity, because that interpretation is unsupported by the

statute’s language.

The majority’s treatment of HLP is facially incorrect. It reads the Supreme Court

as saying “support” is “material insofar as it helps the organization carry out its terrorist

activities.” Majority Op. at 16. But that view was not expressed by the Supreme Court

majority—it was the view of the dissent. See HLP, 561 U.S. at 56 (Breyer, J., dissenting)

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(“I would read the statute as criminalizing” the support at issue “only when the defendant

knows or intends that those activities will assist the organization’s unlawful terrorist

actions.”). The HLP majority squarely rejected that view: “[T]he dissent proposes a”

construction that renders § 2339B “indistinguishable from the one Congress adopted in

§ 2339A.” Id. at 18 n.3. Like the dissent’s view in HLP, the majority’s view here is

untenable as it renders (dd) “indistinguishable” from (aa).8

By the majority’s account, material support must be “significant” or even “essential”

to “the commission of terrorism.” Majority Op. at 14 (quotation omitted). This

interpretation is irreconcilable with the statutory text.

The majority justifies its conclusion by pointing out that “[e]very item on th[e]

[enumerated] list can either be directly used to plan or carry out terrorist activities or can

be readily diverted to such use.” Id. at 13–14 (quotation omitted). That may be true in

some sense. But safe houses and transportation can also support terrorist organizations’

8 Ignoring HLP’s section discussing statutory interpretation, 561 U.S. at 16–18, the majority instead cherry-picks language from an unexpected place: the section discussing why the government’s prohibition on material support in the form of speech survives First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 28–29. Because the government’s material-support statute burdened speech, the Court demanded a government interest to justify that burden. Everyone agreed that the “interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order.” Id. Yet the HLP plaintiffs argued that the government prohibition still violated the First Amendment because the material-support ban was “not necessary” to further that interest. Id. at 28 (quotation omitted). The HLP Court then explained how Congress could justify banning material support in the form of speech to further that specific interest. Id. at 29–38. As this summary should make clear, the Supreme Court’s language connecting the HLP plaintiffs’ speech-based material support to furthering terrorism was applicable only to the First Amendment analysis. Nothing in HLP stands for the proposition that support is only “material” insofar as it helps the organization carry out its terrorist activities. 28 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 29 of 33

goals even if never used for, or diverted to use in, carrying out terrorist activities—and

subclause (dd) tells us that would still be material support. Further, by artificially limiting

the material-support bar’s breadth, the majority’s interpretation renders the enumeration of

all the objects—terrorist activities, terrorists, and terrorist organizations—superfluous by

ignoring all but the first. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (It is “one

of the most basic interpretive canons, that a statute should be construed . . . so that no part

will be inoperative.”) (quotation omitted); Espinal-Andrades v. Holder, 777 F.3d 163, 168

(4th Cir. 2015) (same).

The majority also incorrectly suggests that interpreting the term “material support

to a terrorist organization” to extend beyond support for specific terrorist activities permits

any support to fall within its scope. Majority Op. at 16. But that is not the case. As I

explained above, material support requires enough support to have some meaningful

impact on the terrorist organization’s ability to achieve its goals. For example, though food

can constitute material support, selling a hot dog to a terrorist would not count. Nor would

“material support to a terrorist organization” appear to include uncoordinated advocacy. It

may be generally supportive of the terrorist organization, but advocacy not done in

coordination with a terrorist organization would not appear to provide material support to

that terrorist organization. See HLP, 561 U.S. at 24–26. Not all support qualifies as

“material support to a terrorist organization.”

While not everything qualifies, Ozurumba’s actions do. Ozurumba’s cooking

undoubtedly constituted “support” “to a terrorist organization.” The remaining question is

whether Ozurumba’s support was “material.” Did it help the Unknown Gunmen

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“accomplish its goals”? Viegas, 699 F.3d at 803. I would answer, yes, providing thousands

of meals to a terrorist organization is “material support to a terrorist organization.”

First, Ozurumba’s support was quantitatively material.9 Ozurumba did not run a hot

dog stand that the Unknown Gunmen happened to stop by once or twice. Rather, he acted

as a private chef, providing three meals a day for over a dozen leaders of a terrorist

organization—for months. These many meals, to my mind, were “sufficiently substantial.”

Viegas, 699 F.3d at 803.

I find nothing but support in precedent for this conclusion. In Viegas, for example,

this Court found that a man who “every month for four years . . . voluntarily paid dues and

hung posters for” a terrorist organization provided material support. Id. at 803. The Court

explained that while “a single exchange of a small amount of food and money” might not

be material support, “the sum of” the support provided over months was meaningful. Id.

So too here—while a single meal might not be enough to have any impact, over 8,000 of

them is enough. And our sister circuits seem to agree. For example, the Second Circuit

accepted that providing “$100 packages of foodstuffs every three months for more than

two years” constituted material support. Hernandez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir.

2018).

I note that whether materiality has quantitative aspect is a debated question. Board 9

precedent has found no such requirement. Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 303, 306 (B.I.A. 2018) (“no such quantitative limitation exists.”). Though at least one of our sister circuits has found that material means both “relevant and significant.” Hosseini v. Nielson, 911 F.3d 366, 376 (2018). While this Court has not explicitly taken a side on the issue, we intimated in Viegas that the amount of support matters. 699 F.3d at 803. 30 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 31 of 33

Second, Ozurumba’s support was qualitatively material. An organization acts

through its members, and its members need to eat. Food is a basic need. Cf. Abraham H.

Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 Psych. Rev. 351, 373 (1943) (famously listing

food as a predicate need to the achievement of other goals). Indeed, it’s quite difficult to

imagine how a terrorist organization could achieve any goal without first being fed. And

because of the regularity of the meals, the circumstances in which the meals were prepared

and served—and, yes, the sheer quantity of the meals—Ozurumba’s support took on a

different quality. It amounted to completely providing for one basic physiological need of

the leaders of a terrorist organization. This is material support to the organization itself.

That is, providing the basics helps terrorist organizations “accomplish [their] goals.”

Viegas, 699 F.3d at 803. Perhaps that’s why the statute enumerates safe houses as a classic

example of material support to a terrorist organization—shelter for an organization’s

members is important. A safe house never used for committing terrorism would still help

the organization accomplish its goals because it provides members a place to regroup, to

meet to conduct general operations, or to keep as one of many options for future activities.

Preparing the daily nutritional requirements of the leadership of an organization is no less

important.

In addition to common sense, precedent supports this conclusion. For example, in

Barahona v. Holder, this Court took as a given that a man who allowed a terrorist

organization to “prepar[e] food in [his] kitchen” and “occasionally sleep[] overnight when

the weather was unfavorable” provided material support. 691 F.3d 349, 351–52, 354–55

(4th Cir. 2012). That support was not connected to any act of terror—it was just food and

31 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2070 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/02/2025 Pg: 32 of 33

shelter more generally. See id. at 351–52. And several of our sister circuits have likewise

upheld Board decisions that providing food and shelter, unconnected to any particular act

of terrorism, constitutes material support. See, e.g., Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293,

298–301 (3d Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2018).

Ozurumba provided thousands of meals for the leaders of the Unknown Gunmen.10

Food is support. And the meals Ozurumba cooked provided for the leaders’ basic needs,

freeing up time, energy, and money for those leaders to focus on their goals. I would thus

find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the material-support

bar applies.11

10 There is a factual dispute about whether Ozurumba worked voluntarily. That dispute is legally irrelevant: This Court has held that there is no duress exception to the material-support bar. See Barahona, 691 F.3d at 354–55. And, as the majority acknowledges, that decision may remain binding even after Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). See Chavez v. Bondi, 134 F.4th 207, 212–13 (4th Cir. 2025) (“[P]rior cases that relied on the Chevron framework . . . are still subject to statutory stare decisis.”) (quotation omitted). But if Barahona is no longer binding, then I would find—for many of the reasons discussed in Barahona—that a duress exception cannot be read into the statutory material-support bar. So I would reject Ozurumba’s duress argument. 11 I add one final note—Ozurumba’s cooking should qualify as material support under the majority’s own criteria, as preparing every meal for the leaders of a terrorist organization is “significant or even essential to the commission of terrorism.” Majority Op. at 14 (quotation omitted). Contrary to the majority’s assertion, sustenance is a literal prerequisite to “plan or carry out” acts of terror. Id. at 17. It is no less necessary, in a strict sense, than a map or weapon. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “providing . . . even seemingly benign support” to a terrorist organization “bolsters the terrorist activities of that organization.” HLP, 561 U.S. at 36. That’s because the provision of “valuable resource[s] . . . . frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends.” Id. at 30. Thus not only does the majority render the wrong interpretation of the material-support bar, but it also analyzes this case incorrectly under that interpretation.

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* * *

The majority takes a red pen to the material-support bar, eliminating major

provisions of the statute. It does so to find that providing for the basic needs of the

members of a terrorist organization does not materially support the organization. I

respectfully dissent.

The majority attempts to sidestep this by noting that Ozurumba “provided nothing that the organization could use or readily divert to plan or carry out its terrorist activities.” Majority Op. at 17. But that’s not the test it laid out just three pages earlier, see id. at 14, nor is it one which the statute permits. And even the majority implicitly recognizes that what is essential to terrorism may not be readily divertible to carrying out terrorist activities: Such support may first lend legitimacy to the organization, which then makes it easier to persist, recruit, and fundraise, and only then facilitates more attacks. Id. at 15–16. 33