Izaiah Abrams, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Mansari LLC, d/b/a College HUNKS Hauling Junk & Moving

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedFebruary 25, 2026
Docket8:24-cv-00949
StatusUnknown

This text of Izaiah Abrams, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Mansari LLC, d/b/a College HUNKS Hauling Junk & Moving (Izaiah Abrams, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Mansari LLC, d/b/a College HUNKS Hauling Junk & Moving) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Izaiah Abrams, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Mansari LLC, d/b/a College HUNKS Hauling Junk & Moving, (M.D. Fla. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

IZAIAH ABRAMS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:24-cv-949-CEH-TGW

MANSARI LLC, d/b/a College HUNKS Hauling Junk & Moving,

Defendant. ___________________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ Joint Motion to Approve FLSA Settlement Agreement (Doc. 52), filed on January 7, 2026. In the motion, the parties advise the Court that they have negotiated the terms of the FLSA settlement agreement at arm’s length and request approval of this collective action settlement and dismissal of the case with prejudice. The parties attach a copy of the Settlement Agreement to their motion. Doc. 52-1. On February 3, 2026, the Court held a hearing on the parties’ motion. Having considered the joint motion, received testimony from Plaintiff’s counsel, heard argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court will grant the parties’ Joint Motion to Approve FLSA Settlement Agreement and approve the settlement under the FLSA. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Izaiah Abrams (“Plaintiff” or “Abrams”), on his own behalf and all

similarly situated individuals, filed a Collective Action Amended Complaint on May 15, 2024, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, Mansari LLC d/b/a College HUNKS Hauling Junk & Moving (“Defendant” or “Mansari”) failed to pay the applicable statutory overtime compensation to Plaintiff and all similarly situated persons employed by Defendant.

Doc. 9. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sought certification, pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, of a collective action comprised of all of Defendant’s employees who worked for Defendant as movers and who were paid by Defendant on an hourly basis during the applicable statutory time period but were not paid overtime compensation for work performed more than forty hours per week. Id. ¶¶ 54-58.

Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant improperly required Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals to: “(1) come to work an hour before the start of their paid shifts each day to perform the tasks [] without pay, (2) stay an additional half hour past the ends of their paid shifts each day to complete remaining work without pay, and (3) work one more unpaid hour each week to fulfill miscellaneous duties.” Id. ¶

32. On August 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Conditionally Certify an FLSA Collective Action and Authorize Notice. Doc. 19. The motion requested the Court conditionally certify the collective action and permit notice be given to all similarly situated current and former employees who performed the duties of a mover and who worked for Mansari at its Tampa, Florida location, in the past three years. Id. at 1. On December 26, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Conditionally Certify an FLSA Class defined as:

All individuals who are or have been employed by or worked for Defendant, its subsidiaries or affiliated companies, as movers at any time during the applicable statutory period and performed moving services for Defendant including driving/cleaning moving trucks, lifting and moving household goods and furniture, and performing other related duties.

Doc. 34. The motion also requested notice be provided to all current and former movers employed by Defendant at its Tampa location, who worked more than 40 hours in a workweek within the last three years but who were not paid overtime pay as required by the FLSA. Doc. 19 at 17–18. In its Order granting the motion to conditionally certify, the Court directed the parties to confer and agree upon the form of Notice to be provided to the Tampa employees and a proposed Notice Plan. Doc. 34 at 15. Additionally, Defendant was directed to provide contact and employment information for the proposed collective members. Id. Notice was provided to 330 current and former employees of Defendant on February 4, 2025. At the end of the notice period, 36 individuals, including Plaintiff, returned signed consent forms to join the litigation as plaintiffs. Doc. 52 at 2. On April 17, 2025, the parties attended an in-person mediation with mediator Shane Munoz, Esquire. Doc. 44. Although the parties made progress at the mediation, it was determined that some discovery would be necessary. Accordingly, the mediation was continued to permit informal representative discovery of nine opt-in plaintiffs—three selected by Plaintiff; three selected by Defendant; and three chosen at random. For those nine plaintiffs, Defendant produced voluminous records, including pay stubs, time records, emails, and documentation for every moving job that the opt-in plaintiffs

performed over a two-month period during their employment. Following this discovery, the parties were able to reach an amicable agreement to settle this collective action. Doc. 52 at 2–3. On December 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Resolution. Doc. 51. On January 7, 2026, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Approve FLSA Settlement

Agreement. Doc. 52. Attached to the motion is a copy of the parties’ Settlement Agreement (Doc. 52-1), which reflects the parties agreed to resolve Plaintiff and Opt- In Plaintiffs’ claims for a total of $84,900, divided as described in Exhibit 1 to the Agreement. Id. at 6–11. Of this amount, as testified to by Plaintiff’s counsel, $34,000.00 constitutes attorney’s fees and $1,935.23 reflects costs. Id. at 11. Under the

Agreement, each Opt-In Plaintiff receives a portion of the Settlement Fund based on a pro rata distribution. The distribution is calculated using the number of workweeks worked where the Opt-In Plaintiff had enough hours worked to make a claim for overtime a possibility in that week based on the claims raised by Plaintiff. Pursuant to

the Agreement, the settlement represents a compromise of disputed claims. Defendant admits no liability or violation of any law or statute. Plaintiffs desire to fully and finally resolve their claims. APPLICABLE LAW In Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit explained that

claims for compensation under the FLSA may only be settled or compromised when the Department of Labor supervises the payment of back wages or when a district court enters a stipulated judgment “after scrutinizing the settlement for fairness.” 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982). In Silva v. Miller, the Eleventh Circuit wrote that the FLSA “contemplates that ‘the wronged employee should receive his full wages plus the

penalty without incurring any expense for legal fees or costs.’” 307 F. App’x 349, 351 (11th Cir. 2009). Therefore, in any case in which a plaintiff agrees to accept less than his full FLSA wages and liquidated damages, he has compromised his claim within the meaning of Lynn's Food Stores. Before approving an FLSA settlement, the court must scrutinize it to determine if it is “a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide

dispute.” Id. at 1354–55. In determining whether an FLSA settlement is fair and reasonable, the Court considers the following factors: (1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of plaintiff’s success on the merits; (5) the range of possible recovery;

and (6) the opinions of counsel. See Leverso v. South Trust Bank of Ala., Nat. Assoc., 18 F.3d 1527, 1531 n.6 (11th Cir. 1994).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Luisa E. Silva v. Grant Miller
307 F. App'x 349 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Leverso v. SouthTrust Bank of Al., Nat. Assoc.
18 F.3d 1527 (Eleventh Circuit, 1994)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Izaiah Abrams, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Mansari LLC, d/b/a College HUNKS Hauling Junk & Moving, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/izaiah-abrams-individually-and-on-behalf-of-all-others-similarly-situated-flmd-2026.