Ivy v. Binger

Michigan Court of Appeals

Ivy v. Binger

197 N.W.2d 133, 39 Mich. App. 59, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1392

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedFebruary 28, 1972

DocketDocket 10713

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 197 N.W.2d 133 (Ivy v. Binger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ivy v. Binger, 197 N.W.2d 133, 39 Mich. App. 59, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1392 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

This appeal arises out of a negligence suit in which the jury returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal as of right.

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that if defendant was confronted with a sudden emergency not of his own making, then defendant could not be said to have violated the “assured clear distance ahead” statute. MCLA 257.627.(a); MSA 9.2327(a).

Six-year-old Eddie James Ivy was struck by defendant’s automobile when the child darted out unexpectedly into traffic. The accident occurred at a school crossing at a time when defendant admitted he knew that children would be crossing the street. The court'instrueted the jury that:

“The law recognizes that children act upon childish instincts and impulses. If you find that the defendant knew or should have known that a child or children were or were likely to be in the vicinity, then the defendant is required to exercise greater vigilance and this is a circumstance to be considered by you in determining whether reasonable care was used by the defendant.”

In light of the above instruction on defendant’s duty of care, it was not improper for the trial court to, include its sudden emergency instruction. The jury was authorized to find that such sudden emergency existed only if defendant was exercising the greater vigilance required when one drives through an area where children are likely to be present. Therefore, the trial court properly instructed the jury that if defendant was confronted with a sud *61 den emergency not of Ms own making then his subsequent behavior should be judged according to the way a reasonable man would act under those circumstances. See, McKinney v Anderson, 373 Mich 414, 419-420 (1964); Campbell v Menze Construction Co, 15 Mich App 407, 414-415 (1968); Wright v Marzolf, 34 Mich App 612 (1971).

Affirmed. Costs to the defendant.

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Per Curiam.

This appeal arises out of a negligence suit in which the jury returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal as of right.

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that if defendant was confronted with a sudden emergency not of his own making, then defendant could not be said to have violated the “assured clear distance ahead” statute. MCLA 257.627.(a); MSA 9.2327(a).

Six-year-old Eddie James Ivy was struck by defendant’s automobile when the child darted out unexpectedly into traffic. The accident occurred at a school crossing at a time when defendant admitted he knew that children would be crossing the street. The court'instrueted the jury that:

“The law recognizes that children act upon childish instincts and impulses. If you find that the defendant knew or should have known that a child or children were or were likely to be in the vicinity, then the defendant is required to exercise greater vigilance and this is a circumstance to be considered by you in determining whether reasonable care was used by the defendant.”

In light of the above instruction on defendant’s duty of care, it was not improper for the trial court to, include its sudden emergency instruction. The jury was authorized to find that such sudden emergency existed only if defendant was exercising the greater vigilance required when one drives through an area where children are likely to be present. Therefore, the trial court properly instructed the jury that if defendant was confronted with a sud *61 den emergency not of Ms own making then his subsequent behavior should be judged according to the way a reasonable man would act under those circumstances. See, McKinney v Anderson, 373 Mich 414, 419-420 (1964); Campbell v Menze Construction Co, 15 Mich App 407, 414-415 (1968); Wright v Marzolf, 34 Mich App 612 (1971).

Affirmed. Costs to the defendant.

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197 N.W.2d 133, 39 Mich. App. 59, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1392, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ivy-v-binger-michctapp-1972.

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