Ivy River Land & Timber Co. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance

133 S.E. 424, 192 N.C. 115, 1926 N.C. LEXIS 231
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJune 9, 1926
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 133 S.E. 424 (Ivy River Land & Timber Co. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ivy River Land & Timber Co. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance, 133 S.E. 424, 192 N.C. 115, 1926 N.C. LEXIS 231 (N.C. 1926).

Opinion

Cownoe, J.

Defendant is a foreign insurance company, engaged in the fire insurance business. It has not been admitted or authorized to do *117 business in tbis State, according to the laws thereof. Service Of summons or other legal process cannot, therefore, be made upon defendant, as provided in C. S., 6414 and 6415. No summons in this action has been served upon the Insurance Commissioner of this State, for the reason that plaintiffs do not contend that defendant has been admitted or authorized to do business in the State, under the provisions of C. S., chap. 106, Art. 16.

Defendant is, however, a corporation, incorporated under the laws of another state. It has no property in this State; it has no officer or agent in the State, upon whom process against it may be served. Plaintiffs contend, however, that it was doing business in this State, and, therefore, that under C. S., 1137, summons in this action against defendant may be served upon the Secretary of State by leaving a true copy thereof with him. Defendant admits that a copy of the summons, served on the Secretary of State, was mailed to it, at its office in the city of Elizabeth, New Jersey, and there received by it, but denies that it was doing business in the State of North Carolina, on the date of the issuance of the summons, or on the date of the issuance of the policy, upon which this action is founded.

The insured are citizens of North Carolina; the property insured against loss or damage by fire was located in North Carolina at the time the policy was issued, and also at the time it was destroyed by fire. The application for the policy, however, was made by a broker, engaged in business in New York, to the defendant, at its home office, in the State of New Jersey; the policy was issued, and the premium was paid in said State. The policy was not procured through any officer or agent of defendant in North Carolina or through any person in said State acting in its behalf. Defendant did not negotiate with insured, with respect to said policy through any person in this State. It has sent no adjuster or other agent into this State, since the destruction of the property insured by fire. Defendant has never expressly consented to be sued in the courts of North Carolina; there is no evidence of conduct, on its part, either before or since the issuance of the policy, from which such consent may be implied, unless it appears from the- evidence submitted to the court, upon the hearing of defendant’s motion, that defendant was doing business in the State within the meaning of C. S., 1137. The court found as a fact that defendant was not doing business, in the State and, therefore, held that the court had not acquired jurisdiction of defendant in this action by service of the summons upon the Secretary of State for North Carolina, and dismissed the action. In this, we find no error.

The validity of the service of summons in an action, instituted in the courts of this State against a foreign, or nonresident corporation, upon the Secretary of State, where it was contended that such corpora *118 tion was doing business in this State, and that therefore the service upon the Secretary of State was valid, has been considered recently by this Court in Lunceford v. Association, 190 N. C., 314 and in R. R. v. Cobb., 190 N. C., 376. Upon the facts in each of these cases, it was held that the nonresident corporation was doing business in the State, and that the service was valid.

In the former case, it was found as a fact by the trial court, and embodied in the judgment that “defendant issues and delivers contracts of insurance to residents of this State, and collects from those insured by it in this State the annual dues and assessments agreed to be paid by the insured. An application of a resident of this State to defendant for insurance is dated at the postoffice address of the resident applicant, is also signed by the resident applicant and the applicant is recommended by a resident already insured by defendant and called a member of defendant’s association. The application is signed by the member who recommended the applicant and the acceptance of the application. also shows the postoffice address of such recommending member, and if and when a certificate or contract of insurance is issued and delivered to the applicant upon such application, the contract of insurance so issued and delivered makes the application therefor a part of the said contract of insurance.”

In the latter case, it is said in the opinion of the Court, written by Stacy, C. J., “It clearly appears from the record that the appealing defendant (i. e. the foreign corporation) is ‘doing business in this State.’ ” The record discloses that a resident corporation, a party defendant to the action, was the distributor in North Carolina of the nonresident or foreign corporation, and not merely a distributor of the articles manufactured by it; and that said resident corporation, through its officer, acted for the nonresident corporation, in some, if not all', of the transactions in this State out of which the action arose. It thus appeared that the foreign corporation was doing business in this State through an agent in this State.

These two cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In the instant case, the foreign corporation had no agent or other person acting in its behalf within the State of North Carolina. It would be a strained construction of the facts in this case, to hold that defendant came to North Carolina, and by transacting business here, submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State. Defendant was expressly forbidden by the law of this State to make any contract of insurance within this State upon or concerning property in this State, or with any resident of this State. C. S., 6288. No action could be maintained upon such contract or policy for fire insurance in the courts of this State. C. S., 6424. Plaintiffs, citizens of this State, had not procured *119 license from tbe Insurance Commissioner of the State as provided in C. S., 6425, authorizing them to procure a policy of insurance from a foreign fire insurance company, not admitted or authorized to do business in this State.

The fact that defendant issued two other policies of fire insurance to residents of this State, upon property located in the State, is not determinative of the question involved in plaintiff’s appeal. It does not appear that either of these policies — one issued before and the other subsequent to the issuance of the policy to plaintiffs — was issued in North Carolina, or through an agent or other person in the State. Nothing else appearing, we must conclude that these policies were issued under the same circumstances as those under which the policy was issued to plaintiffs.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
133 S.E. 424, 192 N.C. 115, 1926 N.C. LEXIS 231, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ivy-river-land-timber-co-v-national-fire-marine-insurance-nc-1926.