Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc.
Opinion
This matter comes before the court on audit of the first and final account of the receiver of the Housing Foundation of America, Inc., and the presentation of certain claims by creditors of the Housing Foundation of America, Inc.
The Housing Foundation of America, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, with its principal place of business in Wilkes-Barre, had been engaged in the business of building prefabricated houses until sometime in 1947 when it ceased to do business. The receiver was appointed by this court upon the application of creditors. The only asset of the corporation was a tract of unimproved land located in Dallas township, Luzerne County, which was sold at private sale by the receiver for $18,600.
The receiver filed his first and final account and, no exceptions having been filed, the same was confirmed absolutely. However, distribution by the receiver could not properly be ordered from the record. There [15] were many conflicting and varied claims by both, the State and Federal governments, wage claimants, secured creditors and general unsecured creditors. Accordingly, the court appointed an auditor for the purpose of taking the testimony of the interested parties.
After due notice to all known creditors, several hearings were held by the auditor, at which each creditor present or represented by counsel presented his claim. Subsequently the auditor filed his report in which he recommended that the balance in the hands of the receiver be paid to the State of Pennsylvania and to the United States.
We have considered the matter de novo and have given careful consideration to the testimony taken before the auditor. The record shows that there is little, if any, dispute of fact. No one has disputed the fact of any particular claim or the basis of it. The only disputed question is which creditors are entitled to distribution as a matter of law.
The claimants may be classified as follows:
1. United States Government for withholding taxes and for Federal insurance contributions.
2. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for domestic stock bonus tax and for contributions to the State unemployment compensation fund.
3. Lien creditors.
4. Wage claimants.
5. Unsecured creditors.
The claim of the Federal Government against defendant corporation was filed on December 17, 1946, for withholding taxes, and on January 21, 1947, for Federal insurance contributions.
Sections 3670 and 3671 of the Internal Revenue Code of February 10, 1939, 53 Stat. at L. 448, 26 United States Code sections 3670, 3671, (the Internal [16] Revenue Code of 1954 does not apply), provide that, upon failure to pay taxes owing to the government, the amount due shall be a lien upon any property, real or personal, of the delinquent taxpayer in favor of the United States, which lien shall arise at the time that the assessment list is received by the collector of internal revenue and continue until the liability has been ¡satisfied or becomes unenforcible. Section 3672 provides that such lien shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the collector under .applicable State laws.
The record shows these liens were filed first in time, which we find as a fact. The United States is entitled "to the full amount of its claim with interest to date. The only claimant which might object is the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on the basis of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of April 23, 1942, P. L. '60. Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have ruled that a lien of the United States arising by reason of priority in time of filing, cannot be defeated by State law favoring subsequent liens. In Littlestown National Bank v. Penn Tile Works Company, 352 Pa. 238, the court in an opinion by Justice Stern, now Chief Justice Stern, said at page 242:
“We need not consider whether it was intended by this legislation to confer upon state taxes and unemployment compensation contributions priority not only over other claims and liens arising under the laws of the Commonwealth but also over liens of the United States, for, whatever may have been such intention and whatever interpretation may be given to these statutes, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that a priority in favor of the United States which arises from priority in the date of its lien can[17] not, without the consent of Congress, he impaired or superseded by state law in favor of subsequent liens imposed by authority of any law or judicial decision of the state. In Michigan v. United States, 317 U. S. 338, it was held that a tax lien securing a federal estate taxFootnotes
6 Pa. D. & C.2d 13 (Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.