Ivey v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 9, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02263
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Leiloni Ivey, No. CV-24-02263-PHX-DWL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff challenges the denial of her applications for benefits under the Social 16 Security Act (“the Act”) by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 17 (“Commissioner”). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s opening brief (Doc. 13) and the 18 Commissioner’s answering brief (Doc. 17), as well as the Administrative Record (Docs. 19 11-12, “AR”), and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision. 20 I. Procedural History 21 Plaintiff filed applications for benefits on July 15, 2021, alleging a disability onset 22 date of September 7, 2018. (AR at 17.) The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 23 denied Plaintiff’s application at the initial and reconsideration levels. (Id.) On November 24 17, 2023, following a telephonic hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 25 17-26.) The Appeals Council later denied review. (Id. at 1-4.) 26 II. The Sequential Evaluation Process and Judicial Review 27 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 28 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). The claimant bears the burden of 1 proof at the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 2 v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 3 the claimant has engaged in substantial, gainful work activity. 20 C.F.R. 4 § 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 5 medically determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step 6 three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 7 meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. 8 Part 404. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ 9 assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and proceeds to step four, 10 where the ALJ determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant 11 work. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where 12 the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national 13 economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. 14 § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 15 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 16 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). The 17 Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported 18 by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 19 Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept 20 as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, 21 “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which 22 supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 23 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In determining whether to reverse 24 an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only those issues raised by the party 25 challenging the decision. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 26 III. The ALJ’s Decision 27 At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had engaged in substantial, gainful 28 work activity during a portion of the period of alleged disability, by working from 1 November 2021 to January 2022 as a banquet cook at the Silverleaf Club, but that this 2 period of work was not disqualifying because “there has been a continuous 12-month 3 period(s) during which the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity.” (AR at 4 19-20.) 5 At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following medically 6 determinable impairments: “hernia, depression, thyroid, polycystic ovarian syndrome and 7 thumb dysfunction.” (Id. at 20.) However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “physical 8 and mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not significantly limit 9 [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic work activities. Thus, [Plaintiff] does not have a 10 severe impairment or combination of impairments.” (Id. at 25.) 11 In the course of making this non-severity finding, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s 12 symptom testimony, concluding that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, 13 persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent for the reasons 14 explained in this decision.” (Id. at 22.) The ALJ also evaluated opinion evidence from 15 various medical sources, concluding as follows: (1) Dr. Ana Sierra de Aragon 16 (“persuasive”); (2) Dr. Kirsten Sumner (“persuasive”); (3) Dr. Peter Campbell 17 (“persuasive”); (4) Dr. Nicholas Trang (“persuasive”); (5) unspecified state agency medical 18 consultant at the initial level (“persuasive”); and (6) unspecified state agency medical 19 consultant at the reconsideration level (“persuasive”). (Id. at 24.) Additionally, the ALJ 20 “considered a Third Party Function report, submitted by the claimant’s mother,” and 21 concluded that “[t]his report is consistent with the claimant’s subjective complaints; 22 however, it is not supported by the greater objective medical evidence of record.” (Id.) 23 Because the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have a severe impairment, the ALJ 24 did not proceed past step two and determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 25.) 25 IV. Discussion 26 A. Separate Consideration Of “Keloids Or Scarring Impairment” 27 Plaintiff’s opening brief purports to raise a single issue on appeal: “The ALJ failed 28 to properly consider and evaluate all impairments at Step Two. The ALJ conducted no 1 evaluation of Ivey’s keloids or scarring impairment that develops after Plaintiff undergoes 2 surgical procedures for recurring hernias. The keloids cause severe abdominal pain that 3 that prevents Ivey from working. The ALJ also erred by finding Plaintiff’s hernia 4 impairment not severe.” (Doc. 13 at 1.)1 5 In the Court’s view, this is not a single assignment of error. Rather, Plaintiff is 6 raising two distinct, if related, challenges to the ALJ’s step-two analysis: first, that the ALJ 7 erred by ignoring one of her impairments, “keloid or scarring impairment,” and failing to 8 analyze whether that impairment qualifies as severe; and second, that the ALJ also erred 9 by concluding that a different one of her impairments, “hernia impairment,” was not severe. 10 For purposes of analytical clarity, the Court will address each issue separately. 11 1. The Underlying Proceedings 12 In her Function Report, Plaintiff reported that her keloids and scarring were the 13 result of her hernia surgeries and caused her to suffer from pain, swelling, and pulling 14 sensations that prevented her from working: “Due to multiple surgeries I deal with chronic 15 swelling and pain to my abdominal area. A constant pulling sensation from adhesions and 16 scar tissue this had been going on for years.” (AR at 265.) Likewise, during the hearing 17 before the ALJ, Plaintiff’s counsel grouped together Plaintiff’s hernia surgeries and 18 resulting keloids/scarring when describing Plaintiff’s symptoms: “[Plaintiff] has had 19 multiple recurring hernias that have required multiple surgeries and have caused her to 20 have significant abdominal pain. The hernia surgeries have also resulted in recovery 21 periods of several months, where she’s mostly bedridden and she’s developed major 22 scarring around the areas of the surgery, causing her skin to be hypersensitive to pain and 23 touch. . . . [Plaintiff’s] need for consistent surgical treatment and pain management, due 24 to her multiple recurrent hernias, has left her completely unable to sustain employment at 25 the substantial gainful activity level.” (Id. at 61-62.) During a later portion of the hearing, 26 Plaintiff’s counsel again grouped together Plaintiff’s hernias and resulting keloids/scarring 27

28 1 As a remedy, Plaintiff seeks an order “remanding the matter for the payment of benefits, and alternatively for a new administrative hearing.” (Id. at 21.) 1 when attempting to challenge the state agency consultants’ findings of non-severity: “She 2 reports . . . to her surgeon every visit, that she’s had chronic abdominal pain. . . . She’s had 3 to get those injections for the pain so I know they’re steroid injections for painful keloid 4 scars which comes following the surgeries and she takes a lot of recovery time following 5 each of the surgeries and clearly the repairs have not been helping. She’s had to get 6 multiple surgeries over and over again. . . . [S]he described the pain is like a pulling, 7 chronic swelling pain. I don’t even think she can stand for very long and she said it hurts 8 to breathe and talk. Every time she goes to her surgeon, she reports she’s having abdominal 9 pain . . . .” (Id. at 73-74.) 10 2. The ALJ’s Decision 11 Consistent with this approach, the ALJ acknowledged the existence of Plaintiff’s 12 keloids/scarring in the portion of the underlying decision addressing the severity of 13 Plaintiff’s hernia impairment: 14 The claimant alleged disability due to a hernia and polycystic ovarian 15 syndrome; however, progress notes, dated January 2018 showed the claimant as status post repair of a recurrent incisional hernia in April 2019. A CT scan 16 revealed constipation but there was no evidence of a re-herniation. It was 17 noted the claimant’s primary care physician started the claimant on Neurontin and anti-inflammatories but they were unsuccessful. The 18 evidence shows the claimant has had significant hernia surgeries, but there’s nothing to suggest there is a long-term problem. In April 2019, the 19 evidence shows the claimant underwent surgery for lysis of adhesions with 20 an incisional repair. The claimant testified she has severe swelling but progress notes consistently do not show significant swelling, rather they 21 show “mild” swelling on examination. Records from Jan 4, 2022 reveal the 22 claimant presented with abdominal pain at the site of keloids and prior repair of an umbilical hernia. Of note, the claimant denied any recurrent 23 herniation. Of particular note, the physician reported that the claimant’s 24 symptoms were out of proportion of physical findings. As of January 18, 2022, records show a prominent scar around the umbilicus at site of a prior 25 hernia repair; however it is “Well healed.” Office treatment notes showed 26 the claimant had surgery done for biologic mesh on May 12, 2023. The claimant had urinary retention, was in a urine catheter, which is already 27 removed. The discharge date not reported. During this time, the claimant 28 was only taking Tylenol and Ibuprofen. On May 15, 2023, and May 16, 2023, the claimant reported she noticed blood in the urine and went back to 1 the emergency room and was started on antibiotic. She is now better and still with a “little” pain. The claimant was prescribed, for constipation - Linzess 2 290mcg, Miralax and Amitriptyline 50mg QHS for insomnia. Of particular 3 note, it is noted that both medications working “well” for her. The undersigned notes the most the claimant’s representative could point to when 4 asked why the claimant could not work, the representative responded with 5 the claimant continued to complain of pain between surgeries; however, that is not quantifying the pain or in any way suggesting the level of pain, much 6 less that the level of pain is such that she is unable to do even sedentary work. 7 Adding to that, is that the claimant went to work when she “had to” when her mom was extremely ill. The claimant also testified she has a rabbit, as an 8 emotional pet, which she takes care off. She also reported her hobbies 9 include bi[k]e riding, yoga and poetry; however, the claimant reported she could no longer bike ride and do yoga, she did testify she still participated in 10 yoga. The undersigned finds it difficult to conclude the claimant has more 11 than mild limitations on a long-term basis with regards to her history of hernias and polycystic ovarian syndrome. Accordingly, the undersigned 12 finds these conditions are “non-severe” impairments. 13 (Id. at 22, emphases added.) 14 3. The Parties’ Arguments 15 In her opening brief, Plaintiff contends this analysis was deficient because the ALJ 16 “only loosely referenced [her] keloid impairment when discussing the hernia impairment” 17 and “carried out no analysis of [her] keloids in terms of their severity or medically 18 determinable status,” which was necessary because “keloids is a distinctly different 19 impairment than recurring hernias.” (Doc. 13 at 5.) 20 In response, the Commissioner contends that Plaintiff “can show no error from the 21 ALJ not considering keloids as a separate impairment” because “[t]he Ninth Circuit has 22 found that it is not harmful error for an ALJ to not determine whether an impairment is 23 medically determinable or severe if the impairment’s effects are actually addressed within 24 the decision as a whole,” “[t]he ALJ considered Plaintiff’s complaints of pain, swelling, 25 and other limitations due to abdominal issues,” and “Plaintiff fails to point out evidence 26 that is directly and solely connected to keloids that the ALJ did not consider.” (Doc. 17 at 27 28 1 12.)2 2 4. Analysis 3 The Commissioner has the better of this argument. The ALJ expressly 4 acknowledged Plaintiff’s keloids and scarring, which were caused by Plaintiff’s hernia 5 surgeries, and discussed those conditions in the portion of the opinion analyzing the 6 severity of Plaintiff’s hernia impairment. This approach was rational, given that Plaintiff 7 and Plaintiff’s counsel also grouped together the conditions when addressing Plaintiff’s 8 abdominal pain and swelling, and “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one 9 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion 10 must be upheld.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (citations omitted). 11 Alternatively, even assuming the ALJ should have made separate, formal step-two 12 severity findings as to Plaintiff’s hernia impairment and as to Plaintiff’s keloids and 13 scarring, it is clear in context that the ALJ did not believe Plaintiff’s abdominal pain, 14 swelling, and pulling—regardless of their genesis—significantly interfered with Plaintiff’s 15 ability to perform basic work activities (i.e., qualified as a severe impairment). As 16 discussed in Part IV.B below, Plaintiff’s challenge the sufficiency of the ALJ’s analysis as 17 to that issue lacks merit. It follows that any error in failing to make an additional, formal 18 step-two severity finding as to Plaintiff’s keloids and scarring was harmless. 19 B. Non-Severity Finding 20 1. Legal Standard 21 At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether 22 the claimant suffers from a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments. Smolen 23 v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1996). In general, “[t]he step-two inquiry is a 24 de minimis screening device to dispose of meritless claims.” Id. at 1291. See also Glanden 25 v. Kijakazi, 86 F.4th 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Our narrow application . . . places us in 26 good company: nine other circuits have also announced that they view step two as requiring 27 no more than a de minimis showing.”). “[A]ny impairment or combination of impairments 28 2 Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. 1 which significantly limits [a person’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work 2 activities” is considered “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). “Basic work activities are 3 ‘abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs, including, for example, walking, 4 standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling.’” Smolen, 80 5 F.3d at 1273 (citation omitted). “An impairment or combination of impairments may be 6 found not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than 7 a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 8 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). In determining the severity of impairments, the 9 ALJ considers the claimant’s testimony, treatment notes, imaging, ADLs, opinion 10 evidence, and any other statements or observations in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). 11 2. The ALJ’s Analysis 12 The ALJ identified what the Court perceives to be seven reasons for discrediting 13 Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling abdominal pain, swelling, and pulling sensations and 14 concluding that those alleged limitations, even when considered in combination with the 15 limitations from Plaintiff’s other impairments, did “not significantly limit [Plaintiff’s] 16 ability to perform basic work activities.” (AR at 25.) 17 The first reason was that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her abdominal issues were 18 inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, including (1) “progress notes [that] 19 consistently do not show significant swelling, rather they show ‘mild’ swelling”; (2) a 20 physician’s note that “the claimant’s symptoms were out of proportion of physical 21 findings”; (3) a note that Plaintiff’s “prominent scar around the umbilicus” was “Well 22 healed”; and (4) a note that Plaintiff reported she was “now better and still with a ‘little’ 23 pain.” (Id. at 22.) 24 The second reason was that Plaintiff pursued only conservative treatment for her 25 pain. (Id. [“During this time, the claimant was only taking Tylenol and Ibuprofen.”].) 26 The third reason was that Plaintiff’s claims of disabling abdominal pain, swelling, 27 and pulling sensations were inconsistent with her activities of daily living (“ADLs”), which 28 included “restorative yoga” and “return[ing] to school to be a yoga instructor in 2020.” 1 (Id.) 2 The fourth reason was that Plaintiff was, in fact, able to return to work for a period 3 of months during the period of alleged disability. (Id. [“Adding to that, is that the claimant 4 went to work when she ‘had to’ when her mom was extremely ill.”].) 5 The fifth reason was that Plaintiff never “quantif[ied] the pain or in any way 6 suggest[ed] the level of pain, much less that the level of pain is such that she is unable to 7 do even sedentary work.” (Id.) 8 The sixth reason was that six different medical sources, all of whom the ALJ deemed 9 persuasive, offered opinions that Plaintiff was “capable of returning to work” and/or “has 10 no severe impairments.” (Id. at 23-24.) 11 The seventh reason was that Plaintiff also provided exaggerated testimony regarding 12 some of her other alleged impairments, including her thumb injury and her mental 13 impairments. (Id.) 14 3. The Parties’ Arguments 15 Plaintiff contends she “is disabled, in part, because of keloids or scarring that have 16 developed following her repeated hernia procedures. This impairment produces chronic 17 and severe abdominal pain that impacts [her] capacity to sustain work . . . .” (Doc. 13 at 18 3-4.) Plaintiff also contends that “after a hernia has been repaired, the keloids develop and 19 become a completely different and significant problem for Plaintiff that is unlike the 20 difficulties associated with hernias.” (Id. at 6.) Next, Plaintiff summarizes the medical 21 evidence establishing that she does, in fact, have keloids and contends that “the ALJ 22 disregarded the overwhelming evidence that supported the chronic abdominal pain 23 symptoms and skin sensitivity problems described by Plaintiff.” (Id. at 8-11.) Next, 24 Plaintiff faults the ALJ for “improperly failing to evaluate her specific keloid-related 25 testimony.” (Id. at 11-12.) Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also erred by determining 26 that her recurring hernias were non-severe because the “medical evidence documented the 27 severity of Plaintiff’s hernia impairment” and because her “need for multiple surgical 28 procedures to repair hernias demonstrate[s] how [her] hernias were never resolved or 1 controlled, and her symptoms remained throughout the disability period.” (Id. at 14-16.) 2 Next, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for not crediting her mother’s testimony regarding her 3 symptoms and limitations. (Id. at 16-18.) Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by 4 identifying counsel’s inability to quantify her pain as a basis for the non-severity finding. 5 (Id. at 18.) Next, Plaintiff argues that her pursuit of employment during a portion of the 6 alleged period of disability should not have been viewed as discrediting because this 7 “limited work constituted only a brief period and not a true assessment of [her] ability to 8 sustain work over time as required by SSR 96-8p.” (Id. at 18-19.) Last, Plaintiff agues 9 that her ADLs, including yoga, were not inconsistent with her symptom testimony because 10 her yoga practice “required no physical activities of any kind.” (Id. at 19.) 11 In response, the Commissioner defends the sufficiency of ALJ’s step-two 12 determination of non-severity. (Doc. 17 at 4-14.) The Commissioner’s essential argument 13 is as follows: “The record shows gaps in treatment and periods during which Plaintiff did 14 not report or exhibit significant symptoms due to her abdominal impairments and that 15 Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity after she alleged her disability began. 16 Unchallenged medical source statements indicate that any work restrictions were 17 temporary, and State agency medical consultants determined that Plaintiff had no severe 18 medically determinable impairments. Thus, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff’s 19 abdominal impairments were not severe.” (Id. at 4-5.) 20 4. Analysis 21 The Court finds no harmful error in the ALJ’s step-two finding of non-severity. 22 Although step two “requir[es] no more than a de minimis showing,” Glanden, 86 F.4th at 23 843, this does not mean a claimant will always survive step two simply by identifying a 24 medically determinable impairment and claiming to suffer from disabling pain as a result 25 of that impairment. See, e.g., Nelson v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 2182362, *1 (9th Cir. 2023) 26 (affirming step-two non-severity finding where “[t]he treating physician did not 27 specifically state an opinion that Nelson was unable to work during the relevant time 28 period” and noting that “lay testimony alone, without objective medical evidence, could 1 not establish a severe impairment at step two”). See generally Hensley v. Kijakazi, 2023 2 WL 4700635, *1 n.1 (9th Cir. 2023) (“A non-severe finding at step two will be upheld if it 3 is supported by substantial evidence, and the substantial evidence threshold is not high.”) 4 (cleaned up). This is an unusual case in that the ALJ identified a host of reasons for 5 concluding that Plaintiff’s abdominal-related impairments did not meet step two’s minimal 6 standard and would not significantly limit Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work 7 activities. The ALJ’s analysis was rational and supported by substantial evidence, so the 8 Court must affirm. 9 One of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for the non-severity finding was that all six 10 medical sources opined that Plaintiff was “capable of returning to work” and/or “has no 11 severe impairments.” (AR at 23-24.) Plaintiff does not acknowledge these opinions, much 12 less challenge the ALJ’s basis for determining that each opinion was persuasive. The 13 presence of these unanimous, unchallenged opinions provides support for the ALJ’s step- 14 two finding of non-severity. Hensley, 2023 WL 4700635 at *1 (concluding that 15 “substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s holding that Hensley’s mental health impairments 16 were non-severe” where “the state agency’s mental health consultants . . . reviewed 17 Hensley’s medical record and opined that she did not have a severe mental impairment”). 18 Another of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for the non-severity finding was that 19 Plaintiff was able to practice yoga and even attend a yoga-instructor training program 20 during the period of alleged disability. It was rational for the ALJ to conclude that these 21 activities were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s extreme allegations of disabling abdominal 22 pain, swelling, and pulling sensations—and, thus, that those alleged symptoms would not 23 significantly limit Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities. See, e.g., Trisdale v. 24 Astrue, 334 F. App’x 85, 87 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he ALJ noted that Trisdale successfully 25 completed a marketing workshop, won an award for her photography, and regularly takes 26 yoga and exercise classes. These are clear and convincing reasons supporting the ALJ’s 27 conclusion that ‘claimant’s allegations regarding her pain and limitations and their impact 28 upon her ability to work are not fully credible.’”); Nunes v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 3674730, 1 *7 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (“The ALJ reasonably determined that Plaintiff’s ability to engage in 2 yoga, walking, cycling, cooking, cleaning, dusting, driving, shopping, and performing her 3 own activities of daily living without assistance was inconsistent with her with her 4 allegation that she was precluded from all full-time work.”). Although Plaintiff contends 5 her yoga practice was not inconsistent with her testimony because it was “not a physical 6 practice whatsoever” (AR at 77), it was rational for the ALJ to conclude otherwise, 7 particularly where Plaintiff did not merely practice yoga but also attended an instructor- 8 training course. 9 Another of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for the non-severity finding was that 10 Plaintiff was able to return to work as a chef for a period of months after the alleged 11 disability onset date. Once again, it was rational for the ALJ to conclude that this activity 12 was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s professed inability to work due to her abdominal pain, 13 swelling, and pulling sensations. And although Plaintiff has identified reasons why the 14 ALJ could have construed her post-onset work activity as not inconsistent with her 15 testimony, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, 16 one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas, 17 278 F.3d at 954 (citations omitted). 18 Finally, yet another of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for the non-severity finding was 19 that Plaintiff had provided exaggerated testimony with respect to some of her other alleged 20 symptoms—particularly, her thumb-related symptoms and her mental impairments. In her 21 brief, Plaintiff does not mention this aspect of the ALJ’s analysis and focuses narrowly on 22 the ALJ’s purported failure to provide an “evaluation of [her] specific testimony of 23 incapacitating keloid scarring.” (Doc. 13 at 12.) But this approach ignores that the ALJ 24 could permissibly discount the entirety of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony once the ALJ 25 determined that she had provided exaggerated testimony regarding her thumb-related 26 symptoms and mental impairments. See, e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 27 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that a “tendency to exaggerate” is a “specific and convincing 28 reason[]” for discrediting a claimant’s testimony); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To determine whether the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of 2|| her symptoms is credible, the ALJ may consider. . . ordinary techniques of credibility 3 || evaluation, such as . . . prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 4|| testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid... .”). See generally 9th Cir. 5 || Model Jury Ins. 1.14 (“[I]f you decide that a witness has deliberately testified untruthfully 6|| about something important, you may choose not to believe anything that witness □□□□□□□□□□ 7 Accordingly, 8 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter || judgment accordingly and terminate this action. 10 Dated this 9th day of September, 2025. 11 12 om ee 13 } ——— Dominic W. Lanza 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 3 Given these determinations, any errors in the ALJ’s other reasons for the non- severity finding were harmless.

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