Ivey v. City of Sarasota

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Ivey v. City of Sarasota

533 So. 2d 881, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 2440, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 4828, 1988 WL 115380

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 2, 1988

DocketNo. 87-1865

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 533 So. 2d 881 (Ivey v. City of Sarasota) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ivey v. City of Sarasota, 533 So. 2d 881, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 2440, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 4828, 1988 WL 115380 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on review of a workers’ compensation order denying a medical evaluation and remedial or palliative care for lack of evidence. The parties had earlier executed a settlement stipulating that maximum medical improvement occurred in 1988, with a 20 percent permanent impairment to the body as a whole. We reverse.

Claimant’s uncontroverted testimony was that he continues to suffer pain from the compensable accident. In Walker v. Allied Septic Tanks, 522 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), this court held that under proper circumstances, a claimant has a right to medical care prior to reaching maximum medical improvement. In Professional Administrators v. Macias, 448 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), this court similarly held that a claimant has a right to palliative treatment following maximum medical improvement. Absent anything indicating a change of condition, the maximum medical improvement finding precludes further remedial care. Oak Crest Enterprises, Inc. [882]*882v. Ford, 411 So.2d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). However, it was error to deny claimant an evaluation to determine need for palliative care where the record reflected a 20 percent permanent impairment and claimant testified to recurring pain in the area of the injury. Accordingly, the ruling below is reversed with directions to order an evaluation to determine need for palliative care.

BOOTH, SHIVERS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on review of a workers’ compensation order denying a medical evaluation and remedial or palliative care for lack of evidence. The parties had earlier executed a settlement stipulating that maximum medical improvement occurred in 1988, with a 20 percent permanent impairment to the body as a whole. We reverse.

Claimant’s uncontroverted testimony was that he continues to suffer pain from the compensable accident. In Walker v. Allied Septic Tanks, 522 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), this court held that under proper circumstances, a claimant has a right to medical care prior to reaching maximum medical improvement. In Professional Administrators v. Macias, 448 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), this court similarly held that a claimant has a right to palliative treatment following maximum medical improvement. Absent anything indicating a change of condition, the maximum medical improvement finding precludes further remedial care. Oak Crest Enterprises, Inc. [882]*882v. Ford, 411 So.2d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). However, it was error to deny claimant an evaluation to determine need for palliative care where the record reflected a 20 percent permanent impairment and claimant testified to recurring pain in the area of the injury. Accordingly, the ruling below is reversed with directions to order an evaluation to determine need for palliative care.

BOOTH, SHIVERS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

533 So. 2d 881, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 2440, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 4828, 1988 WL 115380, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ivey-v-city-of-sarasota-fladistctapp-1988.

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