Ivette D. Ayala Gonzalez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico; Autoridad para el Fideicomiso de la Tierra de Puerto Rico

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
• Decided: May 11, 2017
• Docket: 16-00177
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2

4 IN RE: CASE NO. 16-02212 BKT 5 6 IVETTE D AYALA GONZALEZ Chapter 7

7 Adversary No. 16-00177 8 9 Debtor(s)

10 IVETTE D AYALA GONZALEZ 11

12 Plaintiff 13 vs.

14 BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO; 15 AUTORIDAD PARA EL 16 F D I E N P A U N E C R IA T M O I R E I N C T O O

DE LA VIVIENDA

FILED & ENTERED ON 05/11/2017 17 Defendant(s) 18

19 OPINION & ORDER 20 Before the court is Plaintiff/Debtor Ivette D Ayala Gonzalez’s (“Plaintiff”) Request for 21 22 Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 24]. The motion was unopposed by the Defendants despite receiving 23 notice1 of the motion and time to object. For the reasons set forth below, the Debtor’s Request for 24 Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 25 The role of summary judgment is to look behind the facade of the pleadings and assay the

1 The court refers Defendant to PR LBR 5005-4(g). 1 parties' proof in order to determine whether a trial is required. Under Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 56(c), 2 made applicable in bankruptcy by Fed. R. Bankr. P., Rule 7056, a summary judgment is available if 3 the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 4 5 affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 6 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano- 7 Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010). As to issues on which the movant, at trial, would be compelled 8 9 to carry the burden of proof, it must identify those portions of the pleadings which it believes 10 demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact. In re Edgardo Ryan Rijos & Julia E. 11 Cruz Nieves v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya & Citibank, 263 B.R. 382, 388 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001). 12 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not embrace default judgment principles.2 Even 14 when a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the court is not relieved of its duty to decide 15 whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Likewise, the court must still assess 16 17 whether the moving party has fulfilled its burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of 18 material fact. In an unopposed motion for summary judgment, the court is still obliged to consider 19 the motion on its merits, in light of the record as constituted, in order to determine whether judgment 20 21

22 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is the basic procedure to be followed when there is a default in the course of litigation. It tracks the ancient common law axiom that a default is an admission of all well-pleaded 23 allegations against the defaulting party. See generally B. Finberg, Annotation, Necessity of Taking Proof as to 24 Liability Against Defaulting Defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 1070 (1966). Other default provisions embrace that same 25 philosophy. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a) (failure to appear and defend in response to a summons "will result in a judgment by default against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint"); cf. Fed. R .Civ. P.

16(f) (failure to attend pretrial conference); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (failure to obey discovery orders). Motions for summary judgment, however, lack these ancient common law roots. See generally John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure: An Essay Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Keating's Act, 31 Ind. L.J. 329 (1956). They are governed by Rule 56 under which the failure to respond to the motion does not alone discharge the burdens imposed on a moving party. Vermont Teddy Bear Company, Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Company, 373 F.3d 241 (2nd Cir.2004). 1 would be legally appropriate. Aguiar-Carrasquillo v. Agosto-Alicea, 445 F.3d 19 (1st Cir.2006).3 It 2 is well-settled that “before granting an unopposed summary judgment motion, the court must inquire 3 whether the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary 4 5 judgment as a matter of law.” Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1517 6 (1st Cir.1991). Accordingly, we emphasize that "in considering a motion for summary judgment, 7 [courts] must review the motion, even if unopposed, and determine from what it has before it 8 9 whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Custer v. Pan Am. 10 Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir.1993). 11 After reviewing Plaintiff’s arguments, and the relevant law, the court determines that there is 12 13 no triable issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 14 of law. The court concludes after a review of the documents provided by Plaintiff that it has met its 15 burden in terms of producing adequate affirmative evidence. Plaintiff's deed of sale and defendant's 16 17 mortgage should not have been recorded because they lack "tracto" or sequence in the chain of 18 titleholders. Thus, the basic principle of Article 57 of the Puerto Rico Mortgage law, which 19 requires sequence in the chain of titleholders, is absent here. As such, claim number 2-1 filed by 20 21 Defendants in the related legal case 16-02212, is unsecured. 22

23 24 25 3 Entry of a summary judgment motion as unopposed does not automatically give rise to a grant of summary judgment. Instead, “the district court [is] still obliged to consider the motion on its merits, in light

of the record as constituted, in order to determine whether judgment would be legally appropriate.” Mullen v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 446, 452 (1st Cir.1992). “Even when faced with an unopposed motion for summary judgment, a court still has the obligation to test the undisputed facts in the crucible of the applicable law in order to ascertain whether judgment is warranted.” Mendez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 900 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir.1990); Fed. R .Civ. P. 56(e)); Pico Vidal v. Ruiz Alvarado, 377 B.R. 788 (D.P.R., 2007). 1 SO ORDERED San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 11th day of May, 2017.

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’ Brian K. Tester 8 U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25