Ivan Starbuck v. Bunny Kay Waterman

CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedMay 8, 2026
Docket2025-CA-0106
StatusUnpublished

This text of Ivan Starbuck v. Bunny Kay Waterman (Ivan Starbuck v. Bunny Kay Waterman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ivan Starbuck v. Bunny Kay Waterman, (Ky. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

RENDERED: MAY 8, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0106-MR

IVAN STARBUCK APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-004838

BUNNY KAY WATERMAN; JOSEPH W. BURNETT, SR.; AND TRINA BURNETT APPELLEES

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND CETRULO, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment to

Joseph and Trina Burnett with respect to Ivan Starbuck’s premises liability action.

We affirm.

Starbuck sued the Burnetts and Bunny Waterman in August 2023.

The Burnetts lease residential property, and Waterman is one of their tenants. The

gravamen of Starbuck’s complaint is that the Burnetts allowed Waterman to keep her three dogs on the premises, despite their violent history, resulting in their attack

on Starbuck while he was “lawfully walking past the property.” The Burnetts

eventually moved for summary judgment.

Starbuck responded to the Burnetts’ motion by conceding he could not

prevail on his statutory claims but argued his common law negligence claim

remained viable. Unpersuaded, the trial court granted the Burnetts’ motion, and

this appeal followed. We develop additional background as necessary.

“Summary judgment is a remedy to be used sparingly, i.e. ‘when, as a

matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce

evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor and against the movant.’”

Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Ky. 2016). We review grants of

summary judgment de novo, owing “no deference” to the trial court’s reasoning.

Id. See also Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Ky. 2006) (“If the summary

judgment is sustainable on any basis, it must be affirmed.”).

Starbuck argues his common law negligence claim should survive.

“The elements of a negligence claim are (1) a legally-cognizable duty, (2) a breach

of that duty, (3) causation linking the breach to an injury, and (4) damages.”

Patton, 529 S.W.3d at 729. The focus of his brief is foreseeability and superseding

causation. He says nothing about duty.

-2- Reading the brief favorably to Starbuck, he seems to argue the

Burnetts duty was not to “permit[] a tenant’s dog(s) to remain on their rental

property . . . aware[] that the animal was vicious.” (Appellant’s Br. 7).

Necessarily then, any duty must arise from the Burnetts’ ownership of the

property, i.e., a duty based on a premises liability theory. That is where Starbuck’s

claim fails. Starbuck alleged only that the Watermans’ dogs attacked him while he

was “walking past the property,” not while he was on the property.

Generally, “one who owns premises to which the public is invited is

under a general duty to exercise ordinary care to keep those premises in a

reasonably safe condition.” McDonald v. Talbott, 447 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Ky. 1969).

But in Ireland v. Raymond, this Court held that a landlord cannot be held liable

“for injuries resulting from an attack by his tenant’s dogs when the attack does not

take place on the rented premises.” 796 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Ky. App. 1990). In

Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v. Zinsmeister, the Kentucky Supreme Court

recognized “that Ireland limited landlord liability to attacks that occur on the

leased premises,” (i.e., “the premises-only rule”) but clarified that a landlord could

be held liable for off-premises dog attacks where the landlord can be considered

the dog’s owner pursuant to the relevant statute. 367 S.W.3d 561, 563 (Ky. 2012).

Starbuck has not alleged the attack took place “on the leased

premises,” and Starbuck concedes the Burnetts were not the dogs’ owners as

-3- defined by statute. Consequently, Starbuck’s common law negligence claim

against the Burnetts fails as a matter of law, and the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

January 3, 2025 Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Christopher Bailey Michael B. Dailey Louisville, Kentucky Louisville, Kentucky

-4-

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Related

Fischer v. Fischer
197 S.W.3d 98 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2006)
McDonald v. Talbott
447 S.W.2d 84 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1969)
Ireland v. Raymond
796 S.W.2d 870 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1990)
Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v. Zinsmeister
367 S.W.3d 561 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2012)
Patton v. Bickford
529 S.W.3d 717 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2016)

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Ivan Starbuck v. Bunny Kay Waterman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ivan-starbuck-v-bunny-kay-waterman-kyctapp-2026.