Iula v. Voos

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 16, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-02277
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KAREN MARY ASALONE IULA, Case No.: 23-CV-2277 JLS (AHG)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: (1) DISMISSING 13 v. AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 14 JAMES VOOS, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; AND (2) 15 Defendant. DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 16 RESTRAINING ORDER 17 (ECF Nos. 5, 6). 18

19 Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Karen Mary Asalone Iula’s Amended 20 Complaint for Monetary, Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief (“Am. Compl.,” ECF No. 5) 21 and Renewed Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for 22 Preliminary Injunction (“Renewed TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 6). Having carefully considered 23 Plaintiff’s submissions and the law, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended 24 Complaint and DENIES her Renewed TRO Motion. 25 BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff initiated this action by filing her original Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1) 27 on December 14, 2023. She also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 28 the same day. See ECF No. 2. Then, on December 15, Plaintiff filed her initial Ex Parte 1 Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction 2 (“First TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 3). 3 The original Complaint alleged that, after Plaintiff and her children moved into 4 Defendant James Voos’ rental home pursuant to a sublease agreement, Defendant began 5 “demanding sexual favors” from Plaintiff “in exchange for housing and associated 6 benefits.” Compl. at 1, 4, 6. The Complaint further alleged that Plaintiff had “endured a 7 relentless series of harassment and discrimination” at Defendant’s hands, id. at 1; that said 8 harassment had “rendered [Plaintiff’s] living conditions unbearable,” id. at 3; and that 9 when Plaintiff refused Defendant’s sexual demands, he “retaliat[ed]” by “unlawfully 10 evicting” Plaintiff, id. at 1–2. The Complaint listed four causes of action: (1) quid pro quo 11 harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604, id. at 3–4; (2) “interference and intimidation 12 in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617,” id. at 5; (3) “unlawful eviction and retaliation” in 13 violation of the “provisions of the Fair Housing Act” (“FHA”), id. at 6; and (4) intentional 14 infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), see id. at 7–8. 15 In its December 21, 2023 Order (the “Order,” ECF No. 4), the Court granted Plaintiff 16 leave to proceed IFP and screened the Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 17 See Order at 2–3. The Court explained that, to avoid dismissal, the Complaint needed to 18 contain allegations of fact from which the Court could reasonably infer Defendant’s 19 liability. See id. at 3–4. And while the FHA provided for Plaintiff’s first three causes of 20 action, the Court found the Complaint devoid of factual allegations to support them. See 21 id. at 5–8. The Complaint neither alleged facts regarding the timing, frequency, or 22 circumstances of Defendant’s conduct, nor provided details about any specific act of 23 harassment. Instead, the Complaint contained only legal conclusions, like that Defendant 24 “engaged in sexual harassment, intimidation, and coercion.” Id. at 6 (quoting Compl. at 4). 25 As Plaintiff’s IIED claim was equally unsupported, the Court dismissed the Complaint for 26 failing to state a claim for which relief could be granted. 27 Plaintiff’s First TRO Motion, which the Court interpreted to request the enjoinment 28 of a state eviction proceeding, was no more successful. The Court determined that it was 1 precluded from granting Plaintiff’s request by the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”), under 2 which federal courts “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court” 3 unless certain narrow exceptions apply. See id. at 9–10 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283). And 4 to the extent Plaintiff sought to prevent Defendant from committing further harassment, 5 the Court found that Plaintiff had not shown any likelihood of succeeding on the merits 6 because her Complaint did not state a claim. See id. at 10. Accordingly, the Court denied 7 the First TRO Motion. Id. at 11. 8 The dismissal of Plaintiff’s original Complaint and denial of Plaintiff’s First TRO 9 Motion were both without prejudice. See id. The Court granted Plaintiff forty-five days 10 to file an amended complaint. Id. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Renewed TRO 11 Motion followed. 12 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 13 As Plaintiff continues to proceed IFP, her Amended Complaint remains subject to 14 sua sponte dismissal if it is “frivolous, [is] malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which 15 relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 16 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 17 (per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 18 prisoners”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 19 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that 20 fails to state a claim.”). For the reasons below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has again 21 failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The Court thus DISMISSES 22 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. 23 I. Standard of Review 24 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 25 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 26 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 27 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain 28 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 1 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 2 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff 3 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 4 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility requires a plaintiff to plead 5 facts supporting a claim for relief rather than make conclusory allegations or present a 6 “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 7 “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true 8 all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 9 the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, courts have a 10 duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police 11 Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). A district court should grant leave to amend if 12 it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 13 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988)). 14 II. Analysis 15 The Amended Complaint lists three causes of action. First, Plaintiff brings a federal 16 claim for “a violation of the [FHA], 42 U.S.C. § 3604.” Am. Compl. at 3. The Amended 17 Complaint also contains state law IIED and negligence claims. Id. at 3–4. The Court will 18 first summarize Plaintiff’s present allegations and then analyze each of Plaintiff’s causes 19 of action in turn. 20 A. Allegations in the Amended Complaint 21 Plaintiff alleges that after she moved into Defendant’s property, “Defendant 22 immediately began exhibiting unwelcome sexual advances towards [her], creating a hostile 23 living environment.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff further claims that she consistently rejected 24 Defendant’s advances, and that he “retaliated by manipulating living conditions and 25 threatening eviction.” Id. The alleged harassment intensified to the point where Plaintiff’s 26 living situation became “untenable.” Id. Defendant then filed an unlawful detainer action 27 against Plaintiff in February of 2023, eventually receiving a favorable judgment on 28 December 15. Id. at 3. Plaintiff states that, as a result of Defendant’s actions, she suffers 1 from “emotional and psychological distress” and “fac[es] imminent removal from the 2 property by the sheriff.” Id. at 2. 3 B. Federal Claims 4 The Court liberally construes the Amended Complaint’s federal cause of action to 5 include the three FHA-related claims—quid pro quo harassment, hostile housing 6 environment, and retaliatory eviction—Plaintiff brought in her initial Complaint. 7 However, the Amended Complaint’s allegations fail to support any of those claims. 8 1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment 9 As the Court previously explained, courts “apply Title VII discrimination analysis 10 in examining [FHA] discrimination claims.” Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 11 304 (9th Cir. 1997). So, to state a quid pro quo harassment claim, the Amended Complaint 12 must “include facts raising an inference that the receipt of [housing] benefit[s] was 13 conditioned upon sexual consideration.” See Christie v. Reno Flying Serv., Inc., No. 3:21- 14 CV-0368-RCJ-CSD, 2022 WL 1462661, at *3 (D. Nev. May 9, 2022). A plaintiff can raise 15 such an inference by pleading that a tangible housing action resulted from her refusal to 16 submit to a defendant’s sexual demands. See Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947 17 (8th Cir. 2010). Further, quid pro quo threats can be explicit or implicit. See Honce v. 18 Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 1993). To adequately plead an implicit threat, a 19 complaint must allege facts suggesting that the defendant’s words or actions could 20 reasonably have been understood to condition the receipt housing benefits on sexual 21 consideration. Cf. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003). 22 The Amended Complaint fails to state a quid pro quo harassment claim. Plaintiff 23 alleges that she rejected Defendant’s “unwelcome sexual advances,” and that he 24 “retaliated” by threatening eviction. Am. Compl. at 2. That allegation—like those made 25 in her original Complaint—essentially “recit[es] . . . the elements of [Plaintiff’s] cause of 26 action,” which “will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Amended Complaint does 27 not (1) describe a specific instance of Defendant making demands, (2) state why Plaintiff 28 understood Defendant to be implicitly conditioning housing benefits on her acquiescence, 1 nor (3) allege that Defendant explicitly made a quid pro quo threat. 2 The Court stresses that the showing required of Plaintiff is not particularly 3 burdensome. However, courts generally require a complaint to include some detail 4 regarding the quid pro quo threat or threats made; one cannot simply allege that such a 5 threat occurred. Compare Glagola v. MacFann, No. 2:22-CV-1263-NR-LPL, 6 2023 WL 7271340, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2023) (“The core allegation . . . is that 7 [plaintiff’s landlord] offered to waive or pay for [plaintiff’s] rent in exchange for 8 sex. . . . That is enough to state a claim for quid pro quo harassment.” (citation omitted)); 9 Noah v. Assor, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1290–91 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (crediting allegations that 10 defendant responded to plaintiff’s rejection by “stating that if [p]laintiff refused to be his 11 girlfriend, then [p]laintiff wouldn’t be allowed to renew her lease” (citation omitted)), and 12 West v. DJ Mortg., LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1393, 1400 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (concluding plaintiff 13 adequately pled an implicit quid pro quo threat where she described multiple instances of 14 defendant ignoring repair requests after plaintiff rejected his advances), with Fedynich v. 15 Lozano, No. 3:20CV260, 2021 WL 710368, at *12 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2021) (dismissing 16 claim where plaintiffs failed to “state any facts” showing they “had to take [defendant’s] 17 offer or suffer a consequence to their housing rights”). The Amended Complaint lacks this 18 required detail. 19 2. Hostile Housing Environment 20 Establishing a hostile housing environment requires Plaintiff to “show (1) 21 unwelcomed (2) sexual harassment that was (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to 22 interfere with or deprive her right to use or enjoy her home.” Been v. Palais Villa, LLC, 23 No. SACV2101532CJCKESX, 2021 WL 8895168, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2021) (citing 24 Quigley, 598 F.3d at 946–47). To determine whether harassment was sufficiently severe 25 or pervasive, courts consider factors such as “the frequency of the [harassing] conduct; its 26 severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; 27 and whether it unreasonably interferes with the [victim’s environment].” Salisbury v. 28 Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1291 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting 1 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). 2 The Amended Complaint fails to state a hostile housing environment claim for the 3 same reason Plaintiff’s original Complaint did. The Complaint alleged that Defendant 4 “engaged in sexual harassment, intimidation, and coercion.” Compl. at 4. Similarly, the 5 Amended Complaint states that Defendant’s behavior “create[ed] a hostile living 6 environment” and an “untenable living situation.” Am. Compl. at 2. Both allegations 7 amount only to legal conclusions. As Plaintiff has again failed to provide details regarding 8 any specific act of harassment or describe the frequency or severity of Defendant’s 9 conduct,1 the Court remains unable to infer that Plaintiff experienced “severe or pervasive” 10 harassment. See Huddleston v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 16-CV-01998-YGR, 11 2016 WL 4729175, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2016) (explaining that pleading “sexual 12 harassment” is “conclus[ory]” where plaintiff “fail[ed] to allege any facts describing the 13 harassment”). 14 3. Retaliatory Eviction 15 Finally, pleading a retaliatory eviction claim requires alleging that “(1) the tenant 16 engaged in a protected activity, (2) an adverse housing consequence causally linked to that 17 activity, and (3) resulting damage.” West v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 21-CV- 18 02370-EMC, 2022 WL 1556415, at *14 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2022) (citing San Pedro Hotel 19 Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1998)). The second element, 20 causality, can be pled by alleging (1) “circumstantial evidence of a ‘pattern of antagonism’ 21 following the protected conduct,” Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 22 23 24 1 As in her earlier motion, Plaintiff included a “Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order” (the “Request”) that she filed in state court on January 9, 2023, with her Renewed TRO Motion. See Renewed 25 TRO Mot. at 24–41. The Request provides some detail about Defendant’s harassing conduct. See id. at 39. The Court, however, again reminds Plaintiff that, “[i]n screening under § 1915(e)(2) . . . , the Court 26 generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings.” Gibbs v. Jens, No. 2:20-CV- 1956-KJM-DMC, 2022 WL 2067971, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2022), report and recommendation 27 adopted, 2022 WL 4078847 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2022). If Plaintiff is indeed basing her current lawsuit on 28 the facts alleged in the Request, Plaintiff need only include said facts in a future amended complaint for 1 2005) (quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3rd Cir. 1997)); 2 or (2) “temporal proximity between [Plaintiff’s] protected activities and [Defendant’s] 3 adverse acts,” Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). 4 As for the first element, there is caselaw to suggest that resisting sexual advances is 5 a protected activity, see Yeaman v. City of Burley, No. 4:21-CV-00345-BLW, 6 2023 WL 2868575, at *9 (D. Idaho Apr. 10, 2023), but the question is not settled, see 7 Cloud v. Brennan, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1299–300 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (describing split in 8 authority regarding whether “refusing sexual harassment is . . . a protected activity” under 9 Title VII). In either event, courts agree that reporting sexual harassment is a protected 10 activity. See id. at 1300. And here, Plaintiff alleges that she reported Defendant’s behavior 11 to the “local authorities,” and that “Defendant’s behavior” escalated following those 12 reports. Am. Compl. at 2. 13 Further, Plaintiff provides some support for her retaliatory eviction claim in the 14 Amended Complaint that was absent in her earlier filings. Specifically, she alleges that 15 Defendant’s unwelcome sexual advances began in September of 2022, that she later 16 reported the harassment, and that Defendant began attempting to evict Plaintiff in January 17 of 2023. Id. The temporal proximity between Defendant’s demands, Plaintiff’s report, and 18 the unlawful detainer suit supports the inference that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff 19 for complaining about the alleged harassment. See Pardi, 389 F.3d at 850; see also Yartzoff 20 v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding evidence of causal link where 21 adverse employment actions “began less than three months after [plaintiff] filed his first 22 administrative complaint”). 23 However, Plaintiff’s third FHA claim ultimately fails for the same reason as her first 24 two: the Amended Complaint provides no details regarding the alleged harassment. To 25 premise a retaliation claim on the protected activity of reporting sexual harassment, a 26 plaintiff “need not establish that the underlying conduct that was the subject of [her] 27 complaint was an actual violation of the FHA.” Cain v. Rambert, No. 13-CV-5807 MKB, 28 2014 WL 2440596, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014). But such a plaintiff must allege factual 1 circumstances supporting the inference that she “‘had a good faith, reasonable belief’ that 2 she was opposing an unlawful practice,” such as a quid pro quo threat or a hostile housing 3 environment. Id. (quoting Ponce v. 480 E. 21st St., LLC, No. 12 CIV. 4828 ILG JMA, 4 2013 WL 4543622, at *3 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013)); cf. Burke v. Soto, No. 2:16-CV- 5 01311-KJM-AC, 2017 WL 4811832, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2017) (“[T]o be deemed [a] 6 ‘protected activity,’ the employee must subjectively and reasonably believe the facts he is 7 reporting are true.” (citing E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 967 8 (9th Cir. 2009))). Absent any facts describing Defendant’s alleged conduct, the Court 9 cannot infer that plaintiff reasonably believed she was opposing an unlawful practice. 10 C. State Law Claims 11 The Amended Complaint also contains claims for IIED and negligence. Notably, 12 the Court may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over any supplemental state 13 law claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1367(c); Sanford v. Member Works, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n the 15 usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors 16 to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to 17 exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”). Because the Court has 18 dismissed all federal claims in the Amended Complaint, the Court is disinclined to exercise 19 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims at this time. Regardless, the 20 Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims as inadequately pled. 21 1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 22 Under California law, the elements of an IIED claim are: “(1) extreme and 23 outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of 24 the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme 25 emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 26 defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009) (citations 27 omitted). 28 / / / 1 Plaintiff’s IIED claim is premised on the same allegations as her FHA causes of 2 action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in a series of actions that “were extreme” 3 and “outrageous,” including “unwelcome and persistent sexual advances, harassment, and 4 threats of eviction.” Am. Compl. at 3. In California, “well-pled claims of sexual 5 harassment” can constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Morse v. Cnty. of Merced, 6 No. 116CV00142DADSKO, 2016 WL 3254034, at *13 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (citing 7 Christensen v. Sup. Ct., 820 P.2d 181, 202–03 (Cal. 1991)). But Plaintiff’s claims are not 8 well-pled because her assertions of harassment are unsupported by allegations of fact. 9 Consequently, the Amended Complaint does not state a claim for IIED. See Taylor 10 v. First Tech. Fed. Credit Union, No. 3:15-CV-00023-HZ, 2015 WL 3464066, at *5 11 (D. Or. May 29, 2015) (dismissing IIED claim as plaintiff “d[id] not provide any details 12 about the nature of” the alleged “unwelcome physical contact” or the “frequency of the 13 alleged incidents”); Jones v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 18-CV-07086-EMC, 2019 WL 1599183, 14 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019) (“Mr. Jones’ complaint does not detail what about 15 Defendants’ conduct was extreme or outrageous, and conclusorily [sic] asserts that he ‘has 16 suffered humiliation, embarrassment, emotional and mental anguish.’ . . . Accordingly, the 17 IIED claim is dismissed . . . .” (emphasis and citation omitted)). 18 2. Negligence 19 “In California, the ‘plaintiff in a negligence suit must demonstrate a legal duty to use 20 due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the 21 resulting injury.’” Steinle v. United States, 17 F.4th 819, 822 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 22 Vasilenko v. Grace Fam. Church, 404 P.3d 1196, 1198 (Cal. 2017)). Per the Amended 23 Complaint, Defendant was negligent for initiating eviction proceedings and for “fail[ing] 24 to provide a safe and harassment-free environment.” Am. Compl. at 4. Those allegations 25 do not state a negligence claim. 26 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s allegations focus on alleged sexual harassment, 27 suggesting that her negligence claim is premised on said harassment. Plaintiff fails, 28 however, “to explain how such a claim would be anything other than a common law cause 1 of action for sexual harassment, which does not exist” in California. Thomas v. Regents 2 of Univ. of Cal., 315 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623, 651 (Ct. App. 2023). And insofar as Plaintiff relies 3 on Defendant’s obligations under the FHA or California’s Fair Employment and Housing 4 Act to supply a legal duty, her “cause of action is under [those statutes], not negligence.” 5 Johnson v. Cnty. of Yolo, No. 2:12-CV-00812-KJM, 2013 WL 657882, at *9 (E.D. Cal. 6 Feb. 22, 2013); cf. Rodriguez v. Morgan, No. CV 09-8939-GW CWX, 2012 WL 253867, 7 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012) (dismissing negligence claim premised on failure to provide 8 statutorily required accommodation as said failure was actionable under the statute). 9 Lastly, to the extent Plaintiff claims Defendant breached a legal duty by making Plaintiff’s 10 home unsafe in other ways,3 she provides no supporting factual allegations. 11 RENEWED APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 12 Plaintiff previously sought an injunction preventing Defendant from continuing 13 eviction proceedings in state court. See First TRO Mot. at 5. The Court denied that request, 14 concluding that the AIA barred the Court from enjoining the ongoing state court action. 15 See Order at 9–10. Since then, Defendant has obtained a favorable judgment—which he 16 is seeking to enforce against Plaintiff—in his unlawful detainer suit, prompting Plaintiff’s 17 Renewed TRO Motion. See Renewed TRO Mot. at 1–2. For the reasons follow, Plaintiff’s 18 Renewed TRO Motion is DENIED. 19 I. Legal Standard 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) governs the issuance of a temporary 21 restraining order (“TRO”). The standard for a TRO is identical to the standard for a 22 preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 23 24 25 2 Of course, “conduct constituting sexual harassment may be alleged in common law claims such as battery and [IIED].” Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 518 (Ct. App. 2007). 26 3 In California, “[a] landlord may be liable in negligence where, as a result of its failure to exercise 27 reasonable care, the premises are uninhabitable and the tenant is injured as a result.” Martinez v. Optimus 28 Props., LLC, No. 216CV08598SVWMRW, 2017 WL 1040743, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2017) (citing 1 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain either a TRO or a preliminary injunction, the moving 2 party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable 3 harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of 4 equities tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. 5 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The elements of this test are 6 “balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of 7 another.” All. for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). The 8 moving party has the burden of persuasion. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). 9 II. Analysis 10 Before addressing Plaintiff’s arguments, the Court must determine whether it has the 11 authority to grant the relief she seeks. The Court concludes it does not. 12 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “a federal district court does not have subject 13 matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” See 14 Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 15 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 16 Rooker-Feldman precludes jurisdiction when federal court proceedings arise out of a final 17 state court determination that is “judicial in nature” and the issues raised are “inextricably 18 intertwined” with the state court proceedings, making the federal case a de facto appeal of 19 a state court decision. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 486; see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 20 Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that a claim is inextricably 21 intertwined “if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly 22 decided the issues before it”). 23 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow; it “applies only when the federal plaintiff 24 both asserts as her injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy 25 relief from the state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 26 (9th Cir. 2004). But both conditions are present here. Plaintiff seeks to prevent “[t]he 27 enforcement of the state court’s judgment for possession” of the property at issue. 28 Am. Compl. at 2. Plaintiff’s Renewed TRO Motion thus “rel[ies] on the premise that 1 Plaintiff[] w[as] in fact entitled to remain in possession,” meaning that the judgment in 2 Defendant’s favor was “wrongful.” Koshak v. Cnty. of Orange, No. SACV 13-01732- 3 CJC(ANX), 2014 WL 12626351, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 637 F. App’x 323 4 (9th Cir. 2016). And the issue of enforcing an unlawful detainer judgment is inextricably 5 intertwined with the judgment itself. See Barnes v. United Council of Hum. Servs., No. C 6 19-2848 SBA, 2019 WL 2270374, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2019). So, “insofar as [she] 7 requests that the Court ‘stop’ the eviction,” Plaintiff is unavoidably “seeking relief from 8 the state court judgment.” Richards v. Mercy Hous. Cal., No. C 12-00234 JW, 9 2012 WL 174186, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2012). 10 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine thus bars the Court from granting Plaintiff’s Renewed 11 TRO Motion. See Busch v. Torres, 905 F. Supp. 766, 771 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“[P]laintiff’s 12 complaint . . . challenge[s] . . . the state court judgment in the unlawful detainer action and 13 the subsequent enforcement of the judgment . . . . Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 14 this Court is precluded from reviewing that judgment and its execution.”); Pardo-Pena v. 15 Spector, No. 2:20-CV-03562-MAA, 2021 WL 6496732, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2021) 16 (“To the extent that the [complaint] seeks to undo Plaintiff’s eviction as a result of the 17 judgment entered in the Unlawful Detainer Action, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would 18 deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction . . . .”); Guancione v. Wachovia Mortg. 19 Corp., No. 5:10-CV-03166 JF, 2010 WL 2991728, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2010) (holding 20 Rooker-Feldman precluded TRO where “the state court already ha[d] entered a judgment 21 against [p]laintiffs, awarding [defendant] possession of the subject property”). 22 CONCLUSION 23 In light of the above, the Court: 24 1) DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 25 (ECF No. 5) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court will, however, again GRANT Plaintiff leave to amend. 27 Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint curing the pleading deficiencies noted 28 above within forty-five (45) days of the date of this Order. The Court reminds Plaintiff ] |/that any amended complaint must be complete in and of itself without reference to 2 || Plaintiff's original Complaint or Amended Complaint; claims not realleged in the second 3 |}amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Lacey v. 4 || Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). If Plaintiff fails to amend within the 5 || time provided, the Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v. 6 || Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005). 7 2) DENIES Plaintiff's Renewed TRO Motion (ECF No. 6). 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: January 16, 2024 tt 10 pen Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge

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