ITT Consumer Financial Corp. v. Walthall (In Re Walthall)

38 B.R. 140, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6206
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland
DecidedFebruary 24, 1984
Docket19-12621
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 38 B.R. 140 (ITT Consumer Financial Corp. v. Walthall (In Re Walthall)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ITT Consumer Financial Corp. v. Walthall (In Re Walthall), 38 B.R. 140, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6206 (Md. 1984).

Opinion

*141 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

PAUL MANNES, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the court upon the filing by ITT Consumer Financial Corp. (ITT), of a complaint objecting to the dis-chargeability of a debt incurred by Stephanie Annicchiarieo Walthall (Ms. Walthall), the debtor herein. ITT asserts that Ms. Walthall’s debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The relationship between ITT and Ms. Walthall began with her purchase of furniture on credit. Ms. Walthall discovered upon receipt of the payment book for this purchase that she was indebted to Thorpe Credit, Inc. of MD (Thorpe), a subsidiary of ITT. On April 12, 1982, Ms. Walthall successfully completed her payments on this furniture purchase, and her relationship with Thorpe lapsed. Some time later, Ms. Walthall received a card from Thorpe advising her that if her income currently exceeded $12,000, she was eligible for a $1,000 loan.

Ms. Walthall testified that she ignored this solicitation for a while, but that she contacted a nearby Thorpe office on August 5, 1982 when she found she needed additional money to pay her mounting debts. Mr. Brown, the manager of the contacted Thorpe office, spoke with Ms. Walthall on August 5, 1982, and took her loan application by telephone. The information required by Thorpe included Ms. Walthall’s current salary, the length of time that she lived at her current address, the reason for the loan, and the amounts of her outstanding accounts. Mr. Brown recorded this information upon an application form which was signed by the debtor when she visited the office the next day. At that visit on August 6, 1982, Ms. Walthall filled out another form entitled “Financial Statement for Purpose of Obtaining a Loan or Other Extension of Credit.”

Ms. Walthall entered the names of five creditors and their respective debts in her own handwriting on this form. The amount of debt stated on this form eq-ualled $6,758.00. Unfortunately, Ms. Walt-hall failed to include the debts owed to the following six additional creditors:

People’s Security Bank of MD $ 951.72
Bloomingdale’s 984.48
Raleighs 161.70
United Virginia Bank (VISA) 1,882.74
Choice 1,211.45
Sears 394.10

Although the total of the omitted debt exceeds that of the listed debts, Ms. Walthall contends that her omission of the other creditors was inadvertent. She testified that she did not list all of her creditors because the solicitation led her to believe that she need not reveal her liabilities to obtain the $1,000 loan. Ms. Walthall stated that she believed that she only needed to prove that she was earning in excess of $12,000 annually to obtain a loan. Ms. Walthall further testified that she did not remember Mr. Brown inquiring into her outstanding accounts when he took her application by telephone.

Ms. Walthall did not make the first payment when it was due on September 18, 1982. When she was contacted by Mr. Brown on October 5, 1982, regarding her default, Ms. Walthall indicated that she failed to make the payment because she did not have a payment book. Ms. Walthall did assure Mr. Brown that she would mail a payment the next day, however. Although Mr. Brown told Ms. Walthall that she had been given a payment book at the time she picked up her check on August 6, 1982, the Thorpe office promptly mailed her another payment book. Mr. Brown again telephoned Ms. Walthall on October 25, 1982, regarding her failure to make any payments. On that date, Ms. Walthall informed him that she was filing a bankruptcy petition, which she filed November 5, 1982.

ITT asserts that Ms. Walthall’s debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 523(a)(2) provides:

§ 523. Exceptions to discharge
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not *142 discharge an individual debtor from any debt—
(2) for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit, by—
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition; or
(B) use of a statement in writing—
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for obtaining such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive;

First, ITT argues that the debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) because Ms. Walthall obtained the loan by false pretense. According to Thorpe, the false pretense lies in Ms. Walthall’s agreement to repay the loan when she never had any intention of repaying the debt. The plaintiff carries the burden of proving each element by clear and convincing evidence. Brown v. Buchanan, 419 F.Supp. 199 (E.D.Va.1975); Nationwide Financial Corp. v. Smith, 2 B.R. 276 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1980); In re Vissers, 21 B.R. 638, 639 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Wis.1982). The court finds that the plain tiff has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the debtor never intended to repay the loan. The only evidence that ITT produced to substantiate this allegation is the fact that Ms. Walthall failed to make a single payment on the loan. The testimony given by the debtor indicates that Ms. Walthall truly believed that her new job and the infusion of these additional funds would enable her to salvage her sinking financial situation.

Although the hypothetical “reasonable person” might not have viewed the situation so sanguinely, this court declines to adopt an objective standard for determining whether the requisite intent to defraud is present. The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee commented upon the overly optimistic debtor and the requisite intent in In re Hunt and concluded:

“[T]his [subjective] analysis permits the possibility that an irrational individual would conceive of an impossible scheme for repaying debt and then subjectively believe in a successful outcome.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Schwalbe v. Gans (In Re Gans)
75 B.R. 474 (S.D. New York, 1987)
ITT Financial Services v. Woods (In Re Woods)
66 B.R. 984 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1986)
Hein v. Emery (In Re Emery)
52 B.R. 68 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
38 B.R. 140, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6206, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/itt-consumer-financial-corp-v-walthall-in-re-walthall-mdb-1984.