TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00290-CR
Issac Caballero, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 22-00807-1, THE HONORABLE BILLY RAY STUBBLEFIELD, JUDGE PRESIDING
OPINION
This case arises from appellant Issac Caballero’s appeal from an adjudication of
guilt following the revocation of his deferred-adjudication community supervision. In 2022,
Caballero was charged with criminal mischief in Williamson County, Texas, and agreed to plead
guilty in exchange for being placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision for
18 months. Later, the State moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt for alleged violations of the
conditions of his community supervision, and the trial court found that appellant had violated the
conditions by failing to report an arrest to his Community Supervision Officer. Appellant argues
that insufficient evidence was presented at the revocation hearing to support the court’s finding.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt. BACKGROUND
Appellant was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision on August
22, 2022. Among the conditions of his community supervision were the following:
Commit no offense against the laws of this state or any state or the United States or any other country. Defendant shall notify the Community Supervision Officer (“the Officer”) in charge of the case within 48 hours of being arrested or charged with a criminal offense.
Defendant shall perform 40 hours of Community Service Restitution through the Williamson County CSCD CSR Program or a worksite which has been pre-approved by the Williamson County CSCD CSR Program Director, at a rate of no less than 8 hours a month.
On October 4, 2023, the State filed a motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt. The
State later amended this motion on December 8, 2023. In its amended motion, the State alleged
three violations of appellant’s community-supervision conditions: (1) appellant committed a
new offense in Travis County; (2) appellant failed to report an arrest or charge against him
within 48 hours; and (3) appellant failed to perform his required community service hours.
A hearing took place on the State’s motion on March 28, 2024. Before
the hearing began, the State abandoned its third allegation, regarding appellant’s community
service hours.
The State called two witnesses to testify during the hearing. Nickie Vasquez,
appellant’s community-supervision officer, testified at the hearing that appellant violated the first
community-supervision condition because he “obtained a new assault family violence charge in
Travis County, and he did not notify [her] within 48 hours of the arrest.” Further, Vasquez
testified that she received both a “Flash Notice” reporting appellant’s new offense and a copy of
appellant’s offense report. The State offered into evidence a record of emails, phone calls, and
2 other documents related to appellant’s community supervision, referred to as the “Probation
Chronologicals.” These records include the “Flash Notice” mentioned by Vasquez, which states
that appellant was arrested on November 28, 2023. Additionally, the records detail phone and
email conversations between Vasquez and members of the Austin Police Department, in which
they noted that an arrest warrant was issued for appellant and that appellant self-surrendered on
the warrant.
James Looker, an officer with the Austin Police Department, testified that he
responded to a reported altercation involving appellant on November 11, 2023. Officer Looker
interviewed the complaining witness, who appeared upset and had several minor injuries.
Officer Looker testified that he was unable to locate appellant, so no arrest was made at
that time. Officer Looker did not testify whether appellant was charged or arrested following
this incident.
Appellant did not call any witnesses to testify during the guilt phase. However,
he offered into evidence the State’s motion to dismiss his assault-family-violence charge.
In his closing argument, defense counsel argued that appellant “was never
arrested on scene. The warrant was issued, and [appellant] did a walk through. Still didn’t hear
what date he was supposed to have notified them.” Asked by the trial court whether he
“contest[ed] the fact that ultimately the defendant was arrested by Travis County,” counsel
replied, “[Appellant] did a walk through, Judge, yes, so technically he was arrested.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the State had failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant had committed a new offense. The
court found, however, that appellant had failed to report an arrest to his Community Supervision
3 Officer, adjudicated his guilt for the underlying offense, and sentenced him to 30 days’
incarceration. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision to adjudicate guilt and revoke community
supervision for abuse of discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006); Wade v. State, 693 S.W.3d 861, 864 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.); see also Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.108(b). A trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community
supervision when the State fails to meet its burden of proof regarding a violation of community
supervision. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The State
need prove only a single violation to support a revocation. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
“In determining questions regarding sufficiency of the evidence in probation
revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.” Rickels,
202 S.W.3d at 763. That burden is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence before
the court creates a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of community
supervision as alleged. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);
Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s decision. See Browder v. State, 109 S.W.3d 484, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial
court at a probation revocation hearing “is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given to their testimony.” Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865.
4 DISCUSSION
I. The Evidence Presented During the Hearing Was Sufficient to Prove That Appellant Failed to Report an Arrest Within 48 Hours.
Appellant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was
actually arrested. As such, he contends that the evidence does not show that he failed to report
an arrest. Specifically, he argues that his performing a “walk-through” at the county courthouse
to secure bond on his outstanding arrest warrant did not constitute an arrest.
There was undisputed evidence that appellant self-surrendered to authorities after
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TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00290-CR
Issac Caballero, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 22-00807-1, THE HONORABLE BILLY RAY STUBBLEFIELD, JUDGE PRESIDING
OPINION
This case arises from appellant Issac Caballero’s appeal from an adjudication of
guilt following the revocation of his deferred-adjudication community supervision. In 2022,
Caballero was charged with criminal mischief in Williamson County, Texas, and agreed to plead
guilty in exchange for being placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision for
18 months. Later, the State moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt for alleged violations of the
conditions of his community supervision, and the trial court found that appellant had violated the
conditions by failing to report an arrest to his Community Supervision Officer. Appellant argues
that insufficient evidence was presented at the revocation hearing to support the court’s finding.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt. BACKGROUND
Appellant was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision on August
22, 2022. Among the conditions of his community supervision were the following:
Commit no offense against the laws of this state or any state or the United States or any other country. Defendant shall notify the Community Supervision Officer (“the Officer”) in charge of the case within 48 hours of being arrested or charged with a criminal offense.
Defendant shall perform 40 hours of Community Service Restitution through the Williamson County CSCD CSR Program or a worksite which has been pre-approved by the Williamson County CSCD CSR Program Director, at a rate of no less than 8 hours a month.
On October 4, 2023, the State filed a motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt. The
State later amended this motion on December 8, 2023. In its amended motion, the State alleged
three violations of appellant’s community-supervision conditions: (1) appellant committed a
new offense in Travis County; (2) appellant failed to report an arrest or charge against him
within 48 hours; and (3) appellant failed to perform his required community service hours.
A hearing took place on the State’s motion on March 28, 2024. Before
the hearing began, the State abandoned its third allegation, regarding appellant’s community
service hours.
The State called two witnesses to testify during the hearing. Nickie Vasquez,
appellant’s community-supervision officer, testified at the hearing that appellant violated the first
community-supervision condition because he “obtained a new assault family violence charge in
Travis County, and he did not notify [her] within 48 hours of the arrest.” Further, Vasquez
testified that she received both a “Flash Notice” reporting appellant’s new offense and a copy of
appellant’s offense report. The State offered into evidence a record of emails, phone calls, and
2 other documents related to appellant’s community supervision, referred to as the “Probation
Chronologicals.” These records include the “Flash Notice” mentioned by Vasquez, which states
that appellant was arrested on November 28, 2023. Additionally, the records detail phone and
email conversations between Vasquez and members of the Austin Police Department, in which
they noted that an arrest warrant was issued for appellant and that appellant self-surrendered on
the warrant.
James Looker, an officer with the Austin Police Department, testified that he
responded to a reported altercation involving appellant on November 11, 2023. Officer Looker
interviewed the complaining witness, who appeared upset and had several minor injuries.
Officer Looker testified that he was unable to locate appellant, so no arrest was made at
that time. Officer Looker did not testify whether appellant was charged or arrested following
this incident.
Appellant did not call any witnesses to testify during the guilt phase. However,
he offered into evidence the State’s motion to dismiss his assault-family-violence charge.
In his closing argument, defense counsel argued that appellant “was never
arrested on scene. The warrant was issued, and [appellant] did a walk through. Still didn’t hear
what date he was supposed to have notified them.” Asked by the trial court whether he
“contest[ed] the fact that ultimately the defendant was arrested by Travis County,” counsel
replied, “[Appellant] did a walk through, Judge, yes, so technically he was arrested.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the State had failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant had committed a new offense. The
court found, however, that appellant had failed to report an arrest to his Community Supervision
3 Officer, adjudicated his guilt for the underlying offense, and sentenced him to 30 days’
incarceration. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision to adjudicate guilt and revoke community
supervision for abuse of discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006); Wade v. State, 693 S.W.3d 861, 864 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.); see also Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.108(b). A trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community
supervision when the State fails to meet its burden of proof regarding a violation of community
supervision. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The State
need prove only a single violation to support a revocation. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
“In determining questions regarding sufficiency of the evidence in probation
revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.” Rickels,
202 S.W.3d at 763. That burden is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence before
the court creates a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of community
supervision as alleged. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);
Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s decision. See Browder v. State, 109 S.W.3d 484, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial
court at a probation revocation hearing “is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given to their testimony.” Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865.
4 DISCUSSION
I. The Evidence Presented During the Hearing Was Sufficient to Prove That Appellant Failed to Report an Arrest Within 48 Hours.
Appellant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was
actually arrested. As such, he contends that the evidence does not show that he failed to report
an arrest. Specifically, he argues that his performing a “walk-through” at the county courthouse
to secure bond on his outstanding arrest warrant did not constitute an arrest.
There was undisputed evidence that appellant self-surrendered to authorities after
a warrant was issued for his arrest and that information that he was arrested was relayed to
his probation officer. We must determine whether this evidence constitutes sufficient evidence
of an arrest.
An arrest is a technical term with an established history in the common law.
Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An arrest is completed whenever
a person’s liberty of movement is restricted or restrained. Hardinge v. State, 500 S.W.2d 870,
873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). This can occur through physical contact or force or by “submission
to authority.” Medford, 13 S.W.3d at 773. Whether a person has been arrested depends on the
specific circumstances of the situation. See Woods v. State, 970 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1998, pet. ref’d).
Although the question of whether an individual who is subject to an arrest warrant
is arrested when he voluntarily turns himself in to authorities appears to be one of first
impression in the context of community-supervision revocation, we find it persuasive that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently concluded that a defendant with an active arrest
warrant of which he was aware was arrested for purposes of the Damon Allen Act when he
5 voluntarily walked into a courtroom. 1 See Ex parte Gayosso, 685 S.W.3d 100, 102 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2023); see also Mauney v. State, 107 S.W.3d 693, 694–95 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no
pet.) (“[Defendant] turned himself in to the Plano Police Department[] and was arrested.”); Jones
v. State, 944 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. ref’d) (“Jones was arrested in
February 1996, when he turned himself in.”); Harris Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Off. v. Burns,
825 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (determining that man
subject to arrest warrant was arrested for purposes of expunction statute when he surrendered
himself to court bailiff and was released on personal recognizance bond). But see Segovia
v. State, No. 14-08-00176-CR, 2009 WL 1678024, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
June 9, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“It is undisputed
that appellant was not arrested; instead, he turned himself in after charges had been filed on
May 14, 2007.”).
The State also provided other evidence of appellant’s arrest. The State’s second
witness, Ms. Vasquez, who was appellant’s community-supervision officer, testified that on
November 29, 2023, she received a “Flash Notice” from Travis County “showing [appellant]
committed a new offense of assault causes bodily injury.” The notice, which was admitted into
evidence, stated that appellant “was arrested 11/28/23 by Travis Co SO for Assault BI/FV.”
Other probation records admitted into evidence show that Ms. Vasquez spoke with a Travis
County detective, who informed her that “the warrant was issued by APO on 11/21/23 and the
1 The Damon Allen Act requires that a public safety report be prepared when a magistrate considers the release on bail of a person charged with a Class B misdemeanor offense or higher. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.022. However, this requirement only applies to defendants arrested after January 1, 2022. Id. The Court’s decision in Gayosso turned on whether the defendant was arrested after that date, thus invoking the Act. Ex parte Gayosso, 685 S.W.3d 100, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). 6 arrest on 11/28/23 was a self-surrender on said warrant.” Ms. Vazquez testified that appellant
did not notify her of an arrest or charge within 48 hours of the date listed on the Flash Notice.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, is
sufficient to support the conclusion that appellant was arrested and failed to report that arrest.
See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865.
II. There Was Sufficient Evidence that Appellant Failed to Report a Charge to Support the Trial Court’s Ruling.
Alternatively, there was sufficient evidence to show that appellant failed to report
a charge against him within 48 hours. The trial court, in making its ruling, stated “that the
allegation contained in the State’s first amended motion to adjudicate with respect to failing to
inform the probation officer of an arrest is true. The court did not address whether appellant also
failed to report a charge. Both failure to report an arrest and failure to report a charge were
included in the same condition that the court found appellant had violated.
Regardless of the reasons given by the trial court for revoking community
supervision, if evidence supports the court’s decision it will not be disturbed on appeal. Willis
v. State, 2 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (citing Jackson v. State,
508 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). At the hearing, defense counsel offered into
evidence the State’s motion to dismiss appellant’s assault-family-violence charge—the same
alleged offense for which he was arrested. Not only does the motion explicitly state that
appellant was charged with an offense, but the State would have had no need to file the motion to
dismiss if appellant had not been charged. Moreover, Ms. Vasquez testified during the hearing
that appellant “obtained a new assault family violence charge in Travis County, and he did not
7 notify [her] within 48 hours of the arrest.” She also testified that he never “t[old] her that he
picked up a new offense.”
Because appellant was required to report any charge to Ms. Vasquez, and he
failed to report the charge shown on the motion to dismiss, there is sufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s judgment that appellant violated a condition of his community supervision. See
Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. We overrule appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Because we overrule appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
adjudicating guilt.
__________________________________________ Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice
Before Justices Baker, Smith, and Theofanis
Affirmed
Filed: December 6, 2024
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