Isreal Santiago v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 28, 2025
Docket02-24-00241-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Isreal Santiago v. the State of Texas (Isreal Santiago v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Isreal Santiago v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00241-CR ___________________________

ISREAL SANTIAGO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1650653

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Appellant Isreal Santiago guilty of sexual assault of a child, a

second-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(2), (f). After he pleaded

true to a repeat-offender notice alleging his prior conviction for murder, the jury

assessed his sentence at confinement for life. See id. § 12.42(b).

Santiago’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel and a supporting brief under Anders v. California,1 representing that he has

reviewed the appellate record and had been “unable to identify any legally non-

frivolous grounds for appeal.” Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of

Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there

are no arguable grounds for relief. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Counsel has also complied with the requirements

of Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Santiago had the opportunity to file a pro se response but has not done so.2

The State did not file a response but noted in a letter to this court that it agreed with

appointed counsel’s determination that there were no meritorious grounds for appeal.

386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). 1

2 On March 27, 2025, this court received a letter from Santiago, requesting access to the record. We ordered the trial court clerk to make the record available to Santiago by April 21, 2025, and we informed Santiago that his pro se response had to be filed on or before June 16, 2025, and that if he failed to file his pro se response by that deadline, the court would assume that he did not intend to file one.

2 Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on the

ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we must

independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v.

Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. Except for a minor

correction to the bill of costs, addressed below, we agree with counsel that the appeal

is frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably

support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

The judgment contains the trial court’s special finding that Santiago’s

reimbursement fees of $185 are “to be credited for time served.” See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 43.09; see also id. art. 43.015(3) (explaining that “cost” in a judgment

“includes any fee, including a reimbursement fee, imposed on a defendant by the

court”). Contrary to the judgment’s special finding, the bill of costs shows that

Santiago owes $185 for reimbursement fees. See id. art. 43.09. We correct the bill of

costs to match the judgment, see Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Tex. App.—Fort

Santiago filed no response within the deadline. On July 9, 2025, this court informed the State that its response would be due on August 8, 2025. Two days before the State’s deadline, we received Santiago’s request for an extension of time, which he dated July 30, 2025, and in which he gave no explanation for his inability to meet the June 16, 2025 deadline. See Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b)(1), 38.6(d). Accordingly, we have treated his late-filed motion as a failure to respond.

3 Worth 2005, no pet.) (en banc), grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 28, 2025

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Related

Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Penson v. Ohio
488 U.S. 75 (Supreme Court, 1988)
In Re Schulman
252 S.W.3d 403 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Meza v. State
206 S.W.3d 684 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Bray v. State
179 S.W.3d 725 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Stafford v. State
813 S.W.2d 503 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Bledsoe v. State
178 S.W.3d 824 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Kelly, Sylvester
436 S.W.3d 313 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2014)

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Isreal Santiago v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/isreal-santiago-v-the-state-of-texas-texapp-2025.