Islas Paulin v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 24-4244
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 28 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALBERTO ISLAS PAULIN, No. 24-4244 Agency No. Petitioner, A201-680-842 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 24, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: CLIFTON, OWENS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Alberto Islas is a native and citizen of Mexico.1 He petitions for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order that affirmed an Immigration Judge’s

(IJ) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 We refer to the Petitioner by the name he listed in his written application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We review the BIA’s order and any parts of the IJ’s decision adopted by the

BIA. Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1039–41 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). We

review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence.

Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). Under the

deferential substantial evidence standard, the petitioner must show that the

evidence compels the conclusion that the factual findings are erroneous. Id.

1. Credibility Determination. Where the BIA reviewed the IJ’s credibility

determination for clear error and relied upon the IJ’s opinion, we review the

reasons explicitly identified by the BIA and then examine the IJ’s decision for

support of those reasons. Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1152–53 (9th Cir.

2021). “Taking the totality of the circumstances into account, we review the BIA’s

credibility determination for substantial evidence.” Id. at 1153.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding based

on (1) inconsistencies between Islas’ testimony and supporting materials; and (2)

his failure to provide corroborating evidence. During his merits hearing, Islas’

testimony concerning the timeframes and circumstances surrounding when he

claimed he was threatened—the only particularized basis offered to support his

claim of past and feared harm in Mexico—changed repeatedly and significantly.

2 24-4244 See Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020) (deeming petitioner

incredible based on inconsistent testimony about his birth date and circumstances

surrounding a shooting). The agency also considered inconsistencies in Islas’

supporting materials, specifically Islas’ failure to mention religious persecution

during his reasonable fear interview and in his original asylum application. This

type of material alteration in an applicant’s account of persecution is sufficient to

support an adverse credibility finding. Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th

Cir. 2011).

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s finding that Islas had ample time

and opportunity to secure corroborating evidence. An IJ is not required to give a

petitioner notice and opportunity to provide additional corroborating evidence, yet

in this case, the IJ did so twice, months in advance of the merits hearing. See

Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927 (“Because the IJ found [the petitioner’s] testimony

not credible, the IJ was not required to give [the petitioner] notice and an

opportunity to provide additional corroborating evidence.”). In sum, the

inconsistencies and omissions identified by the BIA and IJ within and between

Islas’ written and oral testimony—without any corroborating evidence to

rehabilitate his testimony—more than adequately support the agency’s

determination as to his lack of credibility.

3 24-4244 2. Due Process Claim. Islas’ due process claim fails because the record

reflects that Islas was given a reasonable opportunity to present country conditions

evidence and, indeed, submitted that evidence before both the IJ and BIA.

Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n alien who faces

deportation is entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable

opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.”). Moreover, in his oral decision,

the IJ specifically referenced the country conditions evidence that he considered

and relied upon in making his determination.

3. CAT Claim. Two procedural bars preclude review of Islas’ petition

under CAT. First, Islas failed to exhaust his claim by not first challenging the IJ’s

denial before the BIA. See Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009)

(en banc) (“Petitioner will therefore be deemed to have exhausted only those issues

he raised and argued in his brief before the BIA.”). The BIA’s order even noted

the absence of any challenge and deemed an appeal under CAT to have been

waived. Second, Islas fails to address the IJ’s denial and the BIA’s finding of

waiver in his opening brief before this court, which results in forfeiture. See

Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2013).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-4244