Islam v. Razzak

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 16, 2026
• Docket: 115438
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Islam v. Razzak, 2026-Ohio-1379.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

TAJUL ISLAM, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115438 v. :

RUMANA RAZZAK, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 16, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-21-385823

Appearances:

Theodore A. Amata, for appellant.

Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP and Amanda M. Pipik- Leip, for appellee.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:

Plaintiff-appellant Tajul Islam (“Islam”) appeals the trial court’s

denial of his motion to continue a hearing. Islam claims that he was denied his rights

to effective assistance of counsel, a fair trial, and due process when the hearing proceeded in his and his counsel’s absence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s

decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Islam filed a complaint for divorce against defendant-appellee

Rumana Razzak (“Razzak”) in June 2021, which culminated in a judgment entry of

divorce terminating the marriage and determining various issues, including child

custody, marital-property division, and spousal and child support.1 After the

finalization of their divorce, the parties engaged in extensive post-decree litigation.

Relevant to this appeal — and beginning in March 2023 — Razzak filed motions for

attorney fees, to enforce court-ordered payment for her marital-property interest,

and to show cause for Islam’s failure to pay spousal and child support. Islam also

filed motions to modify support. Multiple conferences were held and several

hearings were cancelled and rescheduled.

In June 2024, Razzak filed a motion to compel discovery. Therein,

Razzak asserted that discovery requests were propounded to Islam in May 2024 and

Islam failed to respond despite subsequent inquiries. At the time of the motion’s

filing, Razzak had not received any discovery-related communications or responses

1 A judgment entry captioned “Judgment Entry of Divorce” was filed in November

2021. Razzak appealed the November 2021 judgment entry, and this court found that it was not a final, appealable order since it did not grant the parties a divorce or terminate the marriage. After the appeal was dismissed, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry revising the November 2021 entry and replacing it with a final divorce decree judgment entry in July 2022. Islam v. Razzak, No. 111071 (8th Dist. June 29, 2022). from Islam. Conferences continued and the hearing was ultimately rescheduled for

October 3, 2024, and assigned to a magistrate.

In September 2024, Razzak issued subpoenas and filed a motion for

continuance. Razzak asserted that she was forced to issue the subpoenas since Islam

refused to respond to discovery. Razzak explained that she received responses

indicating that the subpoenaed records could not be produced in time for the

October 3, 2024 hearing and a short continuance was necessary to complete

discovery.

On October 2 and 3, 2024, docket entries indicated that a new hearing

was set for October 11, 2024, and the October 3, 2024, hearing was cancelled. On

October 4, 2024, the trial court issued a judgment entry indicating that Razzak’s

motion for continuance was well taken and, for good cause shown, the hearing was

reset for October 11, 2024. The judgment entry further stated, “No further

continuances will be granted due to the unavailability of counsel. Should any

counsel be unable to attend the scheduled hearing, he/she shall provide substitute

counsel to represent his/her client in the hearing/trial.” According to the docket,

the judgment entry was sent via email to Razzak, Razzak’s counsel, and Islam’s

counsel that same day and via regular mail to Islam on October 7, 2024.

In the afternoon on October 10, 2024, Islam, through counsel, filed a

motion for continuance. Islam explained that his counsel was engaged in a criminal

jury trial that commenced on October 7, 2024, and was expected to conclude on

October 17, 2024. Islam argued that the criminal trial took precedence based on the Ohio Rules of Superintendence and, therefore, his counsel was unavailable to appear

until the trial’s completion. The motion included a reference to the criminal trial’s

case number, but a copy of the conflicting assignment was not attached.

At the October 11, 2024 hearing — at which neither Islam nor his

counsel were present — the magistrate indicated that Islam’s motion was denied by

the trial court judge. The hearing on the pending motions proceeded despite Islam

and his counsel’s absence. A judgment entry denying the continuance was filed on

October 21, 2024.

After the hearing, Razzak filed a motion to dismiss Islam’s motion to

modify support since he failed to prosecute his claim and disregarded the court’s

order advising that further continuances would not be granted for any counsel’s

unavailability. The trial court granted Razzak’s motion — indicating that it informed

the parties that Islam’s motion for continuance was denied but Islam and his counsel

failed to appear at the hearing — and dismissed Islam’s motion to modify support

without prejudice for failure to prosecute.

The parties continued to engage in extensive post-decree litigation,

and new counsel entered an appearance for Islam in December 2024. On June 18,

2025, the magistrate issued a decision regarding the matters addressed during the

October 11, 2024 hearing. The docket reveals that the magistrate’s decision was sent

to Razzak and both parties’ attorneys — including Islam’s original and new counsel

— via email on June 20, 2025, and to Islam via regular mail on June 23, 2025. However, Islam’s objection to the magistrate’s decision was not filed until July 17,

2025.

On July 23, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry adopting the

magistrate’s decision. Therein, the trial court found that Islam’s objections were

untimely, noting that the version of Cuyahoga C.P., Domestic Relations Loc.R. 27

then in effect established that objections to a magistrate’s decision must be filed and

served within 14 days after the decision’s filing. The trial court concluded that the

parties waived their rights to any further hearings on the matter since timely

objections were not filed.

Islam appeals, raising three assignments of error for review.

Assignment of Error No. 1

The trial court denied Islam due process of law when it denied the request for continuance and proceeded to trial without [the] presence of his counsel.

Assignment or Error No. 2

[Islam] was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

Assignment of Error No. 3

Cumulative error deprived [Islam] of a fair trial.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Denial of Motion to Continue

In his first assignment of error, Islam argues that the denial of his

motion for continuance amounts to an abuse of discretion. Islam claims that the decision was contrary to the Ohio Rules of Superintendence because his counsel was

engaged in a criminal jury trial that had been scheduled months in advance. Islam

further asserts that Razzak was granted many prior continuances, including a

continuance for this trial, and the court selected a new date without input or advance

notice to him or his counsel. Finally, Islam argues that expecting “substitute counsel

to appear and represent [him] in a longstanding and complicated dispute after

having a single attorney fight for him [for] more than 5 years is unfathomable.”

The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance rests in the

broad and sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67

(1981). An appellate court cannot reverse the trial court’s ruling on a motion for

continuance absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs

when the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). In applying the abuse-of-

discretion standard, an appellate court may not simply substitute its judgment for

that of the trial court. In re C.K., 2019-Ohio-4167, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing Vannucci

v. Schneider, 2018-Ohio-1294, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to continue, any

potential prejudice to a party denied a continuance is weighed against the trial

court’s “right to control its own docket and the public’s interest in the prompt and

efficient dispatch of justice.” Unger at 67. There are “‘no mechanical tests’” for

deciding when a continuance’s denial is so arbitrary that it violates due process;

rather, courts must consider the circumstances in every case and the reasons presented to the trial court at the time. Id., quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575,

589 (1964). Courts should also consider certain factors when evaluating a motion

for continuance, including the length of the delay requested; whether other

continuances have been requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants,

witnesses, opposing counsel, and the court; whether the requested delay is for

legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the

defendant contributed to the circumstance, which gives rise to the request for a

continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case.

Id. at 67-68. However, courts are not required ‘“to assign particular weight to any

one factor.’” Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.), quoting Musto

v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2016-Ohio-8058, ¶ 23.

Weighing the potential prejudice to Islam against the trial court’s

right to control its docket and the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient

dispatch of justice, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Islam’s motion for continuance. The October 11, 2024 hearing addressed several

post-decree motions that were filed beginning in March 2023. Multiple conferences

were held and several hearings were previously cancelled and rescheduled. The

record reveals that the October 3, 2024 hearing was continued after Islam failed to

respond to Razzak’s discovery requests and additional time was needed to receive

subpoena responses and complete discovery.

The trial court issued a judgment entry rescheduling the hearing for

October 11, 2024. Therein, the trial court advised, “No further continuances will be granted due to the unavailability of counsel. Should any counsel be unable to attend

the scheduled hearing, he/she shall provide substitute counsel to represent his/her

client in the hearing/trial.” The trial court served this judgment entry via email to

Islam’s counsel on October 4, 2024, the day of its issuance, and to Islam via regular

mail on October 7, 2024. Nevertheless, Islam waited until October 10, 2024, the

afternoon immediately prior to the rescheduled hearing, to file a motion for

continuance based on his counsel’s unavailability.

Razzak and Razzak’s counsel were present at the rescheduled October

11, 2024 hearing. However — despite the fact that Islam’s motion for continuance

remained pending — neither Islam nor his counsel appeared. In light of the

discovery delays created by Islam, the trial court’s clear directives regarding

continuances based on counsel’s unavailability, Islam’s eleventh-hour motion, and

his complete failure to appear for the October 11, 2024 hearing, we cannot say that

the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in denying Islam’s

motion.

Finally, we consider whether the trial court’s denial of Islam’s motion

for continuance was contrary to the Ohio Rules of Superintendence. Sup.R. 41(B)(1)

provides:

When a continuance is requested for the reasons that counsel is scheduled to appear in another case assigned for trial on the same date in the same or another trial court of this State, the case which was first set for trial shall have priority and shall be tried on the date assigned. Criminal cases assigned for trial have priority over civil cases assigned for trial. The court should not consider any motion for a continuance due to a conflict of trial assignment dates unless a copy of the conflicting assignment is attached to the motion and the motion is filed not less than thirty days prior to trial.

This court has noted that the rule applies to conflicting trial dates and arguably does

not apply to post-divorce decree motion hearings. Morgan v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-

2067, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.). However — regardless of the rule’s applicability — the record

reveals that Islam did not attach a copy of the conflicting assignment to the motion.

And, while we recognize that filing the motion thirty days prior to the rescheduled

hearing was an impossibility, Islam did not immediately request a continuance after

the trial court notified the parties of the new hearing date. Instead — despite the

clear scheduling conflict — Islam waited until the afternoon prior to the rescheduled

hearing to file his motion for continuance. Consequently, Sup.R. 41(B) did not

require the trial court to grant Islam’s motion for continuance.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Islam’s motion for continuance. Islam’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his second assignment or error, Islam argues that he was deprived

of effective assistance of counsel. Notably, Islam does not challenge prior counsel’s

conduct. Rather, Islam shifts blame to the trial court, arguing that its “decision to

proceed without any attorney of record violates the constitutionally protected right

to be heard.” Islam claims that he is entitled to these constitutional protections

because the hearing involved a motion to show cause, which could result in a potential jail sentence. Islam claims that “[b]y failing to ensure that the proper proof

was presented to the court at any stage of the proceeding, the court denied Islam any

representation but particularly, effective representation and thus violated his due

process rights.” While Islam cites caselaw to establish the general parameters for

reversal when ineffective assistance of counsel is raised, Islam does not provide any

direct support for his case-specific claims or arguments.

Contrary to Islam’s argument, it is well-established that “‘a party

does not have a guaranteed right to counsel in a domestic relations proceeding.’”

Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443, at ¶ 49 (8th Dist.), quoting Wielgus v. Wielgus, 2011-

Ohio-1569, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). Nor does a constitutional right to counsel exist in civil-

contempt proceedings. D.C. v. J.C., 2025-Ohio-3275, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing Liming

v. Damos, 2012-Ohio-4783, ¶ 11-12. “Where there is no right to counsel in the first

instance, there can be no basis for reversal based on an allegation of ineffective

assistance of counsel.” C.T.F. v. A.B.M., 2025-Ohio-1036, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.).

Moreover, “‘where a party has entered an appearance but fails to appear for trial, the

court may proceed with the trial ex parte in the opponent’s absence[,]’ so long as the

parties have received adequate notice of the trial.” (Bracketed in original.) Id. at

¶ 60, quoting Motors, L.L.C. v. Kaba, 2025-Ohio-640, ¶ 49-50 (8th Dist.).

As discussed above, when the trial court granted Razzak’s motion for

continuance and rescheduled the October 3, 2024 hearing, it notified the parties that

no further continuances would be granted due to counsels’ unavailability. As early

as October 2 and 3, 2024, docket entries indicated that a new hearing was set for October 11, 2024, and the October 3, 2024 hearing was cancelled. A judgment entry

reflecting these rulings was issued on October 4, 2024. The entry was sent via email

to Islam’s counsel that same day and to Islam via regular mail on October 7, 2024.

Despite the trial court’s rescheduling order and Islam’s pending last-minute motion

for continuance, neither Islam nor his counsel attended the hearing. Based on our

review of the record and relevant caselaw — and in the absence of legal authority

cited to the contrary — Islam did not have a constitutional right to counsel at this

domestic-relations hearing, and the trial court was within its right to proceed with

the hearing in Islam’s and his counsel’s absence. Therefore, there are no grounds

for reversal based on Islam’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly,

Islam’s second assignment of error is overruled.

C. Cumulative Error

In his third assignment of error, Islam argues that the cumulative-

error doctrine requires reversal. Islam claims that the following “errors” denied him

of “his right to a constitutionally protected trial free of error”: (1) “[t]he trial court’s

failure to properly and timely serve” him or his new counsel with the magistrate’s

decision; (2) the suspension of his prior counsel; and (3) the trial court’s delay in

issuing a ruling regarding the October 11, 2024 hearing.2

2 We note that the magistrate’s decision was filed on June 18, 2025, and was served

upon Islam’s original and new counsel on June 20, 2025. Moreover, Islam was served via regular mail on June 23, 2025. Therefore, it does not appear that there was any failure of proper or timely service based on the record before us. However, Islam again fails to provide any support for these

contentions. In his appellate brief, Islam cites a single criminal case for the

proposition that “[u]nder the doctrine of cumulative error, a conviction will be

reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the

constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of the errors does not individually

constitute cause for a reversal.” In his appellate brief, Islam cites a single criminal

case – State v. Allen, 2016-Ohio-102 (8th Dist.), for the proposition that “[u]nder

the doctrine of cumulative error, a conviction will be reversed when the cumulative

effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial

even though each of the errors does not individually constitute cause for a reversal.”

Moreover, Islam does not provide any support for his contention that the

cumulative-error doctrine should be applied in this domestic-relations case based

on the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the hearing.

When an appellant fails to cite any legal authority in support of their

claims, this court is allowed to disregard them. See App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R.

16(A)(7). Appellate courts are not advocates, and the appellant bears the burden of

constructing the legal arguments necessary to support their assignments of error.

Lewicki v. Grange Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-4544, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.), citing Taylor-

Stephens v. Rite Aid of Ohio, 2018-Ohio-4714, ¶ 121 (8th Dist.), and Doe v.

Cuyahoga Cty. Community College, 2022-Ohio-527, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). Islam has not

provided any legal authority to suggest that (1) any error — let alone multiple —

occurred, and (2) application of the cumulative-error doctrine is appropriate in this case. We decline to find that the doctrine mandates reversal and overrule Islam’s

third assignment of error.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR