17-4134 Islam v. Garland BIA
Kolbe, IJ
A206 912 018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 17th day of March, two thousand twenty-one. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 8 REENA RAGGI, 9 DENNY CHIN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 JAHIRUL ISLAM, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 17-4134 17 NAC 18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,* 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, 24 Chhetry & Associates, P.C., New 25 York, NY. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boyton, Acting Assistant 28 Attorney General; John S. Hogan, 29 Assistant Director; Lindsay C. 30 Dunn, Trial Attorney, Office of
* The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
1 Immigration Litigation, U.S. 2 Department of Justice, Washington, 3 DC. 4 5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 8 is DENIED. 9 Petitioner Jahirul Islam, a native and citizen of 10 Bangladesh, seeks review of a November 30, 2017, decision 11 of the BIA affirming a March 23, 2017, decision of an 12 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for 13 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 14 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jahirul Islam, 15 No. A206 912 018 (B.I.A. Nov. 30, 2017), aff’g No. A206 912 16 018 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 23, 2017). We assume the 17 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 18 procedural history. 19 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 20 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 21 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 22 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards 23 of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 24 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76
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1 (2d Cir. 2018). “Considering the totality of the 2 circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact 3 may base a credibility determination on . . . the inherent 4 plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the 5 consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written 6 and oral statements . . . [and] the internal consistency of 7 each such statement . . . without regard to whether an 8 inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart 9 of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); 10 see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 11 2008). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s 12 determination that Islam was not credible as to his claim 13 that members of the Awami League beat him on account of his 14 position as public secretary in a local chapter of the 15 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”). 16 It was reasonable for the agency to question Islam’s 17 assertion that he held the position of public secretary in 18 his local chapter of the BNP because he could not describe 19 the party’s platform in any detail. See 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 21 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where an applicant gives 22 very spare testimony, . . . the IJ . . . may fairly wonder
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1 whether the testimony is fabricated.”), overruled in part 2 on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 3 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007). Although the agency may 4 err in basing a credibility determination on an applicant’s 5 lack of doctrinal knowledge, this is an “instance[] in 6 which the nature of an individual applicant’s account . . . 7 render[s] his lack of a certain degree of doctrinal 8 knowledge suspect and . . . therefore provide[s] 9 substantial evidence in support of an adverse credibility 10 finding.” Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 11 2006). Because Islam claimed to hold a position 12 responsible for promoting the BNP publicly, the agency did 13 not err in questioning his credibility based on his lack of 14 knowledge regarding the party’s ideology. See id. 15 The agency also reasonably relied on Islam’s 16 conflicting evidence regarding the injuries he purportedly 17 suffered when Awami League members attacked him in 2013. 18 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Islam testified that he 19 suffered a cut in his mouth that bled but was “not that 20 big” and that the rest of his body “was injured” but was 21 not “bleeding or anything.” But a letter he submitted from 22 the hospital, issued three years after the attack, stated
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1 inconsistently that the injury to Islam’s mouth was 2 “serious” and that Islam had lacerations elsewhere on his 3 body. Further, given that Islam could not describe with 4 any specificity the injuries to his body, other than the 5 cut in his mouth that was “not that big,” the agency did 6 not err in questioning the plausibility of his claim that 7 he required a two-day hospitalization. See 8 U.S.C. 8 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 9 F.3d 63, 66–68 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that adverse 10 credibility determination may be based on inherent 11 implausibility in applicant’s story if the “finding is 12 tethered to record evidence” or based on common sense); see 13 also Jin Shui Qiu, 329 F.3d at 152. 14 Having questioned Islam’s credibility, the agency 15 reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate 16 his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An 17 applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 18 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration 19 in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate 20 testimony that has already been called into question.” 21 Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). 22 The agency did not err in declining to credit affidavits
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1 Islam submitted because many of the authors were interested 2 witnesses who were unavailable for cross-examination. See 3 Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We 4 generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to 5 be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”); see 6 also In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 7 (B.I.A. 2010) (finding that letters from alien’s friends 8 and family were insufficient to provide substantial support 9 for alien’s claims because they were from interested 10 witnesses not subject to cross-examination), overruled on 11 other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 12 133–38 (2d Cir. 2012). The agency also reasonably noted 13 the absence of contemporaneous medical records detailing 14 Islam’s two-day hospitalization, which was particularly 15 noticeable given the lack of detail in Islam’s testimony 16 and his doctor’s letter regarding the type of injuries 17 suffered and why the injuries required hospitalization. 18 Given Islam’s lack of doctrinal knowledge, conflicting 19 evidence, and lack of reliable rehabilitating 20 corroboration, we conclude the agency’s adverse credibility 21 determination is supported by substantial evidence. See 22 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That finding is dispositive
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1 of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because 2 all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. 3 See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 5 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are denied 6 and stays vacated.
7 FOR THE COURT: 8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 9 Clerk of Court