Iskovitz v. District of Columbia

125 A.2d 519, 1956 D.C. App. LEXIS 236
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 5, 1956
DocketNo. 1870
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 125 A.2d 519 (Iskovitz v. District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Iskovitz v. District of Columbia, 125 A.2d 519, 1956 D.C. App. LEXIS 236 (D.C. 1956).

Opinion

QUINN, Associate Judge.

Defendants appeal from a conviction of failure to comply with the Plumbing Regulations after statutory notice.1 Their principal contention is that the information was insufficient because it omitted to state that the notice required the work to be completed within a specified time.

It was admitted that- notice had been issued and served by the proper authorities on April 18, 1956, and the record shows that the information alleging defendants’ noncompliance was not filed until June 4. The record contains no affirmative showing that the omission of the time limitation was called to the attention of. the trial court. Consequently, the rule applies that formal defects in an information which have not been raised before verdict are cured thereby and cannot be complained of on appeal unless it is apparent that they have resulted in prejudice to the defendants.2

There is no such showing of prejudice here. The information set forth the work to be done by defendants and if there was any question as to the time in which it was required to be completed, it was incumbent on them to raise that point at trial. Defendants do not contend that the notice did not adequately advise them of the time within which the work should be done. Their point is merely that the information did not state the time limitation of the notice. We hold that the information sufficiently apprised defendants of the offense. On the record before us we cannot say that the finding of guilt was contrary either to the law or to the evidence, and the conviction must stand.

However, the sentence imposed was $100 or sixty days’ imprisonment in default of payment of the fine. Section 725 of Title 1 further provides:

" * * * any person * * * shall upon conviction thereof be punishable by a fine of not • more than $200 for each ■ and every such offense, or- in default of payment of fine, to imprisonment not to exceed thirty days.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Although not called to our attention by the parties, that part of the sentence relating to imprisonment in default of payment of the fine was excessive and not in accordance with the Code provision. The case will therefore be remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate the existing sentence and resentence defendants in accordance with the statute.

It is so ordered.

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Related

Bush v. United States
215 A.2d 853 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1966)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
125 A.2d 519, 1956 D.C. App. LEXIS 236, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/iskovitz-v-district-of-columbia-dc-1956.