Isiah Walker and Alfreda Walker v. Atlantic National Bank of Seminole

Fifth Circuit

Isiah Walker and Alfreda Walker v. Atlantic National Bank of Seminole

629 F.2d 1088, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 12547

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit·Decided November 5, 1980·No. 80-5450·Published

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

The judgment for the lender in this Truth in Lending case is affirmed on the basis of the well reasoned district court opinion reported at 489 F.Supp. 243 (M.D.Fla.1980).

The district court there held that, in the financing of a single personal or family automobile, the language of the after acquired property clause in the financing agreement was not ambiguous and should be construed to comprehend only items added to or replaced on the automobile, not a replacement of the automobile itself, when such a construction is reasonable and would place the agreement in accord with both the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-91, and Fla.Stat. § 679.9-204 (1966), and when a contrary construction would cause the agreement to violate both.

Although the clause might be ambiguous or could be interpreted differently if some other security such as household furnishings were involved, see Pollock v. General Finance Corp., 535 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, 552 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891, 98 S.Ct. 265, 54 L.Ed.2d 176 (1977), it is clear and unambiguous in relation to an automobile, the transfer of which is precisely regulated by Florida law. See Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 319.22-.24 (1975 & Supp.1980).

AFFIRMED.

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PER CURIAM:

The judgment for the lender in this Truth in Lending case is affirmed on the basis of the well reasoned district court opinion reported at 489 F.Supp. 243 (M.D.Fla.1980).

The district court there held that, in the financing of a single personal or family automobile, the language of the after acquired property clause in the financing agreement was not ambiguous and should be construed to comprehend only items added to or replaced on the automobile, not a replacement of the automobile itself, when such a construction is reasonable and would place the agreement in accord with both the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-91, and Fla.Stat. § 679.9-204 (1966), and when a contrary construction would cause the agreement to violate both.

Although the clause might be ambiguous or could be interpreted differently if some other security such as household furnishings were involved, see Pollock v. General Finance Corp., 535 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, 552 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891, 98 S.Ct. 265, 54 L.Ed.2d 176 (1977), it is clear and unambiguous in relation to an automobile, the transfer of which is precisely regulated by Florida law. See Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 319.22-.24 (1975 & Supp.1980).

AFFIRMED.

Isiah Walker and Alfreda Walker v. Atlantic National Bank of Seminole, 629 F.2d 1088, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 12547 (5th Cir. 1980).

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629 F.2d 1088 (Isiah Walker and Alfreda Walker v. Atlantic National Bank of Seminole) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

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