Isgrig v. Srygley

197 S.W.2d 39, 210 Ark. 580, 1946 Ark. LEXIS 399
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedNovember 4, 1946
Docket4-7962
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 197 S.W.2d 39 (Isgrig v. Srygley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Isgrig v. Srygley, 197 S.W.2d 39, 210 Ark. 580, 1946 Ark. LEXIS 399 (Ark. 1946).

Opinion

GtriffiN Smith, Chief Justice.

Eules relating to activities of Little Eock High School students who organized fraternities and sororities were adopted September 7, 1945. Adults, acting for members of these organizations, and because of their own interest in the subject, sought a restraining order. Prom the court’s action in dismissing the complaint for want of equity this appeal has been prosecuted.

The regulations complained of make enrollees or participants in the groups ineligible to take part in certain activities or to receive designated honors, as shown in the footnote. 1

Primarily it is insisted that the board abused its discretion; but, in addition, it is sought to reverse the decree because (a) when Acts 171 of 1929 and 169 of 1931 are read together, there is disclosed an intent to permit activities the board complains of; (b) the rule is in contravention of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution:

Dissatisfaction of school management with the groups it was sought to curb — hereafter referred to as Societies — followed physical injuries sustained by Junior College students who were being initiated more than ten years ago. The feeling appears to have been general that . orderly procedure had given way to what might be termed unintentional acts of violence, and that the program with its unpleasant incidents would, if unchecked, build a barrier between young people, to the detriment of a very large majority.

In an effort to discharge official duties without being unduly harsh, the board, in 1935, adopted a resolution that those who subsequently joined the organizations, ‘■or who, being already a member, . . . [participate] in the initiation of any new member,” were ineligible to hold class office or to receive scholastic or class honors. It was resolved that “ ... commencing with the fall term of 1935, every student in the Senior High School and Junior College [will] be required to sign a written pledge to abide by-the rule.”

This status continued for two years. Evidence disclosed (Mrs. W. P. McDermott testifying as a director) : “ ... An issue of the ‘Tiger’ came out, setting forth that compelling the pupils to sign this statement that they were not fraternity or sorority members was simply putting them in a position which would make them deceptive in their actions. [Two of the students] were very earnest in their presentation of the matter. They felt that we should rescind [the rule] in order to maintain a certain amount of integrity in the whole group; that many of them were signing the cards saying that they were not members when they were.”

September 28, 1937, the board revoked the resolution of 1935. It is interesting, however, to observe the reasons for abandonment of the plan after'two years of trial and many infractions. After mentioning that the resolution of 1935 was adopted because injuries had been sustained by “ . . . several Little Ñock Junior College students in a secret fraternity initiation,” this statement appears: "[¥e have become convinced, through experience] that, because of lack of cooperation on the part of the parents, [the rule] is not being observed. Secret fraternities and sororities of students of the Senior High School continue to flourish, and the .written statement required of every student ... is being regarded by great numbers, not as a solemn pledge to be kept, but as a trivial promise to* be broken.” Net result of the resolution of 1937 was to abrogate the regulation promulgated in 1935, with this subjoined explanation: “We have, therefore, concluded to abolish the ’rule requiring, the signing of the pledge cards and to return to our former position — which is, that when the student loaves the school grounds our responsibility ends.”

In the litigation before us we are not required to demarcate a school board’s duties and responsibilities in matters requiring discretion; nor could the General Assembly, without running the risk of possible hardships, injury, or extravagance, chart the limits in all cases, and define them. Something — and that something lias fundamental substance — must be left to the judgment of board members; and this can be done only through the process of delegated power.

Appellees’ brief asserts that the undisputed testimony shows that sorority and fraternity members continued to wear tlieir insignia in open defiance of the authorities, and “ . . . they forced pledges to wear bizarre clothing, shaved the heads of boy pledges, and made girl pledges wear their hair in pigtails. They continued to band together in elections, to congregate at the front door, forcing the ‘ barbarians ’ to use other entrances, and to reserve certain tables in the cafeteria for [fraternal] members. They remained so absorbed in fraternalism that scholarship slumped. In the language of the listed objections,' they were undemocratic; they were snobbish. They carried petty politics into the school, set false standards, fostered habits of extravagance, and their [school work] was" made secondary. ”

It is immaterial whether, as appellees insist, certain parts of the testimony were undisputed, or merely preponderated in favor of the decree, unless some rule of law is infringed.

First. — The board’s action does not transgress Amendment No. 1 to the Federal Constitution. The amendment restrains Congress (a) from making laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; (b) abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; (c) [preventing] the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 2 Appellants have not seriously argued the constitutional provisions mentioned and we shall not discuss them because they do not apply; nor is due process of law, as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment, involved.

Second. — Act 171 of 1929 was intended, as the title says, to prohibit undemocratic practices in public schools. A public school fraternity, sorority, or other secret society, is defined to be any which seeks to perpetuate itself by taking in additional members on the basis of a vote of the society “ . . . rather .than upon the free choice of any pupil in the school who is qualified- by the rules of the school to fill the special aims of the organization or society.”

Section three of the act imposes upon school directors and boards of education the duty of expelling those who violate the law. It details the things that are prohibited.

Section four applies to any persons not enrolled in the school, directing that they refrain from soliciting members for such organizations; nor may such outsiders attend a meeting of a banned society.

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Bluebook (online)
197 S.W.2d 39, 210 Ark. 580, 1946 Ark. LEXIS 399, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/isgrig-v-srygley-ark-1946.