Isakova v. Klein, Daday, Aretos & O'Donoghue LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJune 10, 2021
Docket1:19-cv-05221
StatusUnknown

This text of Isakova v. Klein, Daday, Aretos & O'Donoghue LLC (Isakova v. Klein, Daday, Aretos & O'Donoghue LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Isakova v. Klein, Daday, Aretos & O'Donoghue LLC, (E.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------X IRINA ISAKOVA, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

19-CV-5221 (KAM)(ST) -against-

KLEIN, DADAY, ARETOS & O’DONOGHUE LLC, Defendant. --------------------------------------X KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Irina Isakova brings this class action on

behalf of herself and others similarly situated, alleging that defendant Klein, Daday, Aretos & O’Donoghue LLC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq., by sending misleading disclosures in its initial debt collection letters to plaintiff and class members. (ECF No. 1, Complaint.) On July 27, 2020, plaintiff filed a consent motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement. (ECF No. 21.) On February 1, 2021, the court preliminarily approved the class action settlement. (ECF No. 25.) The court subsequently held a final fairness hearing on May 26, 2021. (Minute Entry 5/26/2021.) The court issued an Order of Final Approval and Judgment, approving the class action settlement, but reserving decision on class counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs. (See ECF No. 32; Minute Entry 5/26/2021.)

The court has reviewed class counsel’s motion and supporting submissions in support of their application for attorneys’ fees and expenses. (See ECF Nos. 26, Notice of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses; 26-1, Memorandum, of Law in Support of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses (“Pl. Mem.”); 26-2, Declaration of Jesse S. Johnson in Support of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses.) For the reasons set forth below, the court grants class counsel’s unopposed request for $34,000 in reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and litigation expenses. LEGAL STANDARD I. Reasonableness of the Attorneys' Fees and Costs “Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), counsel for a prevailing party in an FDCPA action is entitled to ‘the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorneys' fee as determined by the court.’” Gonzalez v. Healthcare Recovery Mgmt. Inc., No. 13-cv-1002, 2013 WL 4851709, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

Sept. 10, 2013). In adjudicating a motion for attorneys' fees, both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have held that “the lodestar—the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case—creates a ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’” Millea v. Metro–North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522

F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2007) ). The Court should determine the “presumptively reasonable fee” by looking to “what a reasonable paying client would be willing to pay.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 183–84. “[W]hether the calculation is referred to as the lodestar or the presumptively reasonable fee, courts will take into account case-specific factors to help determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates and the number of hours expended.” Pinzon v. Paul Lent Mechanical Sys., No. 11-CV-3384, 2012 WL 4174725, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 4174410 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2012). These factors include:

[T]he complexity and difficulty of the case, the available expertise and capacity of the client's other counsel (if any), the resources required to prosecute the case effectively (taking account of the resources being marshaled on the other side but not endorsing scorched earth tactics), the timing demands of the case, whether an attorney might have an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends of the litigation or might initiate the representation himself, whether an attorney might have initially acted pro bono (such that a client might be aware that the attorney expected low or non-existent remuneration), and other returns (such as reputation, etc.) that an attorney might expect from the representation. Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 184. “The party seeking reimbursement of attorneys' fees must demonstrate the reasonableness and necessity of hours spent and rates charged.” Finkel v. Omega Comm'n Svcs., Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation omitted). “In awarding attorneys’ fees, especially in the context of a class action, a court must ‘ensure that the interests of the class members are not subordinated to the interests of . . . class counsel.’” Dial Corp. v. News Corp., 317 F.R.D. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995)). The

Second Circuit has emphasized “the importance of the district court's duty ‘to act as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.’” McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1099 (2d Cir. 1977)); see Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that a court should perform a “searching assessment” of requested attorneys’ fees in each case). A district court has broad discretion in setting fee awards. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226,

237 (2d Cir. 1987). “In reviewing the submitted timesheets for reasonableness, the Court relies on its own familiarity with the case, as well as on its experience with the parties' evidentiary submissions and arguments.” Ruiz v. Maidenbaum & Assocs. P.L.L.C ., No. 12-cv-5044 (RJS), 2013 WL 3957742, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013) (citation omitted). “A fee applicant bears the burden of demonstrating the hours expended and the nature of the work performed, preferably through contemporaneous time records that describe with specificity the nature of the work done, the hours expended, and the dates.” Pita v. Tulcingo Car Serv., Inc., No. 10-cv-0481 (DLI)(JO), 2011 WL 1790833, at * 9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011) (citing New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147 (2d Cir. 1983)). DISCUSSION Having reviewed the record and class counsel’s motion or attorneys’ fees and supporting submissions, the court grants class counsel’s unopposed request for $34,000 in reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs. I. Hourly Rates In this case, plaintiff’s counsel and class counsel, Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC (“GDR”), requests an hourly rate of $400 for GDR partner Jesse S. Johnson and $450 for GDR senior partner James L. Davidson. (See ECF No. 26-1, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Litigation Expenses (“Pl. Mem.”) at 10-11.) A district court should generally use the prevailing hourly rates in the district where it sits. See Simmons v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 173 (2d.

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Related

Scott v. City of New York
626 F.3d 130 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Konits v. Karahalis
409 F. App'x 418 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Millea v. Metro-North Railroad
658 F.3d 154 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Simmons v. New York City Transit Authority
575 F.3d 170 (Second Circuit, 2009)
McDaniel v. County of Schenectady
595 F.3d 411 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Hyeon Soon Cho v. Koam Medical Services P.C.
524 F. Supp. 2d 202 (E.D. New York, 2007)
Finkel v. Omega Communication Services, Inc.
543 F. Supp. 2d 156 (E.D. New York, 2008)
Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co.
67 F.3d 1072 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.
209 F.3d 43 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Dagostino v. Computer Credit, Inc.
238 F. Supp. 3d 404 (E.D. New York, 2017)
Dial Corp. v. News Corp.
317 F.R.D. 426 (S.D. New York, 2016)
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.
560 F.2d 1093 (Second Circuit, 1977)
Clarke v. Frank
960 F.2d 1146 (Second Circuit, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
Isakova v. Klein, Daday, Aretos & O'Donoghue LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/isakova-v-klein-daday-aretos-odonoghue-llc-nyed-2021.