Isael Orellana v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedSeptember 8, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-09002
StatusUnknown

This text of Isael Orellana v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department (Isael Orellana v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Isael Orellana v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ISAEL ORELLANA, an individual; ) Case No. 2:24-cv-09002-MWC-PVCx MARGARITA NAVARRO, an ) 12 individual; BRIAN ORELLANA, ) STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER an individual; and EMILY ) 13 ORELLANA, an individual, ) ) 14 ) Plaintiffs, ) 15 ) v. ) 16 ) LOS ANGELES COUNTY ) 17 SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, a ) public entity; JUAN TORRES, an ) 18 individual, COUNTY OF LOS ) ANGELES, a public entity; and ) 19 DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, ) ) 20 Defendants. ) ) 21 ) 22 1. INTRODUCTION 23 1.1 PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 24 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 25 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public 26 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may 27 be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to 28 enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this 1 Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to 2 discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends 3 only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment 4 under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth 5 in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them 6 to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the 7 procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a 8 party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 9 1.2 GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 10 The parties submit that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 11 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace 12 officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records. 13 Peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file 14 records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, 15 and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California law. 16 See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); 17 Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 18 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery 19 disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with 20 its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to 21 discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. 22 Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not 23 inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 24 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Unrestricted disclosure of such personnel 25 file information could potentially threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, 26 officers, and their families/associates. 27 Second, municipalities and law enforcement agencies have federal 28 deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information privilege, 1 federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or 2 attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace 3 officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that 4 contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or 5 evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering 6 legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to evaluative / 7 analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, evaluative / 8 analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the 9 direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice 10 Defendants further contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies have 11 duties to respect the privacy rights of officers and third parties to this litigation, and 12 such duties may bear on the course of discovery in this matter. See Sanchez, 936 13 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 14 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. 15 City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 16 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 18 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such personnel file 19 records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records 20 pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to 21 result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third- 22 party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement 23 investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding 24 and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability 25 to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. 26 Third, because peace officers do not have the same rights as other private 27 citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental 28 principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled 1 statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828- 2 830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 3 Finally, the parties submit that there is a further need for a protective order 4 because of the criminal charges that are pending against Plaintiff Isael Orellana. 5 Accordingly, without a protective order preventing such, production of 6 confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially impair and harm 7 the public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, frank internal 8 deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving the safety 9 of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ families 10 and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and preventing 11 pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by publication of 12 private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does result in 13 litigation. 14 It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as 15 confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good 16 faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and 17 there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. 18 2. DEFINITIONS 19 2.1 Action: This pending federal lawsuit. 20 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the 21 designation of information or items under this Order. 22 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of 23 how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for 24 protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above in 25 the Good Cause Statement. 26 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as 27 their support staff).

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Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Henry Pratt Co. v. Stoody Co.
16 F.R.D. 175 (S.D. California, 1954)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)

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Isael Orellana v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/isael-orellana-v-los-angeles-county-sheriffs-department-cacd-2025.