Isabel Collier Read, as of the Estate of Miles Collier, Deceased v. United States

320 F.2d 550, 12 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5223, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4597
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJuly 18, 1963
Docket19517_1
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 320 F.2d 550 (Isabel Collier Read, as of the Estate of Miles Collier, Deceased v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Isabel Collier Read, as of the Estate of Miles Collier, Deceased v. United States, 320 F.2d 550, 12 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5223, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4597 (5th Cir. 1963).

Opinion

JONES, Circuit Judge.

Miles Collier, a resident of Collier County, Florida, died in 1954. His wife, the appellant, was named by him as his executrix and she qualified as such. Among the assets of his estate were a number of real estate mortgages, known as the Gerry mortgages. These were valued for federal estate taxes in the decedent’s estate at $984,056.50. The federal estate tax attributable to these mortgages was $184,996.51. In 1955 the decedent’s estate disposed of the Gerry mortgages and received the amount of $1,093,305.51, which was income. This income was treated, by the estate for income tax purposes, as a capital gain. Its right to do so is not questioned. During the year the estate realized other capital gains in the amount of $92,012.93. In the 1955 income tax return a tax of $302,213.20 was reported and tax payments of this amount were made. The estate made a claim for refund on the ground that it was entitled to the benefit of, but had not taken in its computation, a deduction under Section 691 of *551 the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 1 The Internal Revenue Service determined that a refund was payable but in an amount much less than the executrix felt she was entitled to receive. To assert her claim suit was brought. The executrix and the Government-both filed motions for summary judgment. The mo-, tion of the Government was granted and. the complaint dismissed. Prom the judgment against her the executrix has appealed.

The Government would impose a tax of 25% on the capital gains of $1,185,318.44 in the amount of $296,329.61
against which it would apply a dividend credit of $755.14 and a foreign tax credit of 78.06
or a total credit of 833.20
leaving a balance of $295,496.41.'

*552 This amount, the Government contends, and the district court held, is the correct amount of the tax of the estate for the year 1955. Deducting this amount from the $302,213.20 which the estate paid, the Government finds an overpayment of $6,-716.79. The ■ Government would apply the estate tax deduction, and other deductions, against the estate’s ordinary income of $30,624.15, with the result that, since the deductions exceed the ordinary income, no tax with respect to it would be payable.

Against the Gerry mortgage capital gain of $1,093,305.51 the estate would offset the estate tax deduction of 184,996.51
leaving a taxable capital gain of Adding other gains of 908,309.00. 92,012.93
would result in a total of capital gain of •on which a 25% tax would be 1,000,321.93 250,080.48.
The tax on the ordinary income, as computed by the executrix, would be 8,659.02
with a total tax of 258,739.50

Against this amount would be applied the credits of $833.20 and a net tax of $257,906.30. Deducting this from the amount of $302,213.20 leaves $44,306.90 which the executrix claims is the amount due the estate as an overpayment.

The issue, more easily stated than resolved, is whether the estate tax deduction which is allowable under Section 691 is available as an offset against capital gains when the tax on such income is computed under the alternative tax method. The Government relies heavily upon Weil v. Commissioner, 6th Cir. 1957, 229 F.2d 593. Previous to this controversy it had converted the Tax Court’s Weil decision into a ruling 2 broader in scope and effect than the decision. No estate income was involved in the Weil case and no estate tax deduction was involved. The Weils sought to use a deduction for charitable contributions in computing their capital gains tax by the alternative method. The court affirmed the Tax Court in sustaining the disallowance of the deduction in the alternative computation. Charitable deductions sprang from profound concern for human welfare. 3 They are to be distinguished from those deductions which are designed as a protection, more or less, against encroachment on capital. 4 The Sixth Circuit has confined the Weil case to its facts and has held that capital charges may be properly applied against capital gains before making the tax computation by the alternative method. United States v. Memorial Corporation, 6th Cir. 1957, 244 F.2d 641.

The Government argues that since there is no express provision making the deduction applicable in alternative tax computations, it is clear and certain that the deduction cannot be taken. The executrix, with like logic, contends that the deduction is permitted and if it were to be withheld in capital gains taxation the statute would have said so. We profit but little from such reasoning. We do not think it can be said that the language of the statute is of itself decisive of the question. The determina *553 tion of the cause depends upon a construction of the statute and we are charged with the duty to decide what that construction shall be. White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 59 S.Ct. 179, 83 L.Ed. 172. See United States v. Ivey, 5th Cir. 1961, 294 F.2d 799.

Mertens has this to say of the Code section:

“The purpose of Section 691(c) of the 1954 Code (formerly Section 126(c) of the 1939 Code), dealing with the ‘deduction for estate tax’ is to provide approximately the same tax consequences in the case of a decedent whose gross estate includes claims to income as in the case of a decedent all of whose income receivables had been collected (and income tax paid thereon) prior to his death. In the latter case, only the income in cash or its equivalent, net after the income tax paid thereon, would be included in the gross estate for estate tax purposes. But in the case of a decedent whose claims to income are included in his gross estate, except for the provisions of Section 691(c) of the Code, the gross amount of the claims would be subject to estate tax and also to income tax when later collected. In this situation, to avoid the imposition of both estate tax and income tax on the full amount of the income claims, Section 691(e) provides that the recipient of income in respect of a decedent may deduct that portion of the estate tax which is attributable to the inclusion of the right to such income in the decedent’s estate.” Mertens, Federal Income Tax § 12-102(b).

To adopt the Government’s view would result in the imposition of both estate and income tax on the income amounts where the alternative computation was used.

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320 F.2d 550, 12 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5223, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4597, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/isabel-collier-read-as-of-the-estate-of-miles-collier-deceased-v-united-ca5-1963.