Isaacson v. Fudge

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 KAREN M. ISAACSON, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-000351-JHC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 MARCIA L. FUDGE, Secretary of HUD; JULIA R. GORDON, Assistant Secretary of 11 HUD and Federal Housing Administration Commissioner; and UNITED STATES 12 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 13 Defendants. 14

15 Before the court is self-represented Plaintiff Karen M. Isaacson’s motion for 16 reconsideration of the court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 22; see also 17 Dkt. ## 21, 16. Having reviewed the motion, pertinent portions of the record, and the governing 18 law, the court DENIES the motion. 19 “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored,” and the Court “will ordinarily deny such 20 motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new 21 facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable 22 diligence.” LCR 7(h)(1). “Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy,” and the moving party 23 bears a “heavy burden.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 24 l Isaacson seeks reconsideration of the Court’s order, contending that certain cases 2 included in her opposition brief (Dkt. # 17) and motion to reconsider (Dkt. # 22) demonstrate 3 that she has alleged a plausible injury in fact under the Article III standing analysis. The Court 4 disagrees. Although Isaacson has included a variety of non-binding and factually inapposite 5 cases 1n her briefing, none of these cases allow for a different result. Indeed, by Isaacson’s own 6 admission, the injury she alleges is a speculative, “potential” future harm. See Dkt. # 22 at 5 (“I 7 do not believe the Court can state unequivocally that weakening regulation does not create a 8 concrete injury, and it is not an abstract harm even if it is only potential.”). Although “‘a person 9 exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue forward-looking, injunctive relief to prevent the 10 || harm from occurring,” this “risk of harm” must be “sufficiently imminent and substantial.” 11 TransUnion LLC vy. Ramirez, 594 U.S. ----, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2210 (2021). Isaacson, in contrast, 12 has not established any imminent risk of harm. Because Isaacson’s alleged injury is neither 13 actual nor imminent, and is both conjectural and hypothetical, the Court concludes that she has 14 ||mot met her burden to demonstrate that the Court’s prior order should be reconsidered.! 15 For these reasons, the court DENIES Isaacson’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. # 22.) 16 Dated this 31st day of October, 2023. 7 CJok. 4. Chur 18 John H. Chun United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 ' Tn the remaining portions of her motion to reconsider, Isaacson continues to litigate the merits of her claims. Yet because Isaacson lacks Article III standing, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 24 and may not consider her underlying claims. See Dkt. # 21 at 6 (citing cases).