Isaac Usoroh v. Todd Koger, Sr.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: January 7, 2025
• Docket: 24-2614
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2614 __________

ISAAC USOROH,

v.

TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, SR.; TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, JR.

TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, SR., Appellant ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-01823) District Judge: Honorable William S. Stickman, IV ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) December 10, 2024

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 7, 2025) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Todd Elliott Koger, Sr., proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order

denying his post-remand motions. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

Isaac Usoroh initiated an ejectment action against Todd Koger, Sr., and Todd

Koger, Jr. Todd Koger, Sr., (“Appellant”) filed a notice of removal in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and he asserted that the District

Court had diversity jurisdiction over the matter. The District Court remanded the case to

the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. This Court dismissed Appellant’s

appeals from the remand order.1

The next year, Appellant and Elliott-Todd Parker Koger moved to proceed in

forma pauperis and filed a “motion to reopen case and/or filing of new complaint with

IFP request.” The motions contained 1) a federal civil complaint against Usoroh and

other defendants; 2) an “application for request for IFP status,” and 3) a “request for

appointment of counsel.” The complaint’s civil cover sheet indicated that the Kogers

brought an “Original Proceeding” arising under, inter alia, federal civil rights statutes, the

bankruptcy code, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The

Kogers alleged, for instance, that the defendants violated due process, violated the Fair

Housing Act, and participated in a conspiracy that included fraudulently transferring

property. The District Court denied the motions, reasoning that it could not reopen the

case because it had lost jurisdiction. Appellant moved for reconsideration, which the

1 See Usorph v. Koger, Sr., et al., C.A. No. 23-1029; Usoroh v. Koger, Sr., et al., C.A. No. 23-1632. 2 court denied. Appellant filed a notice of appeal.2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. See Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining

that most post-judgment orders are final decisions if the district court has completely

disposed of the matter).3

Because Appellant is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his pleadings. See

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But pro se litigants still must “abide by the

same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). To present an issue to the Court for review, a litigant’s opening

brief must include, among other things, a statement of the issues, the legal argument

explaining why the district court decided the issues incorrectly, and the facts and legal

authorities supporting that argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 28. Thus, an appellant’s

failure to raise an issue in his opening brief, even when proceeding pro se, renders it

forfeited. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002). Here,

Appellant’s brief does not address the District Court’s reasoning at all, much less explain

why its disposition was erroneous. Rather, the brief reads as a lengthy complaint that

challenges a sheriff’s sale and related court decisions. As a result, any issues on appeal

2 We liberally construe Appellant’s submissions as challenging the denial of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the order denying the motion to reopen the case, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration. See Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 306 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012). 3 We recognize that ordinarily, the Court lacks jurisdiction over non-collateral orders issued after a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 729 F.3d 350, 353-54 (3d Cir. 2013). But the Kogers’ “motion to reopen” is best viewed as the filing of a new federal civil complaint. See Lewis v. Att’y Gen., 878 F.2d 714, 722 n.20 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that we judge a pleading on its substance, rather than its form or label). 3 are forfeited. See Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763 (3d Cir.

2023).

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order. Appellant’s motions to

supplement the record are denied. To the extent Appellant seeks other relief on appeal, it

is denied.