Isaac Rodriguez v. Target Corporation

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 30, 2024
• Docket: 22-16436
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 30 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ISAAC JUDE RODRIGUEZ, No. 22-16436

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01814-DWL v.

TARGET CORPORATION, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2024**

Before: CALLAHAN, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Isaac Jude Rodriguez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his Title VII employment discrimination action. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo summary judgment, and for an abuse

of discretion the application of the laches doctrine. In re Beaty, 306 F.3d 914, 921

(9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment

on the basis of laches because defendant demonstrated that Rodriguez lacked

diligence in bringing this action and the delay was prejudicial to defendant. See id.

(setting forth requirements for an affirmative defense of laches); Boone v. Mech.

Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a Title VII

claim was barred by laches where plaintiff delayed bringing his action for almost

seven years).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rodriguez’s motion

for reconsideration because Rodriguez failed to set forth any basis for relief. See

Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63

(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rodriguez’s motion

to compel discovery because Rodriguez did not comply with the applicable local

rules. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth

standard of review and explaining that the district court is vested with broad

discretion to permit or deny discovery).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rodriguez’s motion

for appointment of counsel because Rodriguez did not establish exceptional

circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting

forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement).

2 22-16436 We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not

consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. See United States

v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

Rodriguez’s motion for leave to file an oversized reply brief (Docket Entry

No. 47) is granted. The Clerk will file the reply brief submitted at Docket Entry

No. 48.

All other pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 22-16436