Isaac Castro v. United States

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 6, 2018
Docket16-16490
StatusUnpublished

This text of Isaac Castro v. United States (Isaac Castro v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Isaac Castro v. United States, (9th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 06 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ISAAC CASTRO, as Personal No. 16-16490 Representative of the Estate of Sara Castromata, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-00501-MEJ

Plaintiff-Appellant, MEMORANDUM* v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Maria-Elena James, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 6, 2017 San Francisco, California

Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and RICE,** Chief District Judge.

Petitioner-Appellant Isaac Castro (Castro) appeals from the district court’s

dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tragically, Sara

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Thomas O. Rice, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation. Castromata (Castromata) was murdered by a fellow service member. Castro

contends that the district court erroneously determined that the Feres1 doctrine

barred his claim for recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).

Although the FTCA exposes the federal government to liability for tort

claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under

like circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. § 2674, the judicially-created Feres doctrine limits

the reach of the FTCA by precluding liability “for injuries to servicemen where the

injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” Feres, 340

U.S. at 146. The Supreme Court has articulated three policy rationales underlying

the Feres doctrine, but we have consistently emphasized the particular importance

of one: avoiding interference with the military disciplinary structure. See Ritchie v.

United States, 733 F.3d 871, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2013).

Judicial reluctance to second-guess military discipline finds its genesis in

“the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of

the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might

obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given

or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty.” Stencel Aero Eng’g

Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977) (citation and alterations

1 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 2 omitted). “[W]e have consistently barred claims under Feres to avoid examining

acts of military personnel which were allegedly negligent with respect to other

members of the armed services.” Ritchie, 733 F.3d at 877 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Castro’s complaint, premised upon the allegedly negligent acts and

omissions of the government that led to Castromata’s death, “strikes at the core of

the[] concerns” that the Feres doctrine aims to shelter. United States v. Shearer,

473 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (concluding that Feres barred negligence action against the

federal government where a service member kidnapped and murdered another off-

duty service member); see also Estate of McAllister v. United States, 942 F.2d

1473, 1474, 1477-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (analogizing to Shearer and holding that

Feres barred action stemming from a fatal attack by a service member who was

previously diagnosed as schizophrenic and potentially dangerous). Castro’s claim

“calls into question basic choices about the discipline, supervision, and control of a

serviceman,” and is “the type of claim[] that, if generally permitted, would involve

the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and

effectiveness.” Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58-59 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, the

Feres doctrine divests the federal courts of jurisdiction over this action. Id. at 59.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

Feres v. United States
340 U.S. 135 (Supreme Court, 1950)
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States
431 U.S. 666 (Supreme Court, 1977)
United States v. Shearer
473 U.S. 52 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Jonathan Ritchie v. United States
733 F.3d 871 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)

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