Isaac-Burgos v. Rodriguez

485 F. Supp. 2d 14, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33539, 2007 WL 1314582
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedMay 2, 2007
DocketCivil 06-1259 (JP)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 485 F. Supp. 2d 14 (Isaac-Burgos v. Rodriguez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Isaac-Burgos v. Rodriguez, 485 F. Supp. 2d 14, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33539, 2007 WL 1314582 (prd 2007).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

The plaintiffs filed the instant case against a hospital and two doctors claiming medical malpractice and that the hospital violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). The defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the EMTALA claims with prejudice. The defendants’ motions (Nos.63, 68, 73) are DENIED.

I. STANDARD

Summary judgment serves to assess the proof to determine if there is a genuine need for trial. Garside v. Oseo Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appro *16 priate when “the record, including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Zambrana-Marrero v. Sudrez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir.1999) (stating that summary judgment is appropriate when, after evaluating the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence “fails to yield a trial worthy issue as to some material fact”); Goldman v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993); Canal Ins. Co. v. Benner, 980 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir.1992). The Supreme Court has stated that “only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In this way, a fact is material if, based on the substantive law at issue, it might affect the outcome of the case. See Mack v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989).

In a summary judgment motion, the movant bears the burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the [record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party who may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must affirmatively show, through the filing of supporting affidavits or otherwise, that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1116.

II. MATERIAL FACTS NOT IN GENUINE ISSUE OR DISPUTE

The parties stipulated to the following facts at the Initial Scheduling Conference held on August 28, 2006.

1. Dr. Mario Acosta-Duarte is a physician licensed to practice medicine in Puer-to Rico.
2. At all time relevant Dr. Acosta had privileges extended by Hospital Auxilio Mutuo de Puerto Rico, Inc. (“HAM”).
3. Dr. Gilberto Rodríguez is a physician with a specialty in the field of internal medicine, and is authorized to practice medicine in Puerto Rico. At all times relevant he had medical privileges extended by HAM. He is married to Ana Rivera.
4. The plaintiffs are not entitled to he-donic damages under Puerto Rico law.
5. On March 8, 2002 Alfonso Domenech was admitted to HAM’s Emergency Room due to a transient ischemic attack (TIA).
6. On March 13, 2004 Alfonso Dome-nech, a 64-year-old male, was taken to the Emergency Room of HAM.
7. The medical records contain no information as to what time Domenech arrived at HAM’s emergency room on March 13, 2004.
8. It was noted that Domenech arrived at the HAM by stretcher.
9. Domenech was triaged at the HAM on March 13, 2004 at 1:43 p.m.
10. At the time of the triage Dome-nech’s blood pressure was 184/94, temperature 37, heart rate 86, and respirations 18. His complaints were hypoactivity, dehydration, and generalized weakness. On a pain scale of 0-10, 10 being the worst pain *17 possible, the nurse assessed Domenech’s pain at 7. Domenech was classified as a “category 3” patient.
11. Domenech was evaluated at the emergency room by Dr. Acosta.
12. Dr. Acosta placed a verbal communication to Dr. Gilberto Rodríguez at 3:15 p.m. on March 13, 2004.
13. Domenech had a history of high blood pressure, a history of a previous brain infarct or CVA (cerebral vascular accident), and a-recent fall. This history was known by the defendants by the time he was evaluated by Drs. Acosta and Rodriguez. Domenech also had a history of new prostate cancer.
14. HAM’s triage categories are from 1 to 4, with 1 the emergency cases, and 4 the least urgent cases.
15. HAM’s triage protocol category defines, among others, that a patient with acute chest pain and unstable vital signs is a “category 1” patient.
16. HAM’s triage protocol category defines, among others, that a patient with suspicion of brain aneurism or other vascular area is a “category 1” patient.
17. HAM’s triage protocol category defines, among others, that a patient with neurologic deficit of acute onset is a “category 1” patient.
18. HAM’s triage protocol category defines, among others, that a patient with moderate to severe dehydration is a “category 2” patient.
19. On March 13, 2004 Dr. Acosta ordered the following tests: CBC with differential, enzymes profile, cardiac profile, arterial blood gases, chest X-ray, brain CT scan. The orders were taken by the hospital nurse at 7:50 p.m.
20. An electrocardiogram (EKG) was performed on March 13, 2004 at 8:20 p.m.

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485 F. Supp. 2d 14, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33539, 2007 WL 1314582, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/isaac-burgos-v-rodriguez-prd-2007.