Irwin v. United States

401 F. Supp. 547, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5073, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12230
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedMay 22, 1975
DocketCiv. A. No. 74-2735
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 401 F. Supp. 547 (Irwin v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Irwin v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 547, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5073, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12230 (E.D. La. 1975).

Opinion

ORDER

R. BLAKE WEST, District Judge.

This is an action brought under the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States for refund of taxes erroneously and illegally assessed and paid under protest to the United States. Plaintiff has moved for a summary judgment.

The issue involved in this complaint simply stated is:

The plaintiff, Ellis C. Irwin, contends that he has been a practicing attorney for over 35 years; that during the years 1964 and 1965 he purchased stock in Hygrade Investments, Inc., which corporation was placed in liquidation in December, 1966 and is now defunct; that the sole purpose of his original and later acquisitions of said stock was not for investment purposes but solely to give him a sufficient interest to become the Attorney and Notary Public for the corporation and would thus extensively promote his legal and notarial practice through fees derived from Hygrade Investments, Inc. and its borrowers—from relatives and through collection services, both as attorney at law and notary public.

Hygrade Investments, Inc. went into liquidation in 1966 and is now defunct, and the plaintiff in preparing his income tax return for the year 1966 reported the cost of said stock as an ordinary business expense loss, as defined by Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.

The Internal Revenue Agent rejected plaintiff’s contentions and classified the worthless stock of Hygrade Investments, Inc. as a capital loss.

As a result of the Revenue Agent’s ruling, plaintiff paid the additional assessments under protest and subsequently brought this action for a refund.

Plaintiff correctly states in his memorandum of law that property which is normally held as a capital asset may in some circumstances be treated as an ordinary or noncapital asset for tax purposes. Corn Products Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 76 S.Ct. 20, 100 L.Ed. 29 (1955). However, in order to properly resolve the question of whether property is being held as a capital asset, one must pay particular attention to all relevant facts and cricumstances. Indeed, in Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115 [548]*548(C.A.5, 1971), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressly stated:

«->:■ * * jf securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary act in the conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until the time of their sale, any loss incurred as a result thereof may be fully deducted from gross income as a business expense or ordinary loss. If, on the other hand, an investment purpose be found to have motivated the purchase or holding of the securities, any loss realized upon their ultimate disposition must be treated in accord with the capital asset provisions of the Code.
* * -X- * * -X-
The fact that securities are “property”, in the broad sense of the term, is not conclusive.
* * * * * #
In determining whether the transaction involved falls within the “ordinary” or “investment” categories, the Court must consider
* X * -X- * -X-
the circumstances of the transaction (its factual background, the necessities of the particular business involved at the particular time involved, and the intention of the taxpayer, both at the time the securities were originally purchased and at the time they were disposed of) * * * ”

See also Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 157 Ct.Cl. 886 (1962). The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed the Schlumberger rule in Midland Distributors, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 730 (C.A.5, 1973). Accordingly, under the rule of law established by the Fifth Circuit, and after an extensive review of all uncontroverted facts and circumstances, it is clear that the plaintiff had no investment purposes in mind when he purchased the Hygrade stock.1

Therefore, it is hereby ordered that movant prepare and submit to the Court a judgment in his favor and against the defendant, the United States of America, thirty days from this date.

APPENDIX I

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY DEFENDANT

Now into Court comes Ellis C. Irwin, Plaintiff in this cause and in answer to the interrogatories propounded to him (by mail Feb. 14, 1975) states:

INTERROGATORY NO. 1

State your name, your address, and your present occupation.

ANSWER

My name is Ellis C. Irwin, residing at 2508 Pine Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, and I am an Attorney and Notary Public, with offices at Suite 801 Baronne Building, New Orleans, Louisiana.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2

In paragraph No. 9 of your complaint, you state:

9. The ground for recovery raised by Plaintiff was that Plaintiff, a practicing attorney for over thirty-five (35) years, alleges that the cost of stock in Hygrade Investments, Inc., (now defunct), was an ordinary loss; and was acquired so that said stock would give him a sufficient interest to become the attorney and notary for the corporation, and would give him a sufficient interest to become the attorney and notary for the corporation, and would extensively promote Plaintiff's legal practice, through fees to be earned from the Hygrade Investment, Inc. and its borrowers, from retainers and through collection services, both as at[549]*549torney and notary public, and therefore, said acquired stock was not a capital asset, but was an ordinary loss.

State with particularity all facts which tend to support your contention that you are entitled to an ordinary loss under Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (28 U.S.C.) attributable to the worthlessness of your stock in Hygrade Investments, Inc., and state the names and last known addresses of all persons having knowledge of those facts.

In order to understand my reasoning, it is first necessary to have only a slight knowledge of the earning possibilities enuring to an attorney and/or notary for a finance company and/or person or firm engaged in the finance business. The following further comments are respectfully submitted for consideration regarding the lucrative possibilities of being an attorney and/or notary for persons or corporations engaged in the finance business:

When loans are placed in the hand of an attorney for collection, the note involved in the loan usually carries a 20% or 25% collection fee. However, unless the note is secured, collection can be difficult, particularly when it is on a single signature loan.

When real estate is involved as a security for the loan, this requires an examination of title and in many instances, a succession proceeding may be necessary, in order to clear the title, the fees for which are very satisfying.

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Related

Davenport v. Commissioner
70 T.C. 922 (U.S. Tax Court, 1978)
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1976 T.C. Memo. 184 (U.S. Tax Court, 1976)

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Bluebook (online)
401 F. Supp. 547, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5073, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12230, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/irwin-v-united-states-laed-1975.