Irwin v. Bisignano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-3204
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARMEL C. IRWIN, No. 24-3204 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-05567-SKV v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Sarah Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 6, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Carmel Irwin appeals the denial of her application for social security

disability benefits. Irwin contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred

by improperly discounting the testimony of non-examining physician Dr. Peterson,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of Irwin herself, and of lay witnesses. Irwin contends that, as a result, the ALJ did

not properly assess her residual functional capacity and erred in step four and step

five of the disability assessment.

1. We “review de novo the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial

of social security benefits and reverse only if the [ALJ’s] decision was not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Glanden v. Kijakazi,

86 F.4th 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2023). “Substantial evidence . . . is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

2. The standard governing an ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence differs with

the type of evidence presented. In discounting a “non-examining, non-treating

doctor’s opinion,” an ALJ must provide “reference to specific evidence in the

medical record.” Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 488 (9th Cir. 2022). To

discount an applicant’s symptom testimony, an ALJ must provide a reason other

than a lack of objective medical evidence showing that the testimony is unreliable.

See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). And to discount lay

testimony, the ALJ must provide “germane reasons.” Bayless v. Barnhart, 427

F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).

3. Here, the ALJ properly discounted all forms of testimony mentioned

above. Because Irwin filed her application before March 27, 2017, the applicable

2 24-3204 regulations state that the ALJ should afford different weight to medical opinions

based on whether the medical professional treated and/or examined the applicant.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The opinions of medical professionals who treated or

examined the applicant are to be given more weight than the opinions of those who

did not. Id.; see Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014); Pitzer v.

Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990). The ALJ in this case discounted Dr.

Peterson’s testimony because Dr. Peterson’s conclusions conflicted with those of

the examining physician. The ALJ pointed to specific record evidence that

supported the examining physician’s report, and that conflicted with Dr. Peterson’s

opinion. Because the ALJ’s analysis is supported by substantial evidence, we

affirm.

4. The ALJ discounted applicant Irwin’s testimony about her own symptoms

because, although Irwin’s impairments could be reasonably expected to cause the

alleged symptoms to some degree, “the weight that can be given to the claimant’s

symptom reports is undermined[.]” The ALJ observed that doctors’ notes and

daily functioning reports from the relevant period reflect symptoms less severe

than Irwin described. For example, although Irwin testified that she experienced

muscle aches, sore and stiff legs, and throbbing pain, medical records from the

relevant period show that Irwin’s gait was normal and that she did not demonstrate

any muscle atrophy or asymmetry. As the ALJ stated, “[w]hile fibromyalgia

3 24-3204 causes limitation and pain that is not readily explainable with imaging or objective

findings, the limitation in actual functioning from pain would be observable in

functions like gait, tenderness, and range of motion[.]”

5. Irwin contends that the ALJ did not provide germane reasons to discount

the testimony of her husband. But the husband’s statements were inconsistent with

the medical record as a whole. Inconsistency with medical evidence and the

opinion of an examining physician is a germane reason to discount lay testimony.

6. Because the ALJ did not err in calculating Irwin’s residual functional

capacity, the ALJ did not err in relying on that residual functional capacity at steps

four or five of the disability analysis.

AFFIRMED.

4 24-3204