Irving Trust Co. v. Gomez

550 F. Supp. 773, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16731
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 10, 1982
Docket82 Civ. 3183
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 550 F. Supp. 773 (Irving Trust Co. v. Gomez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Irving Trust Co. v. Gomez, 550 F. Supp. 773, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16731 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

Opinion

DECISION OF THE COURT

SAND, District Judge.

The plaintiff Irving Trust Company in this action for fraud, money had and received, conversion and unjust enrichment procured an ex parte order of attachment against the defendants in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, on April 23, 1982. Pursuant to New York CPLR Section 6212(a), plaintiff sought an order confirming the attachment. Defendants Daniel Bulos, Carlos Bulos, and Marlene Bulos moved to transfer the action to this court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The motion to confirm is now presented to this court. In addition, the defendants have moved to vacate the attachments.

For the reasons stated herein, the court confirms the attachments against Mariana Gomez, Aquiles Farias, and the Maximo Gomez P.C. por A, but vacates the attachments against Daniel Bulos, Carlos Bulos, and Marlene Bulos.

The burden of proof with respect to all of these motions is upon the plaintiff. Under NY CPLR Section 6212(a), which governs the granting of a motion to confirm, plaintiff must show: 1) that there is a cause of action and that there is a probability of success on the merits; 2) that there is one or more grounds for attachment; and 3) that the amount demanded from the defendants exceeds all counterclaims known to plaintiff. Section 6223, which governs the granting of a motion to vacate, requires in addition a showing of need for continuing the levy.

In this case the elements other than probability of success on the merits do not pose difficult questions. Since all the individual defendants are nondomiciliaries residing out of state and the defendant corporation is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in this state, there are grounds for these attachments under Section 6201. Although defendants have asserted that they will bring counterclaims against the plaintiff for damages arising out of its stopping payment on certain checks, these counterclaims will not be considered under Section 6212(a) unless plaintiff does not dispute them but concedes that they are just. See Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Scrivener, 480 F.Supp. 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y.1979); Burt Printing Co. v. Middle East Media Corp., 80 F.R.D. 449 (S.D.N.Y.1978). Since these counterclaims would necessarily be based on contentions that the defendants acted in good faith, plaintiffs allegations of fraud amply show that plaintiff does not concede the proposed counterclaims are just. Plaintiff claims that the levy must be continued in order to ensure that a judgment in its favor will in fact be satisfied. The nature of the allegations if probability of success on the merits is shown and the difficulty plaintiff would have reaching the assets of these foreign domiciliaries demonstrate the need for security in this case.

The success of plaintiff’s claims on the merits depends upon showing that the defendants acted in bad faith in their involvement in certain foreign currency transactions described in more detail below. Plaintiff, of course, must show intent in order to succeed on the merits of its fraud claim. Since defendants have asserted the defense that they were holders in due course under UCC Section 3-302 as to the other causes of action, plaintiff cannot sue *775 ceed on these causes of action either, without reference to defendants’ state of mind.

The bad faith that defeats status as a holder in due course was recently described as follows: “Bad faith, then, is obviously something far more extreme than a failure to observe reasonable commercial standards or the standards of a reasonably prudent man. It ‘is not mere carelessness. It is nothing less than guilty knowledge or willful ignorance.’ Manufacturers & Traders Trust Company v. Sapowitch, 296 N.Y. 226, 72 N.E.2d 166 (1947). See also Hall v. Bank of Blasdell, 306 N.Y. 336, 118 N.E.2d 464 (1954). The issue essentially is whether the circumstances of which the holder has knowledge ‘rise to the level that the failure to inquire reveals a deliberate desire on his part to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear that investigation would disclose a defense arising from the transactions.’ General Investment Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193, 9 UCC Rep.Serv. 1, (1971). See also Manufacturers & Traders Trust Company v. Sapowitch, supra.” Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 452 F.Supp. 1108, 1119 (S.D.N. Y.1978).

At a hearing commencing June 2, 1982, defendants Aquiles Farias, Mariana Gomez, and Daniel Bulos testified. A representative of the corporation Maximo Gomez P.C. por A, hereafter referred to as Gomep, also testified.

The Gomez/Farias/Gomep Attachment

Mrs. Gomez testified that she is the president of the corporate defendant Gomep and its active chief operating officer. She owns approximately 20 percent of its stock and family members own an additional 50 percent. The corporation is engaged in the cosmetic and medicine business and has been in existence for over fifty years and enjoys an excellent reputation.

For many years the corporation’s American banking affiliation has been with the Royal Bank and Trust Company in New York. Aquiles Farias, her husband’s nephew, served as financial consultant to the corporation and in recent years has been an executive employee of Gomep.

Neither Gomep nor Mrs. Gomez ever engaged in foreign currency transactions prior to the events described herein.

Mrs. Gomez testified that she received a telephone call from one Rafael Martinez, who described himself as an engineer. Martinez was not previously known to her. He offered to sell United States dollars to her because, allegedly, he and his associates were acquiring Dominican Republic pesos to further investment projects that they contemplated in that country. Martinez was a resident of the Dominican Republic, as are all of these defendants.

All witnesses testified that there is active trading in the Dominican Republic in United States currency and that this trading is lawful and is not limited to licensed currency exchange houses. A market parallel to the official Central Bank-administered exchange market exists. The official rate is one US dollar for one Dominican Republic peso. The rate on the parallel market fluctuates but is in the range of one dollar for 1.45 pesos.

Mrs. Gomez testified that she met with Mr. Martinez and that they quickly agreed to the following arrangement: Mr. Martinez would cause large sums of money, in the millions of dollars, to be deposited in an account which Mrs. Gomez would open in the Irving Trust Company in New York. When Irving Trust Company confirmed to her that the dollars were available in the New York account, Mrs. Gomez was to buy the dollars at a rate which was between 20 and 25 percent under the going exchange rate.

Mrs. Gomez conducted no investigation of Mr. Martinez.

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