Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 16-12126 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00113-LJA
IRVIN E. TALIAFERRO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia ________________________
(January 25, 2017)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 2 of 6
Irvin E. Taliaferro filed this pro se action seeking to enjoin the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) from issuing notices of levy to collect unpaid income
taxes and to force the IRS to return to him all monies already seized as a result of
its levies. The district court dismissed Taliaferro’s complaint sua sponte, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), for frivolity and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, Taliaferro first argues that the district court procedurally erred in
dismissing his complaint because, in his view, § 1915(e) does not apply to non-
prisoners. Next, on the substance of his claims, Taliaferro contends that he is not a
“taxpayer” with taxable “income.” He asserts that taxable income does not include
compensation for labor or services. He also appears to argue that the IRS lacks the
authority to collect income taxes beyond federal land or from private citizens who
are not federal employees. Taliaferro’s arguments are unavailing. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss an action for lack of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th
Cir. 2006). We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for frivolity under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for an abuse of discretion, though a district court’s ruling
on issues of res judicata is reviewed de novo. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160
(11th Cir. 2003). We liberally construe the filings of pro se parties. Id.
Initially, the district court did not procedurally err by relying on § 1915(e) in
its dismissal order. In forma pauperis (“IFP”) proceedings are governed by 28
2 Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 3 of 6
U.S.C. § 1915. The statute is intended to provide all indigent litigants with
meaningful access to courts by removing the obstacle of poverty. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1988). Congress recognized, however, that an
indigent litigant, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain
from filing frivolous or repetitive lawsuits. Id. To prevent such frivolous or
abusive litigation, Congress authorized the federal courts to dismiss IFP actions
sua sponte on various grounds.1 Id.; see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
31 (1992). Thus, under § 1915(e), district courts have the power to screen
complaints filed by all IFP litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike. See Rowe
v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d
1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2002) (“find[ing] no error” in the district court’s
dismissal of a non-prisoner’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
In any case, even assuming without deciding that § 1915(e) did not apply, “a
court sua sponte can raise a jurisdictional defect at any time, leading to dismissal
of the relevant action.” Barnett v. Bailey, 956 F.2d 1036, 1039 (11th Cir. 1992);
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Here, sua sponte
dismissal was appropriate because the district court correctly determined that it
1 Currently, § 1915(e)(2) provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 3 Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 4 of 6
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a). See Leves v. I.R.S., Comm’r, 796 F.2d 1433, 1434-35 (11th Cir. 1986)
(affirming dismissal of complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where the
Anti-Injunction Act barred the suit).
The Anti-Injunction Act (the “Act”), 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), apart from several
statutory exceptions not applicable here, “generally forbids courts to restrain the
IRS from assessing or collecting a tax.” Hempel v. United States, 14 F.3d 572, 573
(11th Cir. 1994); see 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (“[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed.”). The Act bars not only suits that directly seek to restrain the
assessment or collection of taxes, but also suits aimed at interfering with “activities
which are intended to or may culminate in the assessment or collection of taxes.”
Kemlon Prods. & Dev. Co. v. United States, 638 F.2d 1315, 1320 (5th Cir. March
1981), modified on other grounds, 646 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1981) (quotation marks
omitted). 2
We have recognized a judicial exception to the Act applicable if the plaintiff
shows both that “(1) under no circumstances could the government ultimately
prevail on its tax claim and (2) equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.” Mathes v.
2 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 4 Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 5 of 6
United States, 901 F.2d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir. 1990). Equitable relief is not
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Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 16-12126 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00113-LJA
IRVIN E. TALIAFERRO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia ________________________
(January 25, 2017)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 2 of 6
Irvin E. Taliaferro filed this pro se action seeking to enjoin the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) from issuing notices of levy to collect unpaid income
taxes and to force the IRS to return to him all monies already seized as a result of
its levies. The district court dismissed Taliaferro’s complaint sua sponte, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), for frivolity and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, Taliaferro first argues that the district court procedurally erred in
dismissing his complaint because, in his view, § 1915(e) does not apply to non-
prisoners. Next, on the substance of his claims, Taliaferro contends that he is not a
“taxpayer” with taxable “income.” He asserts that taxable income does not include
compensation for labor or services. He also appears to argue that the IRS lacks the
authority to collect income taxes beyond federal land or from private citizens who
are not federal employees. Taliaferro’s arguments are unavailing. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss an action for lack of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th
Cir. 2006). We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for frivolity under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for an abuse of discretion, though a district court’s ruling
on issues of res judicata is reviewed de novo. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160
(11th Cir. 2003). We liberally construe the filings of pro se parties. Id.
Initially, the district court did not procedurally err by relying on § 1915(e) in
its dismissal order. In forma pauperis (“IFP”) proceedings are governed by 28
2 Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 3 of 6
U.S.C. § 1915. The statute is intended to provide all indigent litigants with
meaningful access to courts by removing the obstacle of poverty. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1988). Congress recognized, however, that an
indigent litigant, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain
from filing frivolous or repetitive lawsuits. Id. To prevent such frivolous or
abusive litigation, Congress authorized the federal courts to dismiss IFP actions
sua sponte on various grounds.1 Id.; see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
31 (1992). Thus, under § 1915(e), district courts have the power to screen
complaints filed by all IFP litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike. See Rowe
v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d
1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2002) (“find[ing] no error” in the district court’s
dismissal of a non-prisoner’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
In any case, even assuming without deciding that § 1915(e) did not apply, “a
court sua sponte can raise a jurisdictional defect at any time, leading to dismissal
of the relevant action.” Barnett v. Bailey, 956 F.2d 1036, 1039 (11th Cir. 1992);
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Here, sua sponte
dismissal was appropriate because the district court correctly determined that it
1 Currently, § 1915(e)(2) provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 3 Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 4 of 6
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a). See Leves v. I.R.S., Comm’r, 796 F.2d 1433, 1434-35 (11th Cir. 1986)
(affirming dismissal of complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where the
Anti-Injunction Act barred the suit).
The Anti-Injunction Act (the “Act”), 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), apart from several
statutory exceptions not applicable here, “generally forbids courts to restrain the
IRS from assessing or collecting a tax.” Hempel v. United States, 14 F.3d 572, 573
(11th Cir. 1994); see 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (“[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed.”). The Act bars not only suits that directly seek to restrain the
assessment or collection of taxes, but also suits aimed at interfering with “activities
which are intended to or may culminate in the assessment or collection of taxes.”
Kemlon Prods. & Dev. Co. v. United States, 638 F.2d 1315, 1320 (5th Cir. March
1981), modified on other grounds, 646 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1981) (quotation marks
omitted). 2
We have recognized a judicial exception to the Act applicable if the plaintiff
shows both that “(1) under no circumstances could the government ultimately
prevail on its tax claim and (2) equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.” Mathes v.
2 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 4 Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 5 of 6
United States, 901 F.2d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir. 1990). Equitable relief is not
available if the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. Hobson v. Fischbeck, 758
F.2d 579, 581 (11th Cir. 1985).
In his complaint, Taliaferro sought injunctive relief in the form of an order
directing the IRS to cease collecting taxes from him by levy and to return to him
all monies already collected by levy. Accordingly, the Anti-Injunction Act bars his
lawsuit unless an exception applies. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a); Kemlon Prods., 638
F.2d at 1320; see also Taliaferro v. Freeman, 595 F. App’x 961, 962–63 (11th Cir.
2014) (reaching the same result). 3 But Taliaferro has not shown that an exception
applies.
The judicially created exception to the Act does not apply because, as we
explained in Taliaferro’s prior appeal raising similar claims, “the government
would likely prevail on Mr. Taliaferro’s meritless claims.” Taliaferro, 595 F.
App’x at 963 (rejecting similar claims). We previously have rejected, as frivolous,
arguments that wages are not taxable income and that the income tax applies only
to the federal government and its employees. See Motes v. United States, 785 F.2d
928, 928 (11th Cir. 1986) (determining as frivolous, among other things,
3 Taliaferro previously filed a materially similar lawsuit, which was likewise dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Anti-Injunction Act. See Taliaferro v. Freeman, 595 F. App’x 961, 962–63 (11th Cir. 2014). We discern no meaningful difference between the claims and arguments we address in this case and those Taliaferro presented in that earlier case, but, regardless of whether res judicata applies, the Anti-Injunction Act plainly bars his current complaint. 5 Case: 16-12126 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 6 of 6
arguments that only public servants are subject to tax liability and that wages are
not income subject to tax); Biermann v. C.I.R., 769 F.2d 707, 708 (11th Cir. 1985)
(stating that similar arguments were “patently frivolous, have been rejected by
courts at all levels of the judiciary, and . . . warrant no further discussion”); see
also United States v. Pilcher, 672 F.2d 875, 877 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Every income
earner is required to file an income tax return.”).
In addition, even if Taliaferro could show that the government was sure to
lose on the merits of his claims, an injunction still would be improper because
Taliaferro has “an adequate remedy at law—he can pay the disputed taxes and then
sue for a refund.” Hobson, 758 F.2d at 581; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (“No suit
or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected . . .
until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary.”).
Taliaferro admits that he has not filed an income-tax return for any year that the
IRS is claiming that income taxes are owed. So, he has chosen not to avail himself
of this remedy.
We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Taliaferro’s complaint.4
AFFIRMED.
4 Taliaferro’s “Motion for Judgement” is DENIED. 6