Irrer v. Milacron, Inc.

484 F. Supp. 2d 677, 2007 WL 1300747
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMay 2, 2007
Docket04-72898
StatusPublished

This text of 484 F. Supp. 2d 677 (Irrer v. Milacron, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Irrer v. Milacron, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 677, 2007 WL 1300747 (E.D. Mich. 2007).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS [93]

EDMUNDS, District Judge.

This product liability action comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims. Plaintiffs, a group of over 250 present and former employees at General Motors Corporation (“GM”)’s Buiek Complex in Flint, Michigan, allege that they were injured because Defendant Milacron failed to adequately warn them about health effects caused by exposure to industrial metalworking fluids that Mila-cron manufactured and distributed to their employer, GM. Under Michigan’s 1995 tort reform legislation, a manufacturer or seller of a product cannot be held hable for any alleged failure to warn if the products at issue were provided by it to a sophisticated user. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.2947(4), 600.2945®. Thus, the core issue presented here is whether Defendant Milacron may take advantage of Michigan’s “sophisticated user” statutory provisions and thus avoid liability for Plaintiffs’ injuries. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant Milacron’s motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

This case involves allegations that industrial lubricants called “metalworking *679 fluids” (“MWFs”) caused Plaintiffs’ varied injuries. 1 Plaintiffs are current or former GM employees who worked at the Buick plants in Flint, Michigan. GM manufactured the V6 Engine and certain component parts at the Buick plants, and the majority of Plaintiffs worked at either or both the V6 or Components plants at various times between the 1970s and the present. Defendant Milacron manufactured and supplied MWFs to some of these GM plants at different times. Most Plaintiffs claim respiratory injuries such as occupational asthma, chronic bronchitis, and hypersensitivity pneumonitis. Two Plaintiffs claim to have cancer, and five claim dermatitis and/or skin rashes.

II. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The central inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The non-moving party may not rest upon its mere allegations, however, but rather “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position will not suffice. Rather, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Hopson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir.2002).

III. Analysis

This matter comes before the Court on Milacron’s motion for partial summary judgment arguing that, because it manufactured and sold its MWFs to GM, a sophisticated user as defined under Michigan law, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2945(j), Milacron cannot be held liable for any alleged failure to warn pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2947(4). Plaintiffs respond that (1) GM does not fit the statutory definition of a sophisticated user; and (2) because Plaintiffs are not sophisticated users, GM cannot be defined as one under Michigan’s statute. Plaintiffs further respond that, even if GM fits the statutory definition of a sophisticated user, Milacron cannot take advantage of Michigan’s statute precluding liability for a manufacturer’s or seller’s failure to warn for products it provides to a sophisticated user because (1) federal and/or state regulations *680 require Milacron to warn about its MWFs; and (2) Michigan’s “actual knowledge exception,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2949a, applies. Each of these arguments require the Court to determine whether Milacron owed Plaintiffs a duty to warn. The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law for the Court to decide. See Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union, 414 Mich. 624, 327 N.W.2d 814, 821 (1982).

The Court now considers each of these arguments, beginning with the issue whether GM fits within Michigan’s statutory definition of a “sophisticated user.”

A. GM Falls Within Michigan’s Statutory Definition of a “Sophisticated User”

In lawsuits filed before the March 28, 1996 effective date of Michigan’s tort reform legislation, a manufacturer’s duty to warn of material risks related to its products was governed by common law principles. As the Michigan Supreme Court recently observed, Michigan’s tort reform legislation “displaced the common law.” 2 Greene v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 475 Mich. 502, 717 N.W.2d 855, 859 (2006). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ reliance on common law principles applied in Bock v. General Motors Corporation, 247 Mich.App. 705, 637 N.W.2d 825, 830-31 (2001), is misplaced as that action was filed before the March 28, 1996 effective date of Michigan’s tort reform legislation. 3

Michigan’s tort reform statute defines a “sophisticated user” as;

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Related

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.
398 U.S. 144 (Supreme Court, 1970)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Dole v. United Steelworkers
494 U.S. 26 (Supreme Court, 1990)
In Re Air Crash Disaster.
86 F.3d 498 (Sixth Circuit, 1996)
Eddie Hopson v. Daimlerchrysler Corporation
306 F.3d 427 (Sixth Circuit, 2002)
Greene v. a P Products, Ltd
475 Mich. 502 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2006)
In Re Church
717 N.W.2d 855 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2006)
Mascarenas v. Union Carbide Corp.
492 N.W.2d 512 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1992)
Bock v. General Motors Corp.
637 N.W.2d 825 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2001)
Newson v. Monsanto Co.
869 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Michigan, 1994)
Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union
327 N.W.2d 814 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1982)
Tasca v. GTE Products Corp.
438 N.W.2d 625 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1988)
Barker Bros. Construction v. Bureau of Safety & Regulation
536 N.W.2d 845 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1995)
Belleville v. Rockford Manufacturing Group, Inc.
172 F. Supp. 2d 913 (E.D. Michigan, 2001)
Torres v. County of Oakland
758 F.2d 147 (Sixth Circuit, 1985)

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Bluebook (online)
484 F. Supp. 2d 677, 2007 WL 1300747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/irrer-v-milacron-inc-mied-2007.