Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Engineering Corp.

13 F. Supp. 995, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1579
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedMarch 21, 1936
DocketNo. 1782
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 13 F. Supp. 995 (Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Engineering Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Engineering Corp., 13 F. Supp. 995, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1579 (S.D. Ind. 1936).

Opinion

LINDLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, owner of patent to Garrison, No. 1,386,698, and another to Banfield, No. 1,778,349, sues for infringement. Plaintiff is a manufacturer of completely automatic stoker equipment for heating furnaces, and defendant sells control units intended to be placed on stokers of other make with the result that, when equipped with such control unit, they will perform the functions of and compete with the product of plaintiff. Defendant insists that the patents are invalid, but, if valid, not infringed.

[996]*996The Garrison patent was granted August 9, 1921, on an application filed March IS, 1920. The claims in suit are one and three, which appear in the margin.1 Of the elements named in claim 1 the “furnace of mechanical fuel feed,” “means of connecting said fuel feed to the furnace,” “a control apparatus adapted to open and close the draft of the furnace and start and stop the fuel feed” and “a thermostat adapted to control the operation of said furnace and fuel feed” for normal operations, “according to the temperature requirements,” were all old in the art. Garrison was not in this patent the originator of the idea of feeding the coal or the first to provide a time device for heating systems. The broad idea of thermostatic control of stokers through a control apparatus is the subject matter of a prior patent to him, No. 1,382,-877. To these old elements, Garrison added “a time device adapted to operate the furnace and fuel feed for a definite time periodically, irrespective of temperature requirements.” Thus the claim must be construed as one for a combination of elements adapted to operate periodically a stoker and the drafts of an automatic furnace, controlled by a thermostat, to produce heat in accordance with a predetermined standard with an alleged novel addition of a timing device which will apply electric current which in turn opens the draft and starts the stoker, independent of temperature . requirements, at stated predetermined intervals, so that the fire will not die.

Timing devices for opening and closing switches controlling electric currents at stated intervals are old in electrical art, and the question submitted is whether by the addition of such a device a patentable combination was created. The timing device, according to the patent, has only one function to perform; at stated intervals it closes the switch and thereby starts the furnace so that the fire will not die. The disclosure teaches no other function. The timing device does not shut off the current, but that result, on the contrary, is accomplished by the thermostat controlling the room temperature. In other words, the clock merely starts the motor which controls the stoker and drafts, but does not stop it. This operation, thus started at stated intervals, is not ended until the room thermostat stops the motor when the desired room temperature, which controls the thermostat, has been reached.

In claim 3 we have the same old elements, including, however, an alleged new element, “a time device adapted to so operate the electrical device that the furnace and fuel feed are operated for a definite time periodically irrespective of the temperature requirements and which time device is also adapted to so change the thermostat connections that said electrical device is controlled by the thermostat according to the temperature requirements at all times other than said definite periodical times.” However, an examination of the specifications and descriptions disclose that the device claimed does not, as indicated, stop the fuel feed. It merely starts it. In other words, under this claim also, the time device merely controls one cycle of operation of the electrical device to start the motor, and also changes the thermostat connection all without stopping the motor. The latter is thereafter subject only to the control of the thermostat. Though the claim is more specific than claim 1, it is built up in the same fashion, by a union of old elements, all of which continue to perform individual functions well known to the art.

[997]*997I am of the opinion that each of these claims is invalid for want of invention; that they constitute aggregations. At the risk of repetition, I call attention to established principles upon this subject-matter in order that the reasons for my conclusions may be clear. Mr. Justice Matthews, in Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U.S. 310, 318, 26 L.Ed. 749, said, a long time ago: “In a patentable combination of old elements, all the constituents must so enter into it as that each qualifies every other; to draw an illustration from another branch of the law, they must be joint tenants of the domain of the invention, seized each of every part, per my et per tout, and not mere tenants in common, with separate interests and estates. It must form either a new machine of a distinct character and function, or produce a result due to the joint and co-operating action of all the elements, and which is not the mere adding together of separate contributions.” In endeavoring to follow this opinion, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in National Cash-Register Co. v. American Cash-Register Co., 53 F. 367, 371, said: “A combination, to be patentable, must produce a new and useful result, as the product of the combination, and not a mere aggregate of several results, each the complete result of one of the combined elements.”

It is not necessary, of course, that the several elemental parts of a combination should act simultaneously, but it is necessary that the parts be so arranged that the successive action of each contribute to produce some one practical result, which, when attained, is the product of the simultaneous or successive action of all of the elemental parts, viewed as one entire whole. The union is a mere aggregation unless the elements by their united action perform some function which they do not separately discharge. Combined Patents Can Co. v. Lloyd (C.C.) 11 F. 153. There must be co-operation of the parts in producing a new result, and this must be cooperation united to a common and unitary result. Hoffman v. Young (C.C.) 2 F. 74. The elements must have reciprocal influence 011 each other so that their joint action produces a common object which brings about new additional functions and accomplishes additional results. Here the time device added for the closing of the switch at fixed intervals and performing no additional function merely accomplishes its original individual result and when added to an old combination, does not bring about invention. It does not co-operate with other elements. It contributes to no joint action. There is no co-operation or coalescence of its efforts or actions with those of the other elements. Tt is merely the insertion of a well-known means for closing an electrical switch at stated intervals.

I believe the present claims come within the criticism of the Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Banning, 59 F.(2d) 129, 131, where Judge Evans said: “Bringing old devices into juxtaposition and allowing each to work out its own effect without the production of something novel is not invention. Bringing together several old devices without producing a new and useful result, which is the joint product of the elements of the combination and something more than the aggregation of the old results, is not invention. * * * Co-action it is true may result from the excision, as well as the addition, of a factor. In either case, however, the action of the element must affect another element of the combination described.

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13 F. Supp. 995, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1579, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/iron-fireman-mfg-co-v-industrial-engineering-corp-insd-1936.