Iron and Steel Realty Investments v. Hoberman, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 1095 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A09024-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IRON AND STEEL REALTY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF INVESTMENTS, LLC : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : TYLER HOBERMAN AND JENNIFER : HOBERMAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, : No. 1095 WDA 2024 AND HOBERMAN HOMES, LLC : : Appellants :

Appeal from the Order Entered May 17, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at No(s): 1559 of 2023

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: October 28, 2025

Appellants Tyler Hoberman, Jennifer Hoberman, and Hoberman Homes,

LLC, appeal from an order overruling their preliminary objections to Appellee,

Iron and Steel Realty Investments, LLC’s action alleging unjust enrichment.

Appellants claim that the trial court erred in concluding that Appellee had

stated a cause of action in unjust enrichment sufficient to overcome

preliminary objections. We affirm.

By way of background, this matter arises from an upset tax sale of

property located at 1100 Willowbrook Road in Rostraver, Westmoreland

County (the Property). See Trial Ct. Op., 10/18/25, at 1; see also Iron and

Steel Realty Investments v. Westmoreland County Tax Claim Bureau

893 CD 2021, 2022 WL 2336050, at *1 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Jun. 29, 2022) J-A09024-25

(unpublished mem.) (Iron and Steel Tax Sale).1 In 2015, Appellee

purchased the Property as an “investment property to repair and flip for

profit.” Iron and Steel Tax Sale, 2022 WL 2336050 at *2 (citation omitted).

On September 9, 2019, the Property was put up for “a tax sale by the

Westmoreland County Tax Claim Bureau for delinquent taxes” and was

purchased by Appellant, Hoberman Homes, LLC (Hoberman Homes). See

Appellee’s Am. Compl., 12/1/23, at ¶¶ 6-7; see also Iron and Steel Tax

Sale, 2022 WL 2336050 at *1-2. A deed confirming this tax sale to Hoberman

Homes was issued on December 10, 2019. See Appellee’s Am. Compl.,

12/1/23, at Ex. “B” (Tax Sale Deed, 12/10/19).

On January 10, 2020, Appellee filed a petition to set aside the tax sale

and alleged that, by this action, Appellants were “placed on notice that

[Appellee] was questioning the legal propriety of the sale and consequently

[Appellants’] legal right of control, possession, and maintenance of [the

Property].” Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Appellee alleged that Appellants were also placed

“on notice as to [Appellee’s] claims” because Appellee “requested a Motion for

Stay, a Request for a Supersedeas and other relief[;]” and had “requested

that any rental amount being received by [Appellants] be placed into an ____________________________________________

1 With regard to decisions of our sister Court, the Commonwealth Court, while

we are not bound by these decisions, “such decisions provide persuasive authority and we may turn to our colleagues on the Commonwealth court for guidance when appropriate.” Lynn v. Aria Health System, 227 A.3d 22, 32 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted and some formatting altered). Further, we may cite to unreported memoranda of the Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008 for persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

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escrow account during the pendency of the appeal to the Commonwealth

Court,” which was “yet further notice of [Appellee’s] claim to any rental

proceeds generated from the rental of the premises.” Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.

On July 6, 2021, the trial court granted Appellee’s petition to set aside

the tax sale. On August 3, 2021, the trial court entered an amended order

directing Appellee to pay $9,311.32 to Hoberman Homes as reimbursement

for the tax sale purchase price. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18; see also Iron and Steel

Tax Sale, 2022 WL 2336050 at * 3.

Appellants timely appealed the tax sale set aside order to

Commonwealth Court. See Appellee’s Am. Compl., 12/10/23, at ¶ 19. A

panel of the Commonwealth Court concluded that Appellee’s petition “was

properly granted where the [Westmoreland County Tax Claim] Bureau

conceded that it did not comply with the notice requirements of the Tax Sale

Law” and affirmed the trial court’s set aside order on June 29, 2022. Iron

and Steel Tax Sale, 2022 WL 2336050 at *10. Appellee regained possession

of the Property on or about July 5, 2022. See Appellee’s Am. Compl.,

12/10/23, at ¶ 23.

After regaining possession of the Property, Appellee commenced the

instant action by filing a complaint against Appellants on August 9, 2023.

Appellee subsequently filed an amended complaint in which it alleged that

Appellants “did not invest any proceeds into the Property, supply any labor to

the Property, or otherwise add any value to the Property.” Id. at ¶ 30 (some

formatting altered).

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Additionally, Appellee asserted that Appellants rented the Property to a

third-party tenant for a monthly amount of $1,700.00 from January 1, 2020

through June 30, 2022. Id. at ¶ 13. Because the tax sale was set aside,

Appellees asserted that Appellants “ab initio, had no right, title or interest to

the . . . Property,” and “no legal or equitable claim for the receipt or retention

of the rental payments paid from January 1, 2020, through June 30, 2022.”

Id. at ¶¶ 28, 34 (some formatting altered). Appellee further asserted that

“[a]s the owner of the . . . Property, [Appellee] is the proper party for

receiving rent for the use of the . . . Property,” and that the rental income

“collected . . . and retained by [Appellants] from January 1, 2020, until June

30, 2022, is the rightful property of [Appellee].” Id. at ¶¶ 29, 33 (some

formatting altered). Therefore, Appellee argued that Appellants’ retention of

$51,000 in rental payments “would be unjust, inequitable, and an outright

deprivation of [Appellee’s] property and contractual rights.” Id. at ¶ 35.

Finally, Appellant asserted that

[t]he benefit received by [Appellants] did not arise through passivity. Rather, [Appellants] undertook direct concerted efforts to rent [the Property] and to collect monthly rent for the use and residence of [the Property] while knowing the propriety of the same was being questioned in the [trial court]. Additionally, [Appellants] opposed any and all efforts to place the rental money in an escrow account until the litigation was resolved and legal ownership of [the Property] could be determined.

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Id. at ¶¶ 40, 41 (some formatting altered).2

Appellants subsequently filed preliminary objections to the amended

complaint in the nature of a demurrer. Therein, Appellants argued that

[t]o establish a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show some benefit conferred on defendants by the plaintiff, appreciation of such benefits by defendants, and acceptance and retention of such benefits under circumstances where it would be inequitable for defendants to retain the particular benefit without payment of value.

Appellants’ Prelim. Objs. to Am. Compl., 12/21/23, at 2 (citation omitted).

Appellants further contended that “[Appellee] did not confer any benefit on

[Appellants.]” Id.

After briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered an order

overruling Appellants’ preliminary objections and holding that Appellee’s

“allegations, when taken in the light most favorable to [Appellee], are

sufficient to set forth a claim at this stage of the pleadings.” See Trial Ct.

Order, 5/17/24, at 1; Trial Ct. Op., 10/18/24, at 2-3.

On June 5, 2024, Appellants filed a motion requesting that the trial court

amend its May 17, 2024 order to include language from 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b)

to permit it to file an immediate appeal. After the trial court denied Appellants’

motion, Appellants filed a timely petition for permission to appeal with this

____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth Court, in Iron and Steel Tax Sale, noted that Hoberman Homes had “represented to the [trial court] that it had paid $8,313.68 for the Property at the tax sale and . . . spent a total of $24,845.60 to date on the Property.” Iron and Steel Tax Sale, 2022 WL 2336050 at *2 (citation omitted).

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Court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311. This Court granted Appellants’ petition for

review on September 12, 2024. Both Appellants and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellants present the following questions:

1. Whether [Appellee’s amended complaint] sets forth a cause of action for unjust enrichment under the facts pled in that [Appellee] did not confer any “benefit” upon [Appellants].

2. Whether the [trial] court erred in its conclusion that the allegations of [Appellee’s amended complaint] are sufficient to set forth a claim for unjust enrichment.

Appellants’ Brief at 6.

Appellants’ issues are related, therefore we address them together.

Appellants argue that Appellee failed to allege “facts suggesting that it

conferred a benefit on [Appellants]” and, therefore, the trial court should have

sustained its demurrer that Appellee failed to state a claim for unjust

enrichment. Id. at 19 (some formatting altered). Specifically, Appellants

argue that Appellee did not plead that it gave anything to Appellants,

performed any work or services for Appellants, or paid any debt or saved

Appellants any expense or loss. Id. at 18. Appellants also claim that Appellee

did not allege that it was renting out the Property at the time of the tax sale

and, accordingly, Appellee had not pled that it “suffered any ‘loss’ for which

restitution may be directed.” Id.

Appellants observe that “there appears to be no statutory enactment

providing that the purchaser at tax sale is liable for rents to the original owner

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should the tax sale subsequently be declared void.” Id. at 21. In support,

Appellants direct our attention to Dubin v. County of Northumberland, 847

A.2d 769 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), in which the Commonwealth Court found that

“the plaintiffs ‘failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment because they have

failed to prove that they conferred benefits’ on the defendants,” where “the

defendants were not liable to the plaintiff landowner for the profits and

benefits received during the lease terms.” Id. (quoting Dubin, 847 A.2d at

773). Appellants conclude that the trial court erred in overruling their

preliminary objections because the facts alleged by Appellee, that is, “the use

of [Appellee’s] property to collect a monthly rent” to establish “the benefit

conferred on [Appellants,]” is “inconsistent with both appellate authority and

analogous statutory enactments.” Id. at 22-23 (citation omitted).

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on preliminary objections,

we deem all material facts averred in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom[] to be true. The purpose of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of the complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery if ultimately proven. When sustaining the trial court’s ruling will result in the denial of claim or a dismissal of suit, preliminary objections will be sustained only where the case is free and clear of doubt. With regard to preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer, we consider whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it.

Commonwealth by Shapiro v. Golden Gate National Senior Care LLC,

194 A.3d 1010, 1022 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted and some formatting

altered) (Golden Gate). “We will reverse the trial court’s decision regarding

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preliminary objections only where there has been an error of law or abuse of

discretion.” Ashton v. Aventus Pasteur, Inc., 851 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

This Court has explained:

A claim for unjust enrichment arises from a quasi-contract. A quasi-contract imposes a duty, not as a result of any agreement, whether express or implied, but in spite of the absence of an agreement, when one party receives unjust enrichment at the expense of another.

The elements of unjust enrichment are benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff, appreciation of such benefits by defendant, and acceptance and retention of such benefits under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value. Whether the doctrine applies depends on the unique factual circumstances of each case. In determining if the doctrine applies, we focus not on the intention of the parties, but rather on whether the defendant has been unjustly enriched.

Moreover, the most significant element of the doctrine is whether the enrichment of the defendant is unjust. The doctrine does not apply simply because the defendant may have benefited as a result of the actions of the plaintiff.

Stoeckinger v. Presidential Financial Corp. of Delaware Valley, 948

A.2d 828, 833 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted, some formatting altered,

and emphasis in original).

Here, the trial court stated that it

accepted [Appellee’s] allegations as true in accordance with the standard for preliminary objections” and, in so doing, found “that each of the[] elements [of unjust enrichment] were sufficiently ple[d]. [Appellee] allege[d] that the benefit conferred on [Appellants] by [Appellee] was the use of [Appellee’s] property to collect a monthly rent. [Appellants] appreciated the benefit of using [Appellee’s] property by renting the property and collecting

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the monthly rental payments. Further, [Appellants] accepted and retained the monthly rental amounts under circumstances that would be inequitable as a result of [Appellee’s] petition to set aside the tax sale, the actions taken by [Appellee] in that matter, the ruling by the [trial court] overturning the tax sale, and the appeal of that ruling with no stay during the pendency of that appeal. Based on these allegations, [Appellee’s] claims for unjust enrichment were sufficiently ple[d].

Trial Ct. Op., 10/18/24, at 4.

Based on our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion or

error of law in the trial court’s order overruling Appellants’ preliminary

objections. See Ashton, 851 A.2d at 911. As noted previously, when ruling

on preliminary objections, the trial court must evaluate the sufficiency of the

pleadings, treating all material facts alleged as true. See Golden Gate, 194

A.3d at 1022. Here, Appellee raised a claim for unjust enrichment and pled

that Appellees conferred a benefit upon Appellants when Appellants collected

monthly rent for the Property. See Appellee’s Am. Compl., 12/10/23, at ¶¶

13-40. Even if, as Appellants contend, no statute or case law establishes that

Appellants were liable to Appellee for the alleged rental income collected for

the use of the Property, the trial court was not required to conclude that it

would be impossible for Appellee to establish that it conferred a benefit upon

Appellants under a claim of unjust enrichment when ruling on a demurrer.

See Golden Gate, 194 A.3d at 1022 (directing that “[w]here a doubt exists

as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved

in favor of overruling it”). Therefore, we agree with the trial court that

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Appellee adequately pled its claim for unjust enrichment. See Stoeckinger,

948 A.2d at 833; see also Golden Gate, 194 A.3d at 1022.

Further, to the extent Appellants rely on Dubin, that case involved an

unjust enrichment claim in the context of summary judgment, not preliminary

objections. See Dubin, 847 A.2d at 771 n.7 (explaining that “[s]ummary

judgment is only appropriate when, after examining the record in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material

fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). As

noted previously, in ruling on preliminary objections, the trial court was

required to assume that all of the allegations in Appellee’s amended complaint

were true. See Golden Gate, 194 A.3d at 1022. Therefore, Dubin does not

foreclose the possibility that Appellee could establish that it conferred a benefit

upon Appellants in support of its claim of unjust enrichment. See Dubin, 847

A.2d at 771.

We are mindful that a finding of unjust enrichment depends on “the

unique factual circumstances of each case” and depends “not on the intention

of the parties, but rather on whether the defendant[s, here, Appellants] ha[ve]

been unjustly enriched.” Stoeckinger, 948 A.2d at 833 (citations omitted).

At this stage of proceedings, however, the facts, and the equitable

considerations and conclusions to be drawn from those facts, have not yet

been developed. Accordingly, Appellants are not entitled to relief on their

claims. See Golden Gate, 194 A.3d at 1022; Ashton, 851 A.2d at 911. For

these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 10/28/2025

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