Irina Farquhar v. Department of the Army

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided February 10, 2025·No. DC-0432-23-0635-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

IRINA FARQUHAR, DOCKET NUMBERS Appellant, DC-1221-17-0296-B-1 DC-0432-23-0635-I-1 v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: February 10, 2025 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Irina Farquhar , Burke, Virginia, pro se.

Jonathan A. Heller and Andrea Saglimbene , Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman* Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

*The Board members voted on this decision before January 20, 2025.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed petitions for review of the two initial decisions, which dismissed her appeals for failure to prosecute. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in these appeals, we JOIN these appeals, 2 and conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petitions for review. An administrative judge may impose the sanction of dismissal with prejudice if a party fails to prosecute or defend an appeal. Leseman v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 6 (2015); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(b). Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, the Board will not reverse an administrative judge’s determination regarding sanctions. Leseman, 122 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 6. Such a sanction should be imposed only when necessary to serve the ends of justice, such as when a party has failed to exercise basic due diligence in complying with Board orders or has exhibited negligence or bad faith in her efforts to comply. Leseman, 122 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 6. Although the failure to obey a single order does not ordinarily justify dismissal for failure to prosecute, when an appellant’s repeated failure to respond to multiple Board orders reflects a failure to exercise basic due diligence, the imposition of the sanction of dismissal for failure to prosecute has been found appropriate. Turner v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶¶ 14-16 (2016), aff’d,

2 Joinder of two or more appeals filed by the same appellant may be appropriate when joinder would expedite processing of the appeals and would not adversely affect the interests of the parties. Boechler v. Department of the Interior, 109 M.S.P.R. 542, ¶ 14 (2008), aff’d, 328 F. App’x 660 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(a)(2), (b). We find that these appeals meet the regulatory criteria, and therefore, we join them. 3

681 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Williams v. U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 377, ¶ 9 (2011); see Heckman v. Department of the Interior, 106 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 16 (2007). In a case such as this one, when an appellant’s repeated failure to comply with Board orders reflects a lack of due diligence, and the appellant has been warned of the consequences of such conduct, the sanction of dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate. Turner, 123 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 16, Leseman, 122 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 7. With her petition for review, the appellant has provided a letter from one of her treating physicians discussing her various medical conditions and treatments. Farquhar v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-23-0635-I-1, Petition for Review (0635 PFR) File, Tab 2 at 7-14. To the extent that the appellant is asserting that her failure to comply with the administrative judge’s orders should be excused based on her medical conditions, we conclude that her claim is unsupported. In the physician’s letter, he identifies that he has treated the appellant for a number of psychological and physiological conditions since 2019. Id. at 7-11. The Board has found good cause to reverse the dismissal of an appeal for failure to prosecute when the appellant has proven that her failure to respond to multiple Board orders was due to a health condition. Monley v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 27, 29-30 (1997). However, the appellant has not asserted, and the record does not show, that her various conditions prevented her from complying with the administrative judge’s orders. See Murdock v. Government Printing Office, 38 M.S.P.R. 297, 299 (1988) (declining to excuse an appellant’s failure to respond to an administrative judge’s orders when he claimed on review that he suffered from a medical condition but failed to allege or show that his condition prevented him from complying with those orders). For example, she has not asserted that she was hospitalized, incapacitated, or otherwise physically or mentally unable to understand or to respond to the Board’s orders during the relevant time period. See Malfitano v. Department of the Navy, 63 M.S.P.R. 260, 262 (1994) (finding that general claims of mental and 4

emotional impairment, unsupported by medical documentation, did not establish good cause for the untimely filing of a petition for review), aff’d, 45 F.3d 444 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Table). The appellant also states that she was receiving outpatient therapy out of state for her injuries at the time the show cause orders were issued and the status conferences occurred. 0635 PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3; Tab 6 at 12-13. To the extent she is alleging that her outpatient therapy treatment prevented her from timely responding to the administrative judge’s orders, she also has provided insufficient evidence to support this claim. See Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 57 M.S.P.R. 663, 666 (1993) (concluding that the fact that the appellant was out of town during the entire period for filing a petition for review did not constitute good cause for waiver of the filing deadline); cf. Monley, 74 M.S.P.R. at 29-30 & n.2 (1997) (finding that the appellant showed good cause for his failure to comply with the administrative judge’s orders when he submitted a sworn statement and a doctor’s letter detailing how he had been in and out of the hospital for stress-related illnesses and because of medications he had been taking, and had undergone inpatient and outpatient medical treatment during the relevant time period); Reynolds v. Department of Transportation, 17 M.S.P.R. 564, 565-56 (1983) (reversing a dismissal for failure to prosecute when the appellant missed the hearing due to medical reasons related to her third -trimester pregnancy).

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Irina Farquhar v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2025).

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Turner v. Merit Systems Protection Board
681 F. App'x 934 (Federal Circuit, 2017)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)