Ireland v. Flowserve Corp.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 21, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-01663·Unknown

Opinion

Janelle J. Sahouria (State Bar No. 253699) Kevin P. Lee (State Bar No. 296343) 50 California Street, 9th Floor San Francisco, California 94111-4615 Telephone: (415) 394-9400 Facsimile: (415) 394-9401 E-mail: Janelle.Sahouria@jacksonlewis.com E-mail: Kevin.Lee@jacksonlewis.com

Attorneys for Defendants FLOWSERVE CORP. and UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT JOHN IRELAND, Case No. 2:24-cv-1663-DJC-JDP Plaintiff, DISCOVERY MATTER v. STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER FLOWSERVE CORP, FLOWSERVE US Complaint Filed: 04/03/2024 INC. and Does 1 to 10, Trial Date: 06/01/2026 Defendants. The Parties, through their undersigned counsel of record, and subject to the Court’s approval, hereby stipulate to the entry of a Protective Order in this action as follows: 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than pursuing this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the Parties hereby stipulate to, and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The Parties acknowledge that this Protective Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the A Party’s designation of information as protected material constitutes a representation that such materials have been reviewed by Counsel and there is a good faith basis for such designation. Nothing in this Protective Order shall be construed as limiting a Party’s use of its own Highly Confidential or Confidential information. 2. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT This action is likely to involve trade secrets, customer pricing lists, and other valuable financial proprietary information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecution of this action is warranted. Such confidential and proprietary materials and information consist of, among other things, confidential business or financial information, information regarding confidential business practices. Specifically, good cause exists to designate certain documents as “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – OUTSIDE COUNSELS’ EYES ONLY” where a Designating Party and/or its counsel may have a good faith belief that the documents contain information that is among the most sensitive by the party, including but not limited to trade secret or other confidential research, development, financial or other commercial information, and that such information must be shielded from anyone within a competitor company, including in-house counsel, who might be involved in “competitive decision-making” for the competitor company. See U.S. Steel Corp v. U.S., 730 F.2d 1465, 1468 (Fed Cir. 1984); see also Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1470 (1992). Additionally, good cause also exists to designate certain documents as “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY” where a Designating Party and/or its counsel may have a good faith belief that the documents contain information that is also among the most sensitive by the party, including but not limited to trade secret or other confidential research, development, financial or other commercial information, but may not require the additional protections afforded for documents designated as “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – OUTSIDE COUNSELS’ EYES ONLY.” Finally, good cause exists to designate certain documents as “CONFIDENTIAL” where a Designating Party and/or its counsel may have a good faith belief that the unrestricted disclosure of such information in the documents could be potentially prejudicial to the business or operations of the party. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the Parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the Parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the Parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. 3. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF UNDER SEAL FILING PROCEDURE The Parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 14.3, below, that this Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Civil Rule 141 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony Electrics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated protective orders require good cause showing), and a specific showing of good cause or compelling reasons with proper evidentiary support and legal justification, must be made with respect to Protected Material that a party seeks to file under seal. The Parties’ mere designation of Disclosure or Discovery Material as HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL or CONFIDENTIAL does not— without the submission of competent evidence by declaration, establishing that the material sought to be filed under seal qualifies as confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable—constitute good cause. Further, if a party requests sealing related to a dispositive motion or trial, then compelling reasons, not only good cause, for the sealing must be shown, and the relief sought shall be narrowly tailored to serve the specific interest to be protected. See Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n., 605 F.3d 665, 677-79 (9th Cir. 2010). For each item or type of information, document, or thing sought to be filed or introduced under seal, the party seeking protection must articulate compelling reasons, supported by specific facts and legal justification, for the requested sealing order. Again, competent evidence supporting the application to file documents under seal must be provided by declaration. Any document that is not confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable in its entirety will not be filed under seal if the confidential portions can be redacted. If documents can be redacted, then a redacted version for public viewing, omitting only the confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable portions of the document, shall be filed. Any application that seeks to file documents under seal in their entirety should include an explanation of why redaction is not feasible. 4. DEFINITIONS a. “Acknowledgement” refers to the “Acknowledgement and Agreement to Be Bound” attached hereto as Exhibit A. b. “Action” means the above-entitled proceeding, Case No. 2:24-CV-01663-DJC-JDP. c. “Challenging Party” means a Party or Non-Party challenging the designation of Information or items under this Protective Order. d. “CONFIDENTIAL” Information means information (regardless of how it is generated, stored, or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under

Ireland v. Flowserve Corp., (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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