Iravani Mottaghi v. Barkey Importing Co.

134 F. Supp. 719, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4194
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 7, 1955
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 134 F. Supp. 719 (Iravani Mottaghi v. Barkey Importing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Iravani Mottaghi v. Barkey Importing Co., 134 F. Supp. 719, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4194 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

Opinion

NOONAN, District Judge.

The trial of this action was commenced on October 4, 1954. At that time, a jury having been demanded, the jury was duly empaneled and sworn, and the trial proceeded before it for over two weeks.

On October 19, 1954, however, because of certain remarks made by several of the jurors and brought to the attention of the court, the jury, at the request of counsel, was then dismissed. The trial was continued before the court, without a jury, pursuant to a stipulation to that effect dictated on the record at that'time [721]*721by the attorneys and. to which they orally agreed in open court. Further, it was then stipulated that all of the proceedings had up to that point were to be deemed had before the court without a jury.

Upon the conclusion of the trial, the submission of briefs, reply briefs and analytical computations by both parties herein, and a detailed analysis of all of the arguments and evidence in the case, this court hereby renders the following opinion in lieu of more formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The opinion is a lengthy one because of the complexity of the case and the volume of the evidence. Since the multitude of exhibits in evidence and much of the testimony serves to indicate background and business methods as well as individual commitments by the writers thereof, much of the testimony and many of the exhibits are quoted in the opinion.

Prior to the start of the trial itself the plaintiff herein had thrice altered his complaint, so that the complaint which was the basis for this trial differed considerably from his original complaint.

This court normally would not. find it necessary in the writing of its decision to comment upon the amendments to a pleading; we do so now, however, because the defendant has made it abundantly clear throughout the trial and at great length in all of its briefs that it believes that the amendments constitute evidence of bad faith or worse on the part of the plaintiff. It is the opinion of this court that those amendments signify nothing of the sort. The unusually complex and multitudinous series of transactions that gave rise to this lawsuit are a sufficient cause for the complications that arose in the pleadings.

Without going into the details of the complaint as finally amended, it will suffice for now to state that this suit is brought primarily for the alleged breach of certain contracts, and that the entire suit is broken down into ten causes of action by the plaintiff and two causes of action by the defendant by way of a counter-claim.

This court has jurisdiction over the controversy by reason of diversity of citizenship between the parties, since the plaintiff was and is a citizen and subject of the Kingdom of Iran, and the defendant was and is a corporation organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of New York, and was and is doing business in the* County, City and State of New York, during all of the times pertinent' to this action. The amount in controversy is well in excess of $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs.

Since, the jurisdiction of this court rests on diversity of citizenship, the law of the State of New York will apply to this action to the same extent as it would if the suit were tried in a New York state court.

The action arises out of certain transactions in carpet wool between the plaintiff, an importer and exporter of divers commodities who maintained his place of business in Teheran, Iran, and the defendant, a New York corporation, whose president, Jacob A. Barkey had been engaged in the import, purchase, and sale of carpet wool for a considerable period of time in New York City.

Although the plaintiff had previously done business on a large scale, the transactions that gave rise to this controversy were his first efforts in the export of wool.

Two others of the more important dra-matis personae in the earlier causes of action in this case were one Randolph Valensi (also known as “Randy”), an agent of the plaintiff, and one Robert N. Kitching, formerly an agent and employee of the defendant corporation, and now deceased.

During a portion of the period in which the transactions herein involved were pending, Kitching, as Barkey’s agent, went to and stayed in Teheran to consult with and advise Iravani.

Valensi was engaged in the City of New York in the business of acting as a broker or agent for various exporters of wool and other commodities to the Ünited [722]*722States; one of his clients was the plaintiff, Iravani.

Among the occasions wherein Valensi acted as Iravani’s agent, were those involving his transactions with Barkey.

Among other of Valensi’s duties with respect to his association with Iravani were the following: the making of agreements for the sale of Iranian carpet wool to be exported by Iravani, receiving pro forma or tentative as well as final statements of account in connection with the shipment of these wools to the defendant, receiving payments from the defendant for the wools so shipped, and communicating the oral and written communications of the parties to each other.

At all times during the negotiations that led to this suit, there was a general custom in the use of certain terms in the business of exporting and importing wool that was well known to and understood by both the plaintiff and the defendant. The terms hereinbelow set forth were understood by the parties and are intended by the court to have the following respective meanings:

(1) “Greasy wool” is wool that, at the time of its shipment to the United States, has not been washed or cleaned, and, therefore, is wool that contains a considerable quantity of impurities such as grease and dirt.
(2) “Washed wool” is a wool that, before its shipment to the United States, has had some portion of its impurities removed by washing, but not by any process of cleaning. Wool is considered washed when the sheep from which it will be shorn have been driven through a stream.
(3) “Clean wool” is a greasy or washed wool that, after its arrival in the United States, has been scoured and cleansed of all impurities that were pres-sent in the wool when shipped to the United States.
(4) “Net lb. clean basis”, or “clean basis”, means that payment for wool is to be calculated on each pound of wool that is actually yielded by the wool when, in the United States, it is transformed into clean wool as described above.
(5) “Cream wool” is wool that is not white but is a light gray in color. It is also referred to as “second white wool” or “No. 2 white wool”.
(6) “Colored wool” is wool that is neither white nor cream white, but of dark color, such as black or brown.

On about December 8,1949, in the City of New York, the plaintiff, through Mr. Valensi, and the defendant, through Jacob Barkey, entered into an agreement in writing, dated December 8, 1949, and accepted by Barkey on December 9, 1949, wherein the plaintiff agreed to sell and deliver to the defendant, and the defendant agreed to buy and accept from the plaintiff, about 350 tons of Iranian carpet wools, of Meshed white quality, each ton of 2,240 pounds net, consisting of 300 tons of greasy white wool and 50 tons of washed white wool at 60 cents (U. S. currency) per net pound clean basis. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 1).

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Bluebook (online)
134 F. Supp. 719, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4194, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/iravani-mottaghi-v-barkey-importing-co-nysd-1955.