Iran Israel Irias Ucles v. Caliber Holdings, LLC et al.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: April 15, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00897
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

4 JS-6

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12

13 IRAN ISRAEL IRIAS UCLES, Case No.: 2:26-cv-00897-MEMF-BFM

14 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 15 v. REMAND [DKT. NO. 7]

16 CALIBER HOLDINGS, LLC et al,

17 Defendants. 18 19 20 21 22

23 Before the Court is the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff Iran Israel Irias Ucles. Dkt. No. 7 24 (“Motion”). The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument See Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby GRANTS the 26 Motion. 27

28 1 I. Background 2 A. Factual Background1 3 Plaintiff Iran Israel Irias Ucles (“Ucles”), a 42-year-old Hispanic male, was employed by 4 Defendants for over seven years from October 2015, until his termination on or about February 10, 5 2023. Compl. ¶ 11. Ucles was hired by Regional Manager Mike Townley to the position of Paint 6 Department Manager. Id. At all times during his employment, Ucles performed his job duties in an 7 exemplary manner. Id. 8 In or around November 2018, Ucles suffered a back injury while helping coworkers move a 9 vehicle without a forklift. Id. ¶ 12. Two days later, Ucles became concerned that the pain would 10 become exacerbated by working. Id. As such, Ucles reported his injury to his manager. Id. However, 11 rather than discuss what, if any accommodation could be afforded to Ucles, Ucles’ manager 12 pressured him to continue working. Id. As a result, Ucles was forced to continue working without 13 accommodation. Id. Defendants’ failure to accommodate Ucles ultimately exacerbated his condition. 14 Id. 15 In or around March 2019, Ucles requested two weeks of paternity leave from General 16 Manager R. DOE, for the birth of his daughter. Id. ¶ 13. However, R. Doe denied the request. Id. 17 Ucles was only able to take one day off for his daughter’s birth and to care for his partner during her 18 recovery. Id. Following R. Doe’s refusal to provide him with leave, Ucles complained to Regional 19 Manager, Rocio Gutierrez. Id. However, rather than address Ucles’ complaint, Gutierrez dismissed 20 his concerns. Id. 21 In or around August 2019, Ucles began experiencing respiratory issues. Id. As a result, he 22 requested protective gear from General Manager, Nino Sgro, and Gutierrez. Id. The masks that Ucles 23 had been using were several years old, and insufficient in light of his asthma. Id. However, rather 24 than discussing this, or a potential alternative accommodation, Defendants disregarded Ucles’s 25

26 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the following factual background is derived from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Dkt. 27 No. 1-1 (“Compl.”). For the purposes of this Motion, the Court treats these factual allegations as true, but at this stage of the litigation, the Court makes no finding on the truth of these allegations and is therefore not—at 28 this stage—finding that they are true. 1 requested accommodation. Id. At various times throughout 2019 and 2020, Ucles renewed his 2 request for accommodations, however, his complaints were continually ignored. Id. 3 As a result of being denied accommodations, in or around December 2019, Ucles filed a 4 complaint with the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Id. After receiving 5 notice of Ucles’ complaint, Sgro became angry and scolded Ucles for making his complaint. Id. 6 Thereafter, Ucles received a retaliatory write-up from Sgro, falsely accusing him of attendance and 7 work quality issues. Id. Ucles objected to this write-up, believing it to be issued in retaliation. Id. 8 However, his objections fell on deaf ears. Id. 9 In or around late March 2020, Ucles requested time off from General Manager A. DOE, for 10 the birth of his daughter and to care for his disabled partner. Id. In response, A. Doe denied Ucles’ 11 paternity leave without justification. Id. 12 In or around December 2022, Ucles made a complaint to Ray Solis, the Human Resources 13 Department and General Manager, and Shirley Curran, the Human Resources Manager, about being 14 precluded from receiving meal and rest breaks and being required to work unpaid overtime. Id. Solis 15 disregarded this complaint, claiming that since Ucles was commission-based, he was not entitled to 16 overtime pay. Id. In fact, Ucles was to be paid on a piece-rate compensation plan in addition to his 17 hourly wage. Id. Nonetheless, Ucles’ complaint was never addressed or otherwise rectified. Id. 18 In or around 2022, Ucles made a complaint to management regarding employees smoking 19 next to the paint spray booth. Id. Specifically, he complained about the serious health and safety 20 issues arising from smoking near combustible materials involved in painting. Id. Despite his 21 complaint, no investigation was conducted nor was any remediation undertaken. Id. Notably, 22 General Manager, Jose Serrano, was aware of this practice and was present during and even joined 23 in on conversations with other employees while they smoked. Id. 24 In or around December 2022, when Ucles returned from the bathroom, Jack DOE, an 25 Estimator, stated, “The way you guys paint, you should go paint in Tijuana.” Id. Ucles was deeply 26 offended by this comment that he believed was directed at his race. Id. Accordingly, Ucles 27 complained about the remark to Curran. Id. However, Curran disregarded his complaint, appearing 28 1 to take the view that Ucles should accept such comments because they were common in the 2 workplace. Id. 3 Later that month, Ucles and Edgar DOE, a Detailer, were written up for allegedly drinking 4 alcohol on the job. Id. It was regular practice for employees to drink alcohol on the premises after 5 work hours. Id. Despite this, Ucles and E. Doe were the first ever to receive write-ups for allegedly 6 doing so. Id. Ucles objected to Curran’s write-up and requested that Defendants review the 7 surveillance cameras to confirm that he had not in fact been drinking. Id. However, Curran denied 8 this request, leading Ucles to believe the allegations were being manufactured to terminate him. Id. 9 Later that month, Vahan Gabriyelyan, a Regional Manager, and Serrano called Ucles into the 10 office. Id. During that meeting, they informed Ucles that there were issues with his work. Id. 11 However, this was the first time Ucles was made aware of any such issues, and nonetheless, the 12 assertions regarding his performance directly conflicted with the performance metrics he regularly 13 received regarding his performance. Id. As such, this left Ucles feeling as though he was being 14 targeted. Id. 15 In or around early January 2023, Ucles made a second complaint to Cal OSHA, this time 16 regarding the employees who continued to smoke next to the paint spray booth. Id. Specifically, 17 Ucles complained to Cal OSHA that he had raised this issue with Defendants on multiple occasions, 18 but to no avail. Id. In response, Ucles was instructed by Cal OSHA to leave the premises with his 19 workers when this occurred and pending an investigation. Id. That same month, Ucles began having 20 serious respiratory issues, shoulder pain, and headaches. Id. Thereafter, he acquired a doctor's note 21 and requested a medical leave. Id. Ucles sent the doctor’s note to Curran and Gabriyelyan. Id. 22 Following his return from leave in or around late January 2023, Ucles learned of a company- 23 wide rumor that he was going to be terminated. Id. Later that month, Serrano told Ucles that he had 24 corporate approval to fire him for any mistake he might make. Id. 25 On February 10, 2023, Gabriyelyan and Dustin Doe, a manager, terminated Ucles. Id. ¶ 14. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Procedural History On October 17, 2025, Ucles filed a Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court 2 asserting causes of action against Caliber2 for: (1) discrimination in violation of the California Fair 3 Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) hostile work environment harassment in violation of 4 the PEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of the FEHA; ( 4) failure to provide reasonable 5 accommodation in violation of the FEHA; (5) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation 6 of FEHA; (6) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation in violation of FEHA; (7) 7 negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (8) wrongful termination of employment in violation of 8 public policy; (9) whistleblower retaliation (California Labor Code § 1102.5); (10) 9 discipline/discharge for disclosing working conditions (California Labor Code § 232.5); (11) 10 retaliation for workplace safety complaints (California Labor Code § 631 0); (12) violation of 11 California Labor Code § 6311; (13) retaliation for exercising rights (California Labor Code § 98 .6); 12 ( 14) violation of Labor Code § 6400; (15) CFRA leave retaliation; (16) failure to provide meal and 13 rest breaks (California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 226.2, 512, 516, 558; (17) rest period violations 14 (California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 226.2, 516, 558); (18) failure to pay all overtime wages (California 15 Labor Code §§ 204 510, 558, 1194, 1198); and (19) intentional infliction of emotional distress 16 against Caliber Holdings of California LLC and Caliber Holdings L.L.C. See Compl. 17 On January 28, 2026, Caliber removed the action to this Court. Dkt. No. 1 (“NOR”). On 18 February 25, 2026, Ucles filed a First Amended Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court. 19 Dkt. No. 7-3. 20 On February 27, 2026, Ucles filed the instant Motion. Motion. On March 13, 2026, Caliber 21 filed an Opposition to the Motion. Dkt. No. 9 (“Opposition”). On March 20, 2026, Ucles filed a 22 Reply. Dkt. No. 10 (“Reply”). 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27

28 1 II. Applicable Law 2 In general, “any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United 3 States have original jurisdiction may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district 4 court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have jurisdiction over “diversity” cases, between 5 “citizens of different States.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025). 6 Diversity jurisdiction requires that (1) all plaintiffs be of different citizenship from all defendants, 7 and (2) the amount in controversy exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 8 1332(a). 9 With respect to the amount-in-controversy requirement, the district court first considers 10 whether it is “facially apparent” from the complaint that at least $75,000 is in controversy. Singer v. 11 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). When this is not apparent from 12 the complaint, the amount in controversy alleged by the defendant is normally accepted. Jauregui v. 13 Roadrunner Transportation Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2022). However, if the plaintiff 14 contests the amount in controversy, “both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a 15 preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount in controversy requirement has been 16 satisfied.” Id. (quoting Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 88). In addition to considering the facts presented 17 in the removal petition, defendants can submit any “summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to 18 the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” See Singer, 116 F.3d at 377. (quoting Allen v. R 19 & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335–36 (5th Cir. 1995)). 20 The removing party may rely on “a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions” so long as 21 “the reasoning and underlying assumptions are reasonable.” Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 993 (quoting 22 LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 2015)). These assumptions may be 23 reasonable if they are grounded in the allegations of the complaint. Arias v. Residence Inn by 24 Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2019). 25 III. Discussion 26 Ucles contends that Caliber failed to: (1) demonstrate complete diversity; (2) establish 27 fraudulent joinder; and (3) meet the requisite amount in controversy. Motion at 6-7. In response, 28 Caliber asserts that: (1) Ucles did not comply with Local Rule 7-3; (2) the First Amended Complaint 1 is improper; and (3) it sufficiently established the amount in controversy. See generally Opposition. 2 For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants the Motion. 3 A. Denial of the Motion For Noncompliance With Local Rule 7-3 Is Not Warranted. 4 Local Rule 7-3 provides that for all motions, counsel “must first contact opposing counsel to 5 discuss thoroughly, preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential 6 resolution.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-3. “The conference must take place in person, by telephone, or via 7 video conference at least 7 days prior to the filing of the motion.” Id. Pursuant to the Court’s Civil 8 Standing Order, “[t]he Court may strike or outright deny a motion or other relief if counsel fails to 9 meet and confer in good faith.” Civil Standing Order § VIII(A). 10 As an initial matter, Caliber argues that Ucles “failed to meet and confer as required by Local 11 Rule 7-3.” Opposition at 11. Ucles concedes that the “parties have not yet held a conference . . . to 12 discuss the issues in the instant motion substantively.” Motion at 3. 13 The Court notes that Ucles did email Caliber’s counsel on February 25, 2026. Dkt. No. 7-1 ¶ 14 8. However, as stated by Caliber, this correspondence was made only two days before the Motion 15 deadline and thus, Ucles failed to “meet timely and confer [seven] days prior to filing” the Motion. 16 C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-3; Opposition at 12; Dkt. No. 12-1 ¶ 6. As such, Ucles has failed to comply with 17 Local Rule 7-3. Although Ucles has failed to comply with Local Rule 7-3, it appears that Ucles 18 attempted to meet and confer with Caliber in good faith and thus, the Court will not deny the Motion 19 on this basis. The parties are admonished that future failures to comply with Court Orders may result 20 in the Court declining to consider the parties’ briefing. B. The First Amended Complaint Is Improper. 21 Ucles provides that the First Amended Complaint is the operative complaint that determines 22 jurisdiction. Motion at 5. Caliber contends that the First Amended Complaint is improper and has no 23 legal effect on the basis that: (1) it was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court after the Notice of 24 Removal; and (2) Ucles failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Opposition at 25 13-14. 26 Here, Ucles filed the original Complaint on October 17, 2025, in Los Angeles Superior 27 Court. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3. Caliber removed the action to federal court on January 28, 2026. Dkt. No. 28 1 1. And Ucles filed its First Amended Complaint on February 25, 2026, in Los Angeles Superior 2 Court. Dkt. No. 7-3. 3 First, once Caliber removed the action to federal court, the Los Angeles Superior Court 4 lacked jurisdiction over this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (“[T]he State court[, once the action is 5 removed,] shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.”). Thus, Ucles’s First 6 Amended Complaint has no legal effect on the Court’s analysis. 7 Second, even if the First Amended Complaint was filed in this Court, Ucles failed to comply 8 with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a 9 party seeking to amend an Answer may do so once “as a matter of course” within twenty-one days 10 after serving it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). A party seeking to amend an Answer more than twenty- 11 one (21) days after serving it “may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written 12 consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Because the First Amended Complaint was filed one hundred and thirty-one (131) 14 days after the original Complaint, Ucles was required to seek leave of court or Caliber’s consent. As 15 Ucles did obtain either the Court’s leave or Caliber’s consent, the First Amended Complaint fails to 16 comply with Rule 15. Id. Given this, his reliance on Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 17 U.S. 22, 39 (2025) is unavailing because there, the plaintiff properly amended the original complaint 18 and thus, the first amended complaint was operative. 19 Taken together, the First Amended Complaint is improper and has no legal effect. 20 C. The Amount in Controversy Is Not Satisfied. 21 The Court will first address whether Caliber has satisfied its burden to demonstrate the 22 amount of controversy. Caliber argues that it “has thoroughly and sufficiently laid out the relevant 23 authority and ample evidence to establish the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Opposition 24 at 23. Ucles claims that the amount in controversy is unclear because he did not provide an amount 25 and Caliber’s computations are based on speculative assumptions. Motion at 10-11. 26 Because Ucles contests the amount in controversy presented in the Notice of Removal, 27 Caliber bears the burden of presenting summary judgment type evidence and demonstrating by a 28 preponderance of the evidence that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been met. Caliber 1 does not present any such evidence in its Opposition and relies solely on the Adams Declaration, 2 which was attached to the Notice of Removal. But the Adams Declaration merely establishes that 3 payroll records indicate that Ucles “earned an hourly base pay rate of $31.92 / hour.” Dkt. No. 1-3 ¶ 4 6. There is no evidence as to the hours worked by Ucles or anything else that would establish his 5 back pay or front pay. In his Original Complaint, Ucles asserts that he has suffered harm “including 6 lost past and future income and employment benefits, damage to his career, and lost wages, 7 overtime, unpaid expenses, and penalties, as well as interest on unpaid wages.” Compl. ¶ 15. 8 Because Ucles was terminated in February 2023 and would be entitled to back pay and front pay 9 under California Labor Code § 1102.5, Caliber argues that the possible recovery from February 2023 10 to the present is at least $132,787.20. Dkt. No. 1-3 ¶¶ 5-6, 8. Although Caliber states that the 11 $31.92/hour rate of pay is based on a review of employment records, it does not state or show that 12 the $132,787.20 is based upon the employment records—or any reasonable assumptions. In 13 particular, Caliber fails to detail the “number of hours per week used, whether overtime work is 14 included, or whether the calculation assumes full-time work.” Reply at 8. Thus, Caliber’s 15 computation is based on speculative assumptions, and the wage-loss calculation is not sufficiently 16 supported. And because punitive damages are derived from the compensatory damages, Caliber has 17 also failed to substantiate its punitive damages computations. Roby v. McKesson Corp., 219 P.2d 18 749, 770-71 (Cal. 2009). 19 Further, in the Notice of Removal, Caliber claims that since Ucles alleges emotional distress 20 damages, Compl. ¶¶ 16, 24, 32, 39, 47, 55, 63, 71, 78, 86, 91, 97, 105, 113, 130-132, then such 21 damages should be included in the amount in controversy. NOR ¶¶ 32-33. In particular, Caliber 22 states that emotional distress damages at stake are at least $75,000. Id. Ucles similarly argues that 23 Caliber did not submit any evidence reasonably quantifying its emotion distress damage 24 computation. Reply at 9. Caliber cites to Gardenhire v. Hous. Auth., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, (Cal. Ct. 25 App. 2000), contending that California courts have determined emotional distress damages of 26 $125,000 in employment disputes. NOR ¶ 33. But as emphasized by Ucles, the Original Complaint 27 does not set forth a quantifiable amount. See Compl; Reply at 9. And Caliber “does not connect the 28 cited verdict to [Ucles’] specific pleaded facts, claimed severity, duration, medical treatment, or 1 | other case-specific indicators.” Jd. As such, Caliber has failed to provide summary judgment type 2 || evidence to support its amount in controversy claim as to emotional distress damages. 3 The Court also finds that Caliber failed to substantiate its attorneys’ fees computation. In the 4 | Notice of Removal, Caliber suggests that attorneys’ fees are recoverable and relies on Ninth Circuit 5 | precedent holding that attorneys’ fees can be included in the amount in controversy. NOR {ff 34-36. 6 || Beyond its assertion that attorneys’ fees are recoverable, Caliber does not discuss “expected hours, 7 | rates, staffing, or litigation stage.” Reply at 9. Thus, Caliber does not provide a reasonable basis for 8 | attorneys’ fee amount in this matter. 9 Taken together, the Court finds that Caliber has failed to demonstrate that the amount in 10 | controversy exceeds $75,000. 1] Accordingly, the Court finds that it does not have diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 12 | 1332, and the Court therefore need not reach the other arguments of the parties. 13 IV. Conclusion 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and ORDERS as follows: 15 1. The Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 7) is GRANTED. 16 2. The Case is REMANDED to the Superior Court of California for the County of Los 17 Angeles. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 Af 21 Dated: April 15, 2026 22 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28