I.Q. v. A.Q.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

I.Q. v. A.Q.

228 A.D.2d 301, 643 N.Y.2d 587, 643 N.Y.S.2d 587, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7122

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 18, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 228 A.D.2d 301 (I.Q. v. A.Q.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

I.Q. v. A.Q., 228 A.D.2d 301, 643 N.Y.2d 587, 643 N.Y.S.2d 587, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7122 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

Domestic strife is a recognized standard for an award of temporary exclusive possession (Belli Venneri v Belli Venneri, 120 AD2d 238, 240). The existence of such strife is defendant’s stated reason for having left the marital home, and his use for storage of a portion of it—a second apartment that was combined with the first and then separated again by stipulation after commencement of the action. There being no dispute of a significant potential for strife should defendant return, and no genuine issue raised that defendant’s exclusion would cause him more than minimal disruption, the motion court’s award of temporary exclusive possession, without a hearing, was a proper exercise of discretion (see, Judell v Judell, 128 AD2d 416; Tillinger v Tillinger, 141 AD2d 535). Defendant’s remedy for any inequity in this temporary award is a speedy trial (Wolfe v Wolfe, 111 AD2d 809). Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Ross, Tom and Mazzarell, JJ.

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Domestic strife is a recognized standard for an award of temporary exclusive possession (Belli Venneri v Belli Venneri, 120 AD2d 238, 240). The existence of such strife is defendant’s stated reason for having left the marital home, and his use for storage of a portion of it—a second apartment that was combined with the first and then separated again by stipulation after commencement of the action. There being no dispute of a significant potential for strife should defendant return, and no genuine issue raised that defendant’s exclusion would cause him more than minimal disruption, the motion court’s award of temporary exclusive possession, without a hearing, was a proper exercise of discretion (see, Judell v Judell, 128 AD2d 416; Tillinger v Tillinger, 141 AD2d 535). Defendant’s remedy for any inequity in this temporary award is a speedy trial (Wolfe v Wolfe, 111 AD2d 809). Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Ross, Tom and Mazzarell, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

228 A.D.2d 301, 643 N.Y.2d 587, 643 N.Y.S.2d 587, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/iq-v-aq-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

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