IPCOMM, LLC. v. Group Rossignol USA, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJuly 22, 2020
Docket3:20-cv-00272
StatusUnknown

This text of IPCOMM, LLC. v. Group Rossignol USA, Inc. (IPCOMM, LLC. v. Group Rossignol USA, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
IPCOMM, LLC. v. Group Rossignol USA, Inc., (S.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

5 6

7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 IPCOMM, LLC, Case No. 20-cv-272-BAS-RBB 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 12 DISMISS

13 v. [ECF No. 8]

14 GROUP ROSSIGNOL USA, INC. et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17

18 Plaintiff IPCOMM, LLC filed a complaint for patent infringement. 19 Defendants Group Rossignol USA, Inc. and PIQ USA Inc. move to dismiss the 20 complaint. (“Mot.,” ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion, 21 (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 9) to which Defendants replied (“Reply,” ECF No. 10). The 22 Court finds resolution of this matter is suitable without the need for oral argument. 23 See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the 24 Motion. 25 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 26 Plaintiff is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 8,612,181 (the ‘181 patent), entitled 27 “Wireless System for Monitoring and Analysis of Skiing.” (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1, 1 a ski monitoring system called the PIQ ROBOT. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.) “[T]he PIQ ROBOT 2 is an electronic tracker with Bluetooth connectivity that attaches to a user’s ski boot 3 and allows a user to track data on that user’s ski runs down a slope via the user’s 4 smartphone or tablet running iOS or Android (“computing device”). The computing 5 device can access the Internet using Wide Area Network (WAN), cellular wireless 6 interface, or Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), Wi-Fi.” (Id. ¶ 16.) 7 Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing the claim of infringement 8 is insufficiently pled. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A complaint must plead sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief 11 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 12 quotation marks and citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 13 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 14 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 15 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 16 Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 18 must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must construe 19 them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. 20 Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a Rule 21 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, 22 it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 23 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may 24 be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient 25 facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare 26 Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 27 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). 1 regional circuit. K–Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 2 1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the Ninth Circuit, to be entitled to the presumption 3 of truth, a complaint’s allegations “must contain sufficient allegations of underlying 4 facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” 5 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 6 (2012). Additionally, the pleading standards under Twombly and Iqbal—not Form 7 18—now govern claims for direct infringement of a patent. Footbalance Sys. Inc. v. 8 Zero Gravity Inside, Inc., No. 15-CV-1058 JLS (DHB), 2016 WL 5786936, at *2–3 9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016). 10 III. ANALYSIS 11 A. Plaintiff’s Objection 12 Before diving into the merits, the Court must address Plaintiff’s objection to 13 Defendants’ filing of the present Motion without meeting and conferring with 14 Plaintiff’s counsel. (See Opp’n at 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel spoke with French counsel 15 for Defendant PIQ and Utah counsel for Defendant Rossignol in late 2019. 16 Plaintiff’s counsel was told he would receive requested information, but the 17 information never came, so Plaintiff filed suit. Plaintiff agreed to extend Defendants’ 18 time to respond to April 24, 2020. This was done in an attempt to resolve the case 19 and because Plaintiff believed it would receive needed information. On April 24, 20 Defendants filed the present Motion. Plaintiff objects because Defendants did not 21 meet and confer before filing. 22 Indeed, this Court’s chambers rules state that parties must meet and confer at 23 least seven days prior to the filing of any noticed motion. Defendants inform the 24 Court that their current counsel was retained on April 22, 2020, and a response was 25 due two days later. (Reply at 1.) Their current counsel “were not aware of the extent 26 of the communications among Plaintiff’s counsel, PIQ’s French counsel, and 27 Rossignol’s Utah counsel.” (Id.) And while Defendants admit they did not meet and 1 due to the deadline, but they did attempt to contact Plaintiff’s counsel on April 24, 2 2020. (“Ma. Decl.,” ECF No. 10-2.) 3 After reviewing the facts and timelines, the Court finds that it is not in the 4 interest of judicial economy to deny the Motion for failure to meet and confer. 5 Defendants are instructed to comply with this Court’s standing orders throughout the 6 remainder of case. The Court also denies Plaintiff’s request for sanctions. 7 B. Direct Infringement 8 To state a claim for direct patent infringement, a plaintiff must allege that the 9 defendant, “without authority[,] makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 10 invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see also Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 11 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 12 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990)). “To prove 13 infringement, the patentee must show that an accused product embodies all 14 limitations of the claim either literally or by the doctrine of equivalents.” Cephalon, 15 Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “To establish 16 literal infringement, every limitation set forth in a claim must be found in the accused 17 product, exactly.” Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d 18 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 19 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Under the doctrine of equivalents, ‘a product or 20 process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may 21 nonetheless be found to infringe if there is “equivalence” between the elements of 22 the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.’” 23 DePuy Spine, Inc. v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
IPCOMM, LLC. v. Group Rossignol USA, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ipcomm-llc-v-group-rossignol-usa-inc-casd-2020.